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ARTICLE
PERVERSE INCENTIVES: WHY EVERYONE
PREFERS HIGH DRUG PRICES-EXCEPT
FOR THOSE WHO PAY THE BILLS
ROBIN FELDMAN*
ABSTRACT
Health care spending rarely follows an ordinary, rational model. Yet even
in that context, prescription drug prices are rising at a puzzling rate. What is
causing the phenomenon? Quite simply, incentives percolating throughout the
prescription drug market push players toward higher prices. At the center lies
the highly secretive and concentrated Pharmacy Benefit Manager (PBM) indus-
try middle players who negotiate between drug companies and health insurers
by arranging for rebates and establishing coverage levels for patients. Contracts
between drug companies and the middle players are closely guarded secrets.
The PBM customers, including Medicare, private insurers, and even their audi-
tors, generally are not permitted access to the terms. And the middle players are
not alone; everyone is feeding at the trough.
Markets, like gardens, grow best in the sun. They wither without informa-
tion. Thus, one should not be surprised to see competitive distortions and subop-
timal outcomes.
Despite the extreme secrecy, details have begun to seep out-through case
documents (including recent contract disputes among parties), government re-
ports, reports to shareholders, and industry insider reports. Piecing together
these sources, this Article presents a full picture of incentive structures in which
higher-priced drugs receive favorable treatment, and patients are channeled to-
wards more expensive medicines. In exchange for financial incentives structured
in different ways to appeal to hospitals, insurers, doctors, and even patient advo-
cacy groups, drug companies ensure that lower-priced substitutes cannot gain a
foothold. It is a win-win for everyone, except of course for taxpayers and society.
This Article also analyzes popular proposals that are unlikely to work and sug-
gests approaches for aligning incentives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Prescription drug prices are rising at an alarming and puzzling pace.
Prices for branded drugs rose 12.4% in 2015 alone;1 between 2014 and the
' Neeraj Sood, Dana Goldman & Karen Van Nuys, Follow the Money to Understand How
Drug Profits Flow, STAT (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/12/15/prescription-
drug-profits-pbm/ [perma.ccIW8ZJ-RRM6] (citing MURRAY AITKEN, QUINTILES IMS INST.,
MEDICINES USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW OF 2015 AND OUTLOOK To 2020 2, 8
(2016)); see also Hannah Brennan, Amy Kapczynski, Christine H. Monahan & Zain Rizvi, A
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end of 2018 prices increased 60%.2 Federal government reports show that
price jumps were particularly dramatic for many drugs, with some prices
increasing up to 500%.3 The list price of drugs tells only part of the story,
given the many rebate and discount processes that exist within the industry.4
Nevertheless, real spending for drugs is rising as well. The government
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) projects that the in-
crease in national drug spending will more than double in 2018 from the
prior year's significant rise.5 In 2017, this increase in spending outpaced in-
creased health care spending as a whole and the 2017-2018 consumer price
Prescription for Excessive Drug Pricing: Leveraging Government Patent Use for Health, 18
YALE J.L. & TECH. 275, 284 (2016) (describing soaring drug prices caused by profit margins
reaching an estimated 42%); Jordan Paradise, A Profile of Bio-Pharma Consolidation Activity,
25 ANN. HEALTH L. 34, 41 (2016) (noting that the price for "the type 2 diabetes drug
Glumetza . . . rose 800 percent"); Carly J. Goeman, Note, The Price Isn't Right: Shareholder
Proposals as Opportunities for Institutional Investors to Restore Firm Value and Reduce Phar-
maceutical Prices, 2017 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 748, 755 n. 22 (2017) (stating that "Valeant's
product Nitropress rose by 525% in price" and "Isuprel rose 212%"); Brendan Murphy, Note,
Getting High On Profits: An Analysis of Current State and Federal Proposals to Rein in Soar-
ing Drug Prices, 12 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 37, 37 (2016) (criticizing Martin Shkreli's deci-
sion to hike the price of Daraprim by 5,000% overnight); Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T.
Boller, Enabling Competition in the Pharmaceutical Markets 34 (Hutchins Ctr. On Fiscal &
Monetary Pol'y at Brookings, Working Paper No. 30, 2017).
2 Rabah Kamal et al., What are the Recent and Forecasted Trends in Prescription Drug
Spending?, PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH Sys. TRACKER (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.healthsys-
temtracker.org/chart-collection/recent-forecasted-trends-prescription-drug-spending/#item-
prices-for-common-generic-drugs-have-dropped-by-37-since-2014-while-branded-drug-prices-
have-increased-by-over-60_2019 [https://perma.cc/83DM-WAHU].
3U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-201, BRAND-NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUG
PRICING: LACK OF THERAPEUTICALLY EQUIVALENT DRUGS AND LIMITED COMPETITION MAY
CONTRIBUTE To EXTRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASES 11 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 Gov'T Ac-
COUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT]; see also Michael G. Daniel, Timothy M. Pawlik, Amanda N.
Fader, Nestor F. Esnaola & Martina A. Makary, The Orphan Drug Act: Restoring the Mission
to Rare Diseases, 39 AM. J. CLINICIAL ONCOLOGY 210, 211 (2015) (citing the example of
imatinib, a treatment for chronic myelogenous leukemia, which cost $30,000 a year when it
was introduced in 2001, but whose price had more than tripled to $92,000 a year by 2012).
4 Dylan Scott, Inside the Impossibly Byzantine World of Prescription Drug Prices, STAT
(Dec. 21, 2015), https://www.statnews.com/2015/12/21/prescription-drug-prices-confusion/
[https://perma.ccIW62W-UE4E] (describing secretive discount and rebate systems and ex-
plaining that the list price is the company's opening bid).
'Ed Silverman, Spending Growth on Prescription Drugs Will Double This Year, STAT
(Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2018/02/14/prescription-drugs-spend-
ing-cms/ [https://perma.cc/V6B6-MAHP] (citing Cuckler et al., National Health Expenditure
Projections, 2017-26: Despite Uncertainty, Fundamentals Primarily Drive Spending Growth,
37 HEALTH AFF., 3, 5 (Feb. 2018)); see also NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE, GURU MADHAVAN &
SHARYL J. NASS, MAKING MEDICINES AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 75 (The Nat'l
Acads. Press 2017) [hereinafter NAS REPORT] (showing that although the rate of increase in
spending for prescription drugs in 2016 slowed from the year before to an increase of only
5.8%, that growth rate was still double the rate of increase in 2013; spending rates in 2014 and
2015 rose 10.3% and 12.4% respectively).
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index. 6 All of this, despite the fact that roughly 80% of the prescriptions in
this country are filled using generic drugs.7
This Article analyzes and explains this phenomenon, which has puzzled
modern commentators and policymakers alike. Many academic analyses to
date have focused on entry barriers and activities that prevent lower-priced
generic drugs from getting to market-such as extensions of patent and non-
patent exclusivities, attempts to block generic approval at the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and Pay-for-Delay court settlements that keep lower-
cost drugs off the market. In contrast, this Article focuses on a more troub-
ling section of market activity that occurs after generics clear the patent and
regulatory hurdles. Having finally cleared those substantial hurdles, generics
face a new threat from the shadowy and byzantine system of drug distribu-
tion, data ownership and manipulation, and reimbursement schemes.
Why do drug prices stubbornly continue to rise, despite the promise of
competition after patents expire? Quite simply, the phenomenon occurs be-
cause internal incentives push every market participant in the chain of cus-
tody toward behaviors that push prices higher. At the center of the system
lies the highly secretive and highly concentrated industry known as Phar-
macy Benefit Managers or PBMs. These middle players negotiate prices be-
tween branded drug companies and those who pay the bills, arranging for
rebates from various drug companies. They also establish what are known as
the formularies, schedules that set the terms on which patients can access
particular drugs and the reimbursement rates patients will get. The contracts
6 Compare BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN
THE U.S. CITY AVERAGE, ALL URBAN CONSUMERS, SEASONALLY ADJUSTED (2018) (showing a
2.4% increase in the Consumer Price Index for prescription drugs from January 2017 to Janu-
ary 2018) with Silverman, supra note 5 (noting a 2.9% increase in spending on prescription
drugs in 2017).
' See How Critics Say Drug Companies Play "Games" to Stave Off Generic Competitors,
CBS NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/drug-companies-alleged-tactics-de-
lay-cheaper-generic-drugs/ [perma.cc/526J-HSGA] (quoting industry spokesperson); see also
RACHEL SCHMIDT & SHINOBU SUZUKI, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMN, THE MEDI-
CARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG PROGRAM (PART D): STATUS REPORT 11 (2018) (showing that
growth in brand price more than offset effects of generic use in Medicare Part D).
See generally ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: How BIG PHARMA
RAISES PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 16, 86, 97 (2017); Matthew Avery,
Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Fail-
ure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171 (2008); Michael A. Carrier & Daryl
Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 CARDozo L. REV. 249 (2016); Michael A.
Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100 IOWA L. REV. 7 (2014); Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World
Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA.
L. REV. 1009 (2010); Jessie Cheng, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharma-
ceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471 (2008); Robin Feldman, May Your Drug Price be
Evergreen, 5 J.L. & BioscI. 590 (2018); Robin Feldman & Connie Wang, A Citizen's Pathway
Gone Astray - Delaying Competition from Generic Drugs, 376 N. ENG. J. MED. 1499 (2017);
Robin Feldman et al., Empirical Evidence of Drug Pricing Games -A Citizen's Pathway Gone
Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39 (2017); Robin Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A
New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499 (2016); C.
Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking to
Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (2009).
Perverse Incentives
between drug companies and the PBMs are a closely-guarded secret, with
the details known only to the drug companies and the PBMs. Government
entities and the private insurers who pay the bills are not permitted to see the
full terms of the contracts. Even health plan auditors generally are not per-
mitted full access to the contract terms.9 PBMs provide periodic rebates to
the health plans without providing full information regarding the actual net
pricing for any particular drugs. Markets thrive on information, and from the
standpoint of competition, such an industry design is less than ideal.
Through a variety of sources-government reports, state Medicaid ac-
tions, industry insider reports, case documents-the terms of these secret
contracts are seeping into public view. Piecing together information from
these original sources, this Article for the first time presents a full picture of
the perverse profit-taking incentive structures and demonstrates how using
drugs with higher prices operates in the interests of so many players-in-
cluding doctors, clinics, hospitals, group purchasing organizations, wholesal-
ers, PBMs, brand drug companies, health plans, patient assistance programs,
and patient advocacay groups. Payment flows are structured so that higher
prices benefit the intermediaries. These structures also lead to circumstances
in which higher priced drugs receive more favorable reimbursement treat-
ment, and patients are channeled towards more expensive drugs.
In addition, the system operates to support competition-free zones for
pharmaceutical companies. The perverse incentive structures allow pharma-
ceutical companies to share monopoly rents with parties at each level of the
market in an effort to maintain their position at the top of the market. In
exchange for financial payoffs,10 structured in different ways to appeal to
different groups, drug companies can ensure that as lower-priced substitutes
9See Linda Cahn, Don't Get Trapped By PBMs' Rebate Labeling Games, MANAGED CARE
(Jan. 1, 2009), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2009/1/don-t-get-trapped-pbms-re-
bate-labeling-games [perma.cc/3G3X-9EHF] (explaining that audit materials are limited to
client-specific materials, and given that rebates are not client-specific, the PBM can refuse to
provide information about them); Michael Hiltzik, How 'Price-Cutting' Middlemen Are Mak-
ing Crucial Drugs Vastly More Expensive, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/
business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-pbm-drugs-20170611-story.html [perma.cc/7ZSL-DC9N] (quot-
ing, in part, an industry consultant to explain that "insurers generally don't have the right to
audit PBMs' collections and distributions . . . . The PBMs will say the rebate contracts are
between them and the pharmaceutical companies, and it is none of our business."'); see also
Stephen Barlas, Employers and Drugstores Press for PBM Transparency, 40 PHARMACY AND
THERAPEUTICs 3, 206-08 (2015) (quoting an accredited health care fraud investigator, "PBMs
make it near impossible to audit both their 'secret agreements' for rebates with pharmaceutical
companies and retail network agreements with pharmacy chains."); Neil Weinberg & Robert
Langreth, Inside the 'Scorpion Room' Where Drug Price Secrets are Guarded, BLOOMBERG
(May 4, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-04/in-scorpion-room-audi-
tor-gets-scant-look-at-drug-contracts [perma.cc/R7YA-YEVQ] ("PBMs still often put audi-
tors in secure rooms, limit the number of contracts they can see and restrict and review note-
taking, according to people in the industry and contracts reviewed by Bloomberg.").
o See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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enter the market, these firms cannot gain a foothold." It is a win-win for
everyone, except of course for consumers, taxpayers, and society in general.
This Article describes the way in which, at most levels, the system op-
erates to create incentives for prices to rise and ultimately for consumers and
taxpayers to experience harm. The Article also proposes approaches to better
align incentives and analyzes some popular proposals that are unlikely to
solve the problem. Specifically, Part II of the Article describes the extent of
the rising prices and economic effects. Part III describes the incentive struc-
tures in place at each level of the market. Part IV suggests solutions to begin
realigning the industry's incentives with society's interests and creating
greater competition in pharmaceutical markets.
II. THE LANDSCAPE
The following section describes the current landscape of the prescrip-
tion drug industry, including pricing trends. This section also details the by-
zantine world of negotiating prices and establishing reimbursement levels
for patients. The term "drug company" is used throughout this Article to
refer to drug manufacturers-that is, companies who make the medicines-
as opposed to wholesalers. This section explains the way in which the gen-
eral health care market is an imperfect market and that, even in the context
of such market imperfections, spending on drugs defies rationality. Finally,
this section introduces the Pharmacy Benefit Manager, a main actor in the
health care space and one who plays a key role in rising prices.
A. Branded Prescription Drugs
1. Overview of Drug Market
Research and development in the pharmaceutical industry is a long and
arduous affair. Although scholars disagree over the full extent of costs to
bring a drug to market, no matter how one slices the numbers, estimated
costs range from $161 million to $2.5 billion. 12
" See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
12 A 2014 study from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development found that
developing a new drug costs approximately $2.5 billion, which includes the costs of compound
failures. See DiMasi JA, Grabowski HG & Hansen RA. Innovation in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH EcON. 20, 27 (2016). Moreover, this
study focuses only on the development of new drugs, while many released drugs are merely
repurposed old ones. See Feldman, supra note 8, at 625. This finding has been challenged on
multiple fronts. See Steve Morgan et al., The Cost of Drug Development: A Systematic Review,
100 HEALTH POL'Y 4 (2011) (analyzing 13 different studies to estimate that drug development
costs range from $161 million to $1.8 billon); Aaron E. Carroll, $2.6 Billion to Develop a
Drug? New Estimate Makes Questionable Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2014), www
.nytimes.com/2014/11/19/upshot! calculating-the-real-costs-of-developing-a-new-drug.html
[perma.cc/J5BQ-V95Z] (suggesting that the disparity in the findings stem from methodologi-
cal mistakes in the Tufts study, and noting that the Tufts Center is funded by pharmaceutical
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The pharmaceutical industry in this country has introduced extraordi-
nary health care advances. One cannot overemphasize the major life im-
provements over the last century that flow from innovation in prescription
medications, including new life-saving antibiotics, treatments for pain,
psychopharmacological treatments, and cancer drugs. Pharmaceuticals also
constitute a major export for the United States, 13 with domestic companies
accounting for 45% of the global market. 14
To incentivize this substantial and uncertain investment, new drugs are
generally protected by a patent, which prevents others from copying the drug
and competing in the market. Other regulatory awards, for activities such as
engaging in new studies or pediatric analyses, can extend the protection for
additional, limited periods of time.15 When the various patent and regulatory
protections that allow a period of time for recoupment of investment have
expired, the Hatch-Waxman system for approval of generic drugs is de-
signed to expedite the entry of generic competitors. 16
Not all patent-protected drugs represent major health care innovations.
Some are merely combinations of existing medications that can be pur-
chased for less individually.17 Others are tweaks of existing medicines, al-
companies); TuFrs CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEVELOPMENT, FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE,
https://csdd.tufts.edu/financial-disclosure [perma.cc/37HF-GBQN]. Additionally, a study ana-
lyzing the SEC filings for 10 cancer drugs found that the average cost of developing a single
cancer drug was $648.0 million. See Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Devel-
opment Spending to Bring a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177
JAMA INTERN. MED. 1569 (2017).
13 See MICHAEL FINN, U.S. DEPT OF COM., 2016 Top MARKETS REPORT PHARMACEUTI-
CALS 8 (2016) ("With $47 billion in exports in 2015, pharmaceuticals rank as one the top [sic]
exporting sectors for IP-intensive industries in the United States.").
14 Matej Mikulic, U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry - Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (May 9,
2017), https://www.statista.com/topics/1719/pharmaceutical-industry/ [https://perma.cc/
SD6Y-HTWS].
15 See Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 53,
67-68 (2016) (detailing the history of more than a dozen forms of non-patent exclusivities).
16 For detailed descriptions of the Hatch-Waxman system, see generally FELDMAN &
FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 21-22, 26-33 (citing WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS,
CONG. RES. SERV., THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 1 (2011); Mat-
thew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders
and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 178 nn.55-56 (2008)).
" Treximet is a migraine medicine that combines sumatriptan and naproxen in multilayer
tablets. Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of Follow-On Biologics, 16 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 9, 42 n.186 (2012). Soon after Treximet was brought to market, GlaxoS-
mithKline sold the branded drug for $18 per pill when the individual components sumatriptan
and naproxen were available for approximately $5 apiece. Tracy Staton, Treximet: Cautionary
Tale of Payer Price Revolt, FIERCEPHARMA (June 19, 2009), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
pharma/treximet-cautionary-tale-of-payer-price-revolt [https://perma.cc/4WAF-YHPX].
Pernix later acquired the drug and more recent sources indicate that the average cost for a
Treximet prescription of 9 tablets is $1,050.15, but this can vary depending on the pharmacy.
Press Release, Pernix Therapeutics, Pernix Signs Agreement to Acquire Treximet Tablets for
Migraine from GSK (May 14, 2014), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/2014051400
5549/en/PERNIX-Signs-Agreement-Acquire-TREXIMET@-Tablets-Migraine [https://perma
.cc/R2XA-GFEV]; Drug Price Search for Treximet, GOODRx, https://www.goodrx.com/trex-
imet [https://perma.cc/GZ49-DRA3] (search for "Treximet" in search bar). There is currently
no generic version of the drug available, and generic manufacturers have been blocked from
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tered in dosage or delivery system in an effort to obtain additional
protection.8 Such alterations generally cost far less to produce than the orig-
inal pharmaceutical formulation, and yet they receive new protections of the
same length as the original. The patent and exclusivity system, unfortu-
nately, incentivizes this type of suboptimal behavior.
The price of a generic drug averages 75% to 90% below the cost of the
original branded drug. 19 This price reduction tends to happen across time,
with the largest reduction occurring as multiple generic drugs are available
on the market. 20 This, of course, is when the generic market works at its best,
although some scholars have observed generic drugs experiencing high
prices or sharp price increases. 21
During the period of protection for a branded drug, however, monopoly
pricing reigns. There may be drugs within the same general class of medica-
tions that can serve as therapeutic alternatives, but most branded drug com-
panies enjoy considerable freedom in setting the price in the United States.
entering the market for patent infringement claims. See Treximet Prices, Coupons and Patient
Assistance Programs, DRUGS.COM (2018), https://www.drugs.com/price-guide/treximet
[https://perma.cclY6TL-5ZBP]; Christopher M. Holman, In Defense of Secondary Pharma-
ceutical Patents: A Response to the UN's Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Patent Examination,
50 IND. L. REV. 759, 801 (2017) (noting that "[v]arious generic drug companies sought to
bring a generic version of Treximet to the market, and were sued ... for infringement"). See
also Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharma., Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 809 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
" Feldman, supra note 8, at 597 (observing that "[r]ather than creating new medicines,
pharmaceutical companies are recycling and repurposing old ones[,]" referring to empirical
data that on average, "78% of the drugs associated with new patents were not new drugs
[coming on the market], but existing ones").
19 U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-706, GENERIC DRUGS UNDER MEDI-
CARE: PART D GENERIC DRUG PRICES DECLINED OVERALL, BUT SOME HAD EXTRAORDINARY
PRICE INCREASES 1 (2016) [hereinafter 2016 GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT].
20 Under Hatch-Waxman, a first filing generic that submits an abbreviated new drug appli-
cation with a complete paragraph IV certification receives a six-month period (180 days) in
which no other generic company may receive approval to enter the market. 21 U.S.C.
§355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2018). Paragraph IV certification refers to an ANDA applicant's certifica-
tion that the original patent is either "invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use,
or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted." 21 U.S.C.
§355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). During this period, the only versions on the market will be the original
brand and the first-filing generic, along with any generic versions that the branded company
might choose to introduce or authorize. See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 59
(describing the concept of "authorized generics": generic, unbranded versions of a drug intro-
duced by the brand-name company).
21 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAY-
MENT POLICY 408-09 (2017) [hereinafter MEDPAC 2017 REPORT] (citing Why Are Some Ge-
neric Drugs Skyrocking in Price? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Primary Health and Aging
of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 113th Cong. 50-55 (2014) (statement
of Aaron S. Kesselheim, Associate Professor, Medicine, Harvard Medical School); Jonathan
D. Alpern et al., High-Cost Generic Drugs - Implications for Patients and Policymakers, 371
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1859, 1859-62 (2014); Adam Fein, Retail Generic Drug Inflation Reaches
New Heights, DRUG CHANNELS (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.drugchannels.net/2014/08/retail-
generic-drug-inflation-reaches.html [https://perma.cc/T5UD-R8GR]); see also 2016 GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 19, at 13 (showing 351 cases over history of
extraordinary price increases for generic drugs within a single year); Chintan V. Dave et al.,
High Generic Drug Prices and Market Competition: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 167 AN-
NALS INTERNAL MED. 145, 145 (2017).
Perverse Incentives
With any commodity in a monopoly price setting, of course, the upper
bounds of pricing are set by the limits of the budgetary capacity of those
consuming the product. 22 No budgets are endless, and all goods must com-
pete to some extent with other items in the consumer's basket. After all, I can
only pay what I am willing to (I want to provide for my family and go to the
movies once in a while) and what I can afford to (I need to secure food, a
roof over my head, and a coat for the winter).
Health care, however, is no ordinary expenditure, and the industry ex-
periences unusual effects. Key aspects of this odd market include the follow-
ing. 2 3 First, although patients are the ultimate consumers of prescription
medication, they lack full information and may be insulated from the full
costs in a variety of ways. 4 Employer-provided health insurance is subsi-
dized by federal and state governments, in the form of tax advantages for the
employers and employees. 25 Insurance itself can insulate users from the full
costs of their care, spreading the cost across a pool of other workers and
across time. For many of those without a connection to employment, Medi-
care, Medicaid, government health plans, and other government programs
absorb much or all of the cost.
Second, the patient is at an information disadvantage in health care,
relying on the expertise of health care professionals. With prescription medi-
cation in particular, consumers are not even able to make the purchasing
choice, with the physician making the ultimate decision on what to pre-
22 Thomas J. Campbell, Labor Law and Econ., 38 STAN. L. REV. 991, 1005 (1986) (citing
EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICs 251 (4th ed. 1982)); Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemploy-
ment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor Organization & Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L.
REV. 259, 280, 298 (1994); Brian A. Hearn, Nicola Amendola & Giovanni Vecchi, On Histori-
cal Household Budgets, (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 45, 2016).
23 For a full description of buying distortions in the health care market see generally FELD-
MAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that the "pharmaceutical market does not oper-
ate much like a standard market at all"); Abigail Moncrieff, Understanding the Failure of
Health-care Exceptionalism in the Supreme Court's Obamacare Decision, 142 CHEST 559, 559
(2012) (arguing that the Supreme Court's failure to employ health-care exceptionalism in a
constitutional challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was an "odd" hold-
ing that disregards the uniqueness of the health care market); Clifford D. Stromberg, Health
Law Comes of Age: Economics and Ethics in a Changing Industry, 92 YALE L.J. 203 (1982)
(reviewing WILLIAM J. CURRAN & E. DONALD SHAPIRO, LAW, MEDICINE AND FORENSIC SCI-
ENCE (3d ed. 1982)).
24 Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at 7 (explaining that externalities and information asym-
metries prevent consumers from optimal substitution because they do not bear full costs and
lack medical expertise or reliable information to identify therapeutic equivalents).
25 Nicholas Drew, Two Federally Subsidized Health Insurance Programs Are One Too
Many: Reconsidering the Federal Income Tax Exclusion for Employer-Provided Health Insur-
ance in Light of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2047, 2056
(2013) (describing the government subsidy for employer-provided health care created by Sec-
tion 106 of the Internal Revenue Code); Max Huffman, Competition Policy in Health Care in
an Era of Reform, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 225, 261 (2010) (observing that health care costs are
paid with "before tax dollars"); Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Impor-
tance of Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 49 (2012)
(noting a government subsidy excluding "employer-provided health insurance from income
tax").
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scribe. And, as will be described in detail below, 2 6 that prescription decision
may be influenced by the insurance plan's willingness to reimburse for the
medication, as well as by less savory aspects including direct-to-consumer
advertising 27 and drug companies courting physicians. 28 Accurate informa-
tion on both price and quality of health care services can benefit consumers,
both by helping them become better shoppers and also by spurring competi-
tion among providers along both price and quality dimensions. 29 Delivering
that information in an easily understandable format-and one that is not
drowned out by other messages such as advertising-can be challenging. 30
Most important, buying decisions for health care do not follow ordinary
economic logic-stretching the boundaries of rationality. 31 My own life may
26 See infra n. 82 and accompanying text.
27 The United States and New Zealand are the only two industrialized nations that allow
direct-to-consumer advertising for prescription medication. See Bruce Patsner, Problems Asso-
ciated with Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTC) of Restricted, Implantable Medical De-
vices: Should the Current Regulatory Approach be Changed?, 64 FOOD DRUG L.J. 1, 3 (2009)
("[A]side from New Zealand, DTCA is banned in every other Western industrialized nation
except the United States."); see also Erin J. Asher, Note, Lesson Learned from New Zealand:
Pro-Active Industry Shift Towards Self-Regulation ofDirect-to-ConsumerAdvertising Will Im-
prove Compliance with the FDA, 16 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 599, 614 (2006) ("New Zealand is
currently the only other industrialized country in the world besides the United States to allow
DTC advertising.").
28 Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Open Payments (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www
.cms.gov/openpayments/ [https://perma.cc/MN6F-WB79] (noting that Open Payments is a
government program under the Affordable Care Act that details the value and nature of pay-
ments made from companies to physicians).
29 See Marina Lao, Deborah L. Feinstein & Francine Lafontaine, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Comment Letter on Amend. to the Minn. Gov't Data Pracs. Act, 4-5 (June 29, 2015), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy documents/ftc-staff-comment-regarding-
amendments-minnesota-government-data-practices-act-regarding-health-care/150702min-
nhealthcare.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9CZ-X352]. See generally High Prices, Low Trans-
parency: The Bitter Pill of Health Care Costs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 113th
Cong. 8 (2013) (statement of Paul B. Ginsburg, Ph.D., Center for Studying Health System
Change and National Institute for Health Care Reform); U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-11-791, HEALTH CARE PRICE TRANSPARENCY: MEANINGFUL PRICE INFORMATION Is DIF-
FICULT FOR CONSUMERS TO OBTAIN PRIOR To RECEIVING CARE 2 (2011) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT], http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585400.pdf [https://perna.cc/SE4L-KDL7]; Chris-
topher Whaley et al., Association Between Availability of Health Service Prices and Payments
for These Services, 312 JAMA 1670, 1670-76 (2014); Video: Public Workshop to Study to
Examining Health Care Competition, held by the Fed. Trade Comm'n (Mar. 20-21, 2014),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/eventscalendar/2014/03/examining-health-care-
competition [https://perma.cc/2KV4-4B79].
3 See GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 23.
31 See generally Wendy Netter Epstein, Revisiting Incentive-Based Contracts, 17 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2017) (addressing skewed economic incentives in health care);
William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidiaries, Third-Party-Payments, and Cross-Subsidization:
America's Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 279 (2009) (citing DAVID
GRATZER, THE CURE: How CAPITALISM CAN SAVE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 42 (2006)); AR-
NOLD KLING, CRISIS OF ABUNDANCE: RETHINKING How WE PAY FOR HEALTH CARE 53-54
(2006); E. Haavi Morreim, Diverse and Perverse Incentives of Managed Care: Bringing Pa-
tients into Alignment, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 89, 95, 139 (1996); Jennifer Prah Ruger, Health,
Capability, and Justice: Toward a New Paradigm of Health Ethics, Policy and Law, 15 COR-
NELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 476 (2006) (noting efforts to manufacture economic incentives
through "inappropriate" and "deleterious" insurance deductibles and copayment schemes to
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be of incalculable value to me, well beyond what my budget or society's
budget can rationally afford. That may be true even when the likelihood of
success is low or the additional lifespan provided is no more than weeks or
months. 32 When someone else is paying the bill, the value to me, measured
by my willingness to consume the good, becomes infinite. Of course, not all
prescription drug buying decisions are matters of life and death, but the gen-
eral irrationality of health decisions can distort ordinary purchase choices in
a society whose citizens generally exist beyond the subsistence level. All of
this suggests that the normal budgetary limitations a monopolist might face
have less force in the health care system.
2. Prices
Even within the distorted world of health care, however, prescription
drug prices stand out, rising faster than any other form of health care spend-
ing, including hospitalization and nursing home care.33 In a 2017 report to
Congress, the non-partisan legislative branch agency called the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) reported that between 2006 and
2014, drug prices in Medicare Part D rose by an average of 57% cumula-
tively, with dramatic increases in 2013-2014 in particular. 34 One industry
report for 2016 projected that prescription drug prices would rise 11.6% for
help health care purchases mimic typical economic rational); Clive Crook, The Slippery Eco-
nomics of Health Care, NATL J. MAG. 3249, 3249-50 (2005) (discussing the lack of consumer
incentives in health care decision making); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reorganizing the Financial
Flows in American Health Care, 12 HEALTH AFF. 172, 176 (1993); see also Paige Kelton,
Some Pharmacists Barred from Helping Patients Save Money, ACTION NEWS JAX (Feb. 22,
2018), http://www.actionnewsjax.com/news/local/some-pharmacists-barred-from-helping-pa-
tients-save-money/705277162 [https://perma.cc/PS2S-2N6R] (quoting one commentator that
"key question is not: What's it worth to save a child's life ... if that was the question, the polio
(vaccine) they gave me when I was 6 years old would have cost a million dollars. The right
question is: What is the price that will maximize accessibility and affordability, while main-
taining a robust R&D pipeline?").
32 In the U.S., 8.5% of total health care spending is for individuals in the last year of life.
See Alan R. Weil, Advanced Illness and End-Of-Life Care, 36 HEALTH AFF., 1167, 1167
(2017).
3 See MURRAY AITKEN QUINTILES IMS INST., UNDERSTANDING THE DYNAMICS OF DRUG
EXPENDITURE (2017), http://www.imshealth.com/files/web/IMSH%20Institute/Reports/Under-
stan ding-theDynamicComposition-of DrugExpenditure/QIIHIUnderstandingtheDy-
namics of DrugExpenditure SharesLevelsCompositionsDrivers.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZU79-YSRZ] (noting that net drug expenditure in the U.S. increased from $377 per person in
1995 to $974 per person in 2015); Aimee Picchi, Martin Shkreli-Style Drug Price Hikes are
Everywhere, CBS NEWS (Feb. 2, 2016, 3:43 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/martin-sh-
kreli-style-drug-price-hikes-are-everywhere/ [https://perma.cc/4LPR-3NHR] (citing Robert
Langreth & Rebecca Spalding, Shkreli Was Right: Everyone's Hiking Drug Prices, BLOOM-
BERG (Feb. 2, 2016, 1:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-02/shkreli-
not-alone-in-drug-price-spikes-as-skin-gel-soars- 1-860 [https://perma.cc/8YKT-5GMS], to
note that "[a]bout 20 of the top prescription drugs have at least quadrupled" their prices from
2014 to 2016).
3 MEDPAC 2017 REPORT, supra note 21, at 408-09.
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Americans younger than 65 and 9.9% for older adults, compared to wages
increases projected for that year of 2.5%.35
These price increases have played a significant role in drug company
profits in recent years. For example, the Wall Street Journal reported in 2015
that 80% of the growth in profits for the 20 largest drug companies were due
to increasing prices on existing drugs, not new drugs or increased drug
sales. 36
Some drug price rises stand out in particular. A report from the U.S.
Government Accountability Office estimated that between 2000 and 2008
alone, 416 branded products displayed extraordinary price increases. 37 Those
increases ranged from 100% to 499%.38
Such price increases are driven by rising prices in branded medications.
Although branded drugs account for only 11% of prescription volume in the
country, they account for 74% of the spending.39 Thus, although the pharma-
ceutical industry correctly points out that generic medications represent most
of the prescription volume in this country and the FDA approves a vast num-
ber of new generics every year,40 the year-to-year increase in the prices of
branded drugs along with higher prices for the new branded drugs are
swamping the savings from generic competition. 41
As described below, rising list prices play an important role in driving
up patient out-of-pocket costs as well as overall spending. In the case of
branded medications, these list prices continue to rise sharply. List prices for
branded drugs rose 12.4% in 2015 and increased 10% or more annually for
each of the prior three years.42 Although there may be some moderation in
pricing due to public pressure, the general trend of increasing prices appears
35 EXPRESS SCRIPTS HOLDING Co., VALUE BEYOND: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT, DELIVERING
MORE THAN MEDICINE (FORM 10-K) 4 (Dec. 31, 2016).
36 Joseph Walker, For Prescription Drug Makers, Price Increases Drive Revenue, WALL
STREET J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 9:59 PM), www.wsj.com/articles/for-prescription-drug-makers-price-
increases-drive-revenue- 1444096750 [https://perma.cc/5RDJ-9BDZ]; see also Lydia Ramsey,
We Just Got a Better Idea of How Much Drug Companies Rely on Price Hikes, and It Doesn't
Look Good, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 19, 2017, 12:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/drug-
price-increases-represented-pharma-earnings-growth-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/QA3Q-PLS2].
3 2009 GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
38 See id.; see also Brenda Goodman & Andy Miller, The High Cost of Surviving Rabies,
WEBMD (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.webmd.com/a-to-z-guides/news/20180220/the-high-
cost-of-surviving-rabies [https://perma.cc/82EU-2VL3] (noting that the cost of the rabies shot
regimen increased nearly 400% between 2008 and 2018).
3 Generic Drug Access and Savings in the U.S., Ass'n for Affordable Medicines 33
(2017).
40 How Critics Say Drug Companies Play "Games" to Stave Off Generic Competitors,
supra note 7 (quoting representative of the pharmaceutical industry group PhRMA that 90% of
all medicines are generic and that over 1,000 new generics were approved in 2017, the highest
of anywhere in the world).
41 See MEDPAC 2017 REPORT, supra note 21, at 408 (concluding that price increases in
the brands are overwhelming the effects of using lower-cost generic drugs, even as the use of
generics continues to climb).
42 Sood, Goldman & Van Nuys, supra note 1; Murray Aitken, supra note 1, at 8.
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likely to hold for the foreseeable future. 43 For example, Eli Lilly's trans-
parency report noted that the company raised list prices 14% on average in
2016;4 Allergan increased its list prices for eighteen medications by 9.5%.45
In general, the price rises are most dramatic in a category called spe-
cialty drugs. The definition of specialty drugs varies, but the category tends
to include high-cost drugs, particularly ones that are used to treat a rare
condition, require special handling, use a limited distribution network, or
require ongoing clinical assessment.46 Some drugs are categorized as "spe-
cialty," however, simply because their cost exceeds $10,000 a year.47 The
National Academy of Sciences reports that over the last five years, spending
on specialty medicines has nearly doubled, outpacing the consumer price
index from 2011 and 2013 and composing more than two-thirds of growth in
drug spending between 2010 and 2015.48 The 2016 annual report from Ex-
press Scripts PBM projects that 1% of all drugs will account for 50% of the
drug spending by 2018 due to higher-cost specialty medicines. 49 In institu-
tional and retail settings, specialty drug spending as a share of net spending
accounted for 24.7% in 2008 increasing to 46.5% in 2017,50 while specialty
43 Health Affairs: Health Spending Projections Through 2027, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb.
22, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20190221.997607/full/ [https://per
ma.cc/ZTH2-PAUQ].
" See ELI LILLY & Co., 2016 LILLY INTEGRATED SUMMARY REPORT 15 (2016).
45 Silverman, Several Drug Makers Just Raised Their Prices by Nearly 10 Percent, and
Buyers Expect More Price Hikes, STAT (2018), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2018/
01/02/price-hikes-inflation-survey/ [https://perma.cc/Z458-F4XV].
46 MEDPAC 2017 REPORT, supra note 21, at 427 n.37; see also Juliette Cubanski, Wyatt
Kom & Tricia Neuman, The Out of Pocket Cost Burden for Specialty Drugs in Medicare Part
D in 2019, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (Feb. 01, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/
the-out-of-pocket-cost-burden-for-specialty-drugs-in-medicare-part-d-in-2019/ [https://perma
.cc/LM2X-2U64] (noting that Medicare set a floor of at least $670 per month in 2019 to define
a drug as "specialty"). Most biologics fall within a subset of specialty medicines. See id.
4 Fact Sheet: Specialty Drugs & Health Care Costs, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (2015), https:/
/www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2015/1 1/specialty-drugs-and-health-
care-costs [https://perma.cc/NM7F-FD4M].
48 See NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 77 (citing AMERICA'S HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS,
SPECIALTY DRUGS: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES: ADVANCING EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES To ADDRESS
SOARING COSTS WHILE ENSURING ACCESS To EFFECTIVE TREATMENTS AND PROMOTING CON-
TINUED MEDICAL INNOVATION 6 (2015)); MURRAY AITKEN, QUINTILES IMS INST., MEDICINES
USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S.: A REVIEW OF 2015 AND OUTLOOK To 2020 13 (2016), https://
morningconsult.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IMS-Institute-US-Drug-Spending-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5C39-4XKL]. Spending increases of specialty drugs are reported on an in-
voice price basis, referring to the amounts that pharmacies and hospitals pay to distributors for
medicines. See, e.g., 2009 GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORT, supra note 3 at 2, 11
(noting that between 2000 and 2008, a few specialty drugs used to tread conditions such as
fungal or viral infections or heart disease experienced price increases of 1,000% or more).
49 EXPRESS SCRIPTS, supra note 35, at 4 (Express Scripts, the institutional author of this
report, is a pharmacy benefit manager).
5o MURRAY AITKEN & MICHAEL KLEINROCK, IQVIA INST. FOR HUMAN DATA SC.,
Medicine Use and Spending in the U.S.: A Review of 2017 and Outlook to 2022 6 (2018),
https://www.iqvia.com/-/medialiqvialpdfs/institute-reports/medicine-use-and-spending-in-the-
us-a-review-of-2017-and-outlook-to-2022.pdf?= 1582048573615 [https://perma.cc/46FA-
BN3J].
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drugs accounted for -2% drugs in retail and non-retail settings.51 In other
words, more of the drug spending is flowing into this category.
List prices, of course, are only the beginning of the story. Drug compa-
nies enter into a variety of contracts that provide for rebates from the list
price. Although these price concessions are a closely-guarded secret, and it
is difficult to tease out the actual net price different entities pay along the
drug chain,52 the net price to the drug company is substantially less than the
list price. Defending against complaints about rising drug prices, the indus-
try interest group PhRMA reported at a Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
roundtable that after accounting for rebates and discounts, prices grew only
3.5% in 2016.53 Similarly, a leading industry analysis group estimates that
although list prices increased 13.5% in 2014, the net price increase was only
5.5%.54 Even these net price increases, however, outstrip the inflation rate
over the last five years, which has ranged from a low of under one percent in
2014 and 2015 to a high of 2% for 2016 and 2017, with the same projected
for 2018.55
Many people, however, do pay the full list price or an amount based on
the list price. Private insurance plans often require that patients contribute an
amount based on a percentage of the full list price of the drug, a contribution
known as co-insurance. Other plans require that patients pay for medications
in full at the list price until meeting an individual or family deductible. 56 For
example, in 2016, nearly 30% of those enrolled in employer-sponsored plans
were enrolled in high-deductible plans that require patients to pay 100% of
51 See id. (indicating specialty drugs are 1.9% of prescriptions in retail, while they account
for 2.3% of drugs).
52 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 4 (quoting Acting Administrator of the Federal Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services that, "[W]e have list prices, wholesale prices, average
wholesale prices, rebates, supplemental rebates, mark-ups . . . [m]ost of that information is not
available or well understood by the public" and University of Pittsburgh Professor Walid Gel-
lad referring to pricing as a black hole and noting that "It's impossible to understand what
people are paying.").
53 See Neeraj Sood, Workshop Slides: Understanding Competition in Prescription Drug
Markets: Entry and Supply Chain Dynamics, FED. TRADE COMMN 101 (2017) [hereinafter
FTC Workshop Slides], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public-events/1255653/
understanding-competition in prescription drug-markets-workshop-slides_11-8-17.pdf
[https://pemia.cc/A9TE-GWCM]; see also MURRAY AITKEN ET AL., QUINTILES IMS HEALTH,
MEDICINES USE AND SPENDING IN THE U.S. 2 (2017), https://structurecms-staging-psyclone
.netdna-ssl.com/client assets/dwonk/medialattachments/590c/6aa/6970/2d2d/4182/0000/
590c6aa069702d2d41820000.pdf [https://perma.cc/L236-NQU3].
54 See Scott, supra note 4.
5 See Current U.S. Inflation Rates: 2009 to 2020, COINNEWS MEDIA GROUP LLC (2018),
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/current-inflation-ra [https://perma.cc/KS8P-
B5PF].
56 For an example of a plan requiring that the patient pay 100% of the costs of drugs up to
a certain limit, see the Anthem insurance plan described at First Am. Consolidated Class Ac-
tion Compl. at 7, In re Express Scripts/Anthem ERISA Litig., 285 F. Supp. 3d 655 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (No. 16-3399) [hereinafter Anthem Class Action Complaint]; see also CIGNA Insur-
ance Plan Documents (2018) (showing patient pays for medication in full until $2,500 family
threshold) (on file with author).
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their health care costs up to a defined amount. 7 Others require substantial
deductibles or co-insurance, with studies showing dramatic reductions in
coverage and shifts to percentage-based cost sharing for higher priced drugs
across time. 8 Even when full Medicare coverage is in place, patients must
pay part of the cost of medications, with gaps occurring that can force pa-
tients to pay the majority of costs.59 These amounts are nearly always based
on the list price and not the net price of the medication, thus depriving con-
sumers of the benefit of the rebate price concessions.
In addition, although the number of people with health insurance in-
creased substantially after passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2009,60
10% of those under 65 in the United States still had no insurance in 2017,
and not all of those who had health insurance enjoyed prescription drug cov-
erage. 61 Even with Medicare, 12% of beneficiaries are not enrolled in pre-
scription drug coverage or covered by another prescription plan such as
veteran's benefits. 62 Thus, cash-paying consumers who lack sufficient drug
benefits also pay the exaggerated list price. As a result, the total out-of-
pocket amount that U.S. consumers are spending on medication continues to
rise sharply. 6 3
Most important, rebates on the whole are not keeping pace with the rise
in drug prices. Although the net price for an individual pharmaceutical
purchase is a closely guarded secret, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services collects and reports total rebate dollars percentages for all drug ex-
penditures in these systems, 64 which can be used to calculate the average
annual brand drug rebate. Between 2012 and 2015, total rebates on brand
' NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 99-100.
5 Id. at 98; Jalpa Doshi et al., Specialty Tier-Level Cost Sharing & Bio. Agent Use in the
Medicare Part D Initial Coverage Period Among Beneficiaries with Rheumatoid Arthritis,
ARTHRITIS CARE & RES. 1623-30 (2016); J.K. Jung, R. Feldman, C. Cheong, P. Du, & D.
Leslie, Coverage for Hepatitis C Drugs in Medicare Part D, AM. J. MANAGED CARE 220-26
(2016); J.M. Polinski, P.E. Mohr & L. Johnson, Impact of Medicare Part D on Access to and
Cost Sharing for Specialty Biologic Medications for Beneficiaries with Rheumatoid Arthritis,
ARTHRITIS CARE & RES. 745, 745-54 (2009); J. Yazdany, R. A. Dudley, R. Chen, G.A. Lin &
C.W. Tseng, Coverage for High-Cost Specialty Drugs for Rheumatoid Arthritis in Medicare
Part D, ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATOLOGY 1474, 1474-80 (2015).
59 MEDPAC 2017 REPORT, supra note 21, at 404.
60 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act., Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
61 NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 98.
62 See id.
63 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text; cf Robert Langreth, Blacki Migliozzi &
Ketaki Gokhale, The U.S. Pays a Lot More for Top Drugs Than Other Countries, BLOOMBERG
(2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-drug-prices/ [https://perma.ccI6Z3X-
GS6X] (concluding that those in the U.S. pay more for top drugs, even after accounting for
discounts).
6 See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY
MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 140 (2019).
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drugs in the Medicare system rose from 16% to 24%.65 During the same
period, however, the price of brand drugs rose 42%.66
Consider these simplified numbers: 67 if a company raises prices from
$100 to $142 dollars and gives back $24, the buyer is still paying more. The
$118 net price is still above the original price of $100. In short, rebates
simply are not compensating for the increased costs, particularly as those
costs continue to rise across time.
Against this backdrop, government budgets are struggling to cover
pharmaceutical costs. For example, if the Defense Department were to have
treated all VA patients infected with hepatitis C in 2015, using the first
breakthrough Hepatitis C cure Sovaldi, the $12 billion cost would have ac-
counted for 20% of the department's annual budget-just for a single disease
treatment.68 With budgets in the home, patients report rationing or forgoing
medications for lack of funding. 69 This is precisely the type of boundary that
should create pressure to reduce pricing. And yet, puzzlingly, the rise per-
sists. The following section describes the perverse incentives that relent-
lessly drive prices ever higher.
65 See Robin Feldman, The Devil in the Tiers 76 (U.C. Hastings, Working Paper No. 379).
66 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
67 One should note that the rebate amounts from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services Trustees Report are average rebates, calculated across all drug expenditures. Individ-
ual drug transactions can vary widely.
68 See Patricia Kime, VA, DoD Spend More Than $450M on Costly Hepatitis Drug, USA
TODAY (Jan. 8, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/01/08/government-
hepatitis-drug-costs/21462363/ [https://perma.cc/3FFQ-US9H]; cf Pauline Bartolone, Cali-
fornia Pays Insurers Millions More for Hepatitis C Drugs, NPR (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www
.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/01/28/46470891 1/california-pays-insurers-millions-more-
for-hepatitis-c-drugs [https://perma.cc/4F25-P6V6] (noting that the state of California spent
$387 million to treat 3,624 patients with the new hepatitis C drugs).
69 NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 110 (explaining that patient "sticker shock" at the phar-
macy leads them to forgo filling the prescription or extend their medication by reducing dos-
ages); see also Robyn Tamblyn, The Incidence and Determinants of Primary Nonadherence
with Prescribed Medication in Primary Care: A Cohort Study, 160 ANNALS INTERN. MED.
(2014) (showing that patients with higher copays, recent hospitalizations, other severe health
problems, or combinations of these factors were less likely to fill their prescriptions); BAR-
BARA K. RIMER ET AL., PRESIDENT'S CANCER PANEL, PROMOTING VALUE, AFFORDABILITY, AND
INNOVATION IN CANCER DRUG TREATMENT A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES FROM THE PRESIDENT'S CANCER PANEL 17 (2018), https://prescancerpanel.cancer.gov/
report/drugvalue/pdf/PresCancerPanelDrugValueMar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH53-
UL5J] (detailing that higher out-of-pocket costs makes it less likely for patients to adhere to
recommended treatment regimens or undergo financial hardship); NAT. CANCER INST., NAT.
INSTS. OF HEALTH, FINANCIAL TOXICITY AND CANCER TREATMENT (PDQ)-HEALTH PROFES-
SIONAL VERSION, https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/managing-care/track-care-costs/finan-
cial-toxicity-hp-pdq [https://perna.cc/6YUY-Z5EA] (noting how high costs have resulted in
cancer patients selling property and other assets, incuring medical debt, reducing spending on
necessities, changing housing, and declaring bankruptcy).
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B. Rebates and Reimbursement: The Byzantine World of Drug Sales
Most people in the U.S. have some form of health insurance that pays
for prescription medication, either a public or private plan.70 With each of
these forms of insurance, a significant middle player negotiates between
drug companies and those who pay the bills, whether the payors are insur-
ance companies, self-funding employers, or Medicare/Medicaid systems.
These middle players are known as Pharmacy Benefit Managers or PBMs.
PBMs started as simple claims processing services, helping health in-
surance plans manage the flow of patient claims for the reimbursement of
drug purchases.7 1 When claims processing became commoditized in the
1990s with the advent of digital processing, PBMs looked for ways to differ-
entiate their services, eventually moving into the role of negotiating drug
prices on behalf of their health plan clients. 72 The importance of this role,
o Forms of health insurance include: 1) employer-sponsored health insurance and individ-
ually purchased plans, such as those offered by CIGNA, Anthem, Blue Cross, or Kaiser
Permanente; 2) Medicare for those over 65; 3) Medicaid for those below a certain level of
income; 4) government employee plans including Department of Defense Veterans Adminis-
tration benefits and plans for federal, state, and local workers; 5) government insurance that
provides heath care to prisoners; and 6) state health insurance sold in established under the
Affordable Care Act. Employer plans may be what are known as "self-insured" plans or a
combination of a private plan and self-insurance, a route taken by some prominent companies
such as Google and Walmart. Under self-insurance, an employer assumes all financial risk for
all employee health care costs. Employee claims are paid directly from the company's financial
assets and are tax deductible by the employer. The employer is also responsible for any costs
associated with administering the health plan. In one subset of self-insurance called Adminis-
tration-services-only (ASO) arrangements, the employer buys only the claims administration
function from a third-party company, often a PBM, as opposed to the insurance protection
function itself. See JEFFREY D. MAMORSKY, HEALTH CARE BENEFITs LAw §3.04[3] 19-20
(2005). The federal government funds Medicaid and Medicare, but individual states administer
the programs. See Jennifer Rae Fleming, The Blurred Line Between Nursing Homes & Assisted
Living Facilities: How Limited Medicaid Funding of Assisted Living Facilities Can Save Tax
Dollars While Improving the Quality of Life of the Elderly, 15 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 245,
261 (2007) ("Each state administers its own Medicaid program while the federal Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) (formerly the Health Care Financing Administration) in
the United States Department of Health and Human Services monitors the state-run programs
and establishes requirements for service delivery, quality, funding, and eligibility standards.");
see also BARBARA S. KLEES, CHRISTIAN J. WOLFE & CATHERINE A. CURTIS, CTRS. FOR MEDI-
CARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF MEDI-
CARE & MEDICAID: TITLE XVIII AND TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AS OF
NOVEMBER 17 (2009), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/MedicareProgramRatesStats/downloads/MedicareMedicaidSumma-
ries2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PE2-PWKR] ("DHHS has the overall responsibility for ad-
ministration of the Medicare program. Within DHHS, responsibility for administering
Medicare rests with CMS."); id. at 18 ("[E]ach State establishes its own eligibility standards;
determines the type, amount, duration, and scope of services; sets the rate of payment for
services; and administers its own program."). In addition, insurance companies generally oper-
ate state and federal employee plans, such as those listed above-Cigna, Anthem, Blue Cross,
Kaiser Permanente, etc.
7 Gregory S. Kaupp & Scott B. Lynch, To Regain Control of Drug Costs, Health Plans
Must Understand the Road They've Traveled, MEDSCAPE (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.med-
scape.com/viewarticle/432389 [https://perma.cc/ZFC6-YPBK].
72 See id.
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increased with implementation of the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act,
which led to widespread drug coverage for Medicare patients. 73 Today,
PBMs negotiate drug prices on behalf of their health plan clients for all types
of plans.
PBMs leverage the volume demand from patients within an insurance
program to negotiate price concessions from a drug company. In other
words, the PBM is saying, "I will deliver a large volume of clients to you
under this health insurance plan, if you will give a large rebate." 7 4 In theory,
PBMs use their negotiating leverage, along with their knowledge of things
such as the post-rebate prices on similar drugs that drug companies have
offered to their various clients in the past, to negotiate the lowest prices
possible on behalf of their clients.
As benchmarks for these negotiations, the parties generally use the na-
tional Average Wholesale Price (AWP). 75 AWP refers to the average price
reported by drug companies 76 as paid for drugs at the wholesale level, not
including reductions for rebates or discounts. AWP is referred to as the list
price, or more colloquially, "Ain't What's Paid."''77 The figure also is not
verified, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has studied
price disparities among these indexes. Finally, lawsuits have alleged collu-
sion between the commercial publishers of AWP information and wholesal-
7 The 2003 Medicare Modernization Act provided senior citizens and other Medicare
beneficiaries with voluntary prescription drug benefits beginning in 2006. PBMs manage the
drug benefit systems for their clients using services such as assemgling retail pharmacy net-
works, establishing drug formularies for the client, and using mail order pharmacy options. See
generally FED. TRADE COMMN, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER
PHARMACIES (2005) [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM'N 2005 REPORT]; see also Jessica Wapner,
Understanding the Hidden Villain of Big Pharma: Pharmacy Benefit Managers, NEWSWEEK
(Mar. 17, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/big-pharma-villain-pbm-569980 [https://perma
.cc/PK3V-62JF].
7 See Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at 21-22 (rebates are percentage discounts used by
manufacturers to gain market share from PBM enrollees).
1 See, e.g., Anthem Class Action Complaint, supra note 56, at 28; EXPRESS SCRIPTS,
Annual Report 2015, EXPRESS SCRIPTS (2016), http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/An-
nualReportArchive/e/NASDAQESRX_2015.pdf [https://perma.cclZR7S-QY52]. Wholesale
Acquisition Cost ("WAC"), is a similar benchmark used in these contracts and as a starting
point in negotiations. See id. Wholesalers mark up the drug from the WAC by a certain per-
centage, which leads to the Average Wholesale Price ("AWP"). For example, if a drug has a
WAC of $250, its AWP across the nation might be $250 + 20%, for a total of $300. See Julie
Appleby, Tracking Who Makes Money on a Brand-Name Drug, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 6,
2016), https://khn.org/news/tracking-who-makes-money-on-a-brand-name-drug/ [https://per
ma.cc/H6M7-98A8]; see also WellPoint, Inc. and Express Scripts, Inc., Pharmacy Benefit
Mgmt. Services Agreement (EX-10.30) (Dec. 1, 2009) (specifying that the AWP refers to the
average wholesale price of a prescription drug "as established and reported by the Pricing
Source" and that a drug's applied AWP will be the AWP for the actual 11-digit National Drug
Code).
76 Commercial publishers of AWP data include Truven Health Analystics, Red Book,
Medi-Span, and First Data Ban National Drug Data File Plus. Drug companies report the aver-
age wholesale price to these third parties using indexes that include the National Drug Code
(NDC), which is a universal drug product identifier for prescription and nonprescription drugs.
" Patrick Mullen, The Arrival of Average Sale Price, 4(3) BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE
48, 48-53 (2007).
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ers to artificially inflate AWP numbers, in order to increase the markup
spreads for the wholesalers.78
A PBM's contract with a drug company can include complicated calcu-
lations of concessions and volume-based rebates. These will be measured
periodically based on items such as the total volume of drugs purchased, the
number of product prescriptions filled, or on maintaining or exceeding the
prior year's percentage of an insurer's patients who filled their prescriptions
in that drug class with that drug. 79 As detailed later in this Article, this rebate
system significantly distorts the incentive structure of pharmaceutical pric-
ing and reimbursement.
PBMs also manage the drug claims for each of their health plan clients
and help each client establish formularies. Formularies are the lists of drugs
for which a health plan will reimburse patients. Small group and individual
health plans-including the Affordable Care Act's exchanges-are required
to cover at least one drug in every class of medication. 0 A Medicare insurer
typically is required to cover at least one drug in each class of medications,
and to cover all drugs within the protected classes of antiretrovirals, an-
tidepressants, antipsychotics, anticonvulsants, immunosuppressants, and an-
tineoplastics. 1 In general, most insurance plans in both the public and
private markets also require different levels of patient cost sharing for differ-
ent drugs, managing these through what are known as formulary "tiers."8 2 In
" See Appleby, supra note 75 (describing the relationships between AWP and the markup
fees that wholesalers receive). Concerns also have been raised about a practice known as re-
packaging, in which PBMs or their mail-order pharmacies repackage a drug to obtain a new
NDC code at a new and usually higher Average Wholesale Price. In the FTC's 2005 report,
PBMs reported that repackaging rarely occurred. For example, one study participant reported
repackaging in only 1 out of roughly every 1 million prescriptions filled. FED. TRADE COMMN
2005 REPORT, supra note 73, at xiii. Recent anecdotal reports by community pharmacists and
others suggest that this practice may be increasing. See FTC Workshop Slides, supra note 53.
7 Provisions between drug companies and PBMs that condition rebates on maintaining or
exceeding the prior year's percentage of an insurer's patients who filled their prescriptions in
that drug class with that drug may operate as a method of helping larger pharmacies (and
larger PBMs that own large pharmacies) avoid competition from smaller players. For details of
this technique, and the manner in which it maintains the market position for both large drug
companies and large pharmacies, see infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
8
oSee 42 U.S.C. § 18022 (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 156.122(a)(1) (2020).
* See 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(iv) (2018); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improve-
ment, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C and 42 U.S.C.); CENTS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDI-
CAID SERVS., MEDICARE MODERNIZATION ACT 2007 FINAL GUIDELINES - FORMULARIES, CMS
STRATEGY FOR AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO COMPREHENSIVE DRUG COVERAGE (2007), https://
www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContraldownloads/
FormularyGuidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/BF3B-G8WV]. See also Morton & Boller, supra
note 1, at 19 (citing Mark Duggan & Fiona Scott Morton, The Effect of Medicare Part D on
Pharmaceutical Prices and Utilization, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 590, 594 n.14, 603 (2010)).
82 See EXPRESS SCRIPTS, supra note 35, at 11 ("Most clients choose formularies designed
to be used with financial incentives, such as three-tier co-payments, which drive preferential
selection of plan-preferred generics and branded drugs over their non-formulary altema-
tives."). See also Allison Dabbs Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the
Pharmacy Benefit Management Industry, 42 VAL. U.L. REV 33, 34 (2007) ("A common struc-
ture is the three-tier plan. The first tier . . . typically provides for a copay of around $10 for
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one of the most significant aspects of the system, the PBM, together with the
insurance plan, decides which drugs to include on which tier of the insurer's
formulary. This includes establishing the incentives (and barriers to utiliza-
tion) that will drive patients toward particular drug options.8 3 Historically,
health care economists and policy makers presumed that formularies would
drive patients toward generic drugs and lower-cost competitors.8 4 As will be
discussed below, recent evidence suggests that is not the case.
As strange as it may seem, the insurance companies-the payors in this
system-generally do not know the actual net price paid for individual
drugs. 5 The PBM collects and delivers periodic reports along with rebates
from drug companies apportioned to each plan according to the contract
terms. Thus, although the health plan knows how much it reimburses a par-
ticular patient at the moment the patient buys the drug,8 6 the health plan
never knows the net price that the drug company receives.
In addition, as described below, the health plan may have difficulty
teasing out the per unit price that the plan itself is paying for a particular
drug across all purchases, let alone on a particular purchase. That informa-
tion is tucked within the folds of complex data and contractual calculations,
generic drugs. The middle tier, with a slightly higher copay, allows for the purchase of brand-
name drugs that have been determined by the PBM to be the preferred brand drugs in the
formulary for treating a particular disease or condition. The third tier, allows plan participants
to purchase non-preferred brand drugs with the payment of the highest copay."). In addition to
requiring the highest copay, the third tier may include a lower percentage coverage. Modern
formularies may have up to six tiers, including two levels of cost sharing each for generic,
brands, and specialty drugs. The most restrictive specialty tier relies entirely on coinsurance (in
which the patient pays a percentage of the cost or the full cost up to a specified amount), rather
than a copay (in which the patient pays a fixed amount). Given the high price of specialty
drugs, paying co-insurance is a particularly heavy burden for a patient to bear.
Tiering can have a significant effect on a patient. A 2017 survey of patients on private plans
found that copays increased from $11 for first-tier drugs to $110 for fourth-tier drugs, average
coinsurance rates rose from 17% per drug in the first tier to 38% in the third tier, and that in
addition to copays and coinsurance, some health plans required additional deductibles for
drugs, separate from the general annual deductible. GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2017 ANNUAL SURVEY 150, 154, 159 (2017).
83 See, e.g., GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENE-
FITS 2017 ANNUAL SURVEY 150, 154, 159 (2017) (listing the PBM's services provided). See
also NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 52 (explaining that higher tiered drugs require greater
copays from patients thereby discouraging use of the drug; narrowing indications for which a
drug may be used also constrains volume; excluding the drug entirely from coverage is the
most powerful leverage).
84 In theory, formularies are divided into tiers with lower costing drugs on the lower tiers
and higher, branded drugs on the higher tiers. Each tier corresponds to a certain copay with
lower copays on lower tiers and higher copays on the higher tiers. This system is supposed to
lead to consumers preferring lower cost generics to branded drugs. See Cole Werble, Health
Policy Brief. Formularies, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Sep. 14, 2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/
10.1377/hpb20171409.000177/full/ [https://perma.cc/5E5R-PJY8].
85 Mark Meador, Squeezing the Middleman: Ending Underhanded Dealing in the Pharma-
ceutical Benefit Management Industry Through Regulation, 20 ANNALS OF HEALTH Law 77,
82 (2011) (noting PBMs are not required to share information about rebates with plan sponsors
and so often remain silent and pocket some or all of the money saved through rebates).
86 In health system lingo, this is referred to as the "point of sale."
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including rebates that may flow-in whole or in part-to the health plan
later in the year. 7
How is it possible that insurers like Blue Cross and companies like
Walmart never know the net prices of the drugs they are paying for? Quite
simply, that information is a fiercely guarded secret. The contracts between
PBMs and drug manufacturers are claimed as trade secrets and staunchly
protected, even from a PBM's own health insurance client.8 In some cases,
the contract between the health insurance plan and the PBM offers minimal
audit rights. When audit rights are granted and the plan exercises those
rights, the plan's auditors are likely to be denied full access to the PBM's
drug company contracts, even for the limited purpose of confirming that the
plan's own contracts are being carried out as negotiated.89 One insurance
industry consultant describes the situation as "buying blind."9 0
The PBM industry is highly concentrated. Three PBMs-Express
Scripts, CVS Health, and OptumRX-dominate 85% of the commercial in-
surance market.91 In an indication of the power of the big three outside that
market, the three major PBMs reportedly handled 50% of the prescription
drug benefits for the Medicaid managed-care population in 2015, as well.9 2
A number of PBMs also have acquired their own pharmacies. Patients may
" See FED. TRADE COMMN 2005 REPORT, supra note 73, at 24 n.6 (stating that some PBM
contracts with plan sponsors state the PBM has several MAC lists used for generic pricing and
allowing the PBM to select which list it will use with a particular plan sponsor).
" See Hiltzik, supra note 9. One bright spot on the horizon is a recent decision from a
California court, rejecting an attempt by pharmacists to claim First Amendment protection
against efforts to force the revelation of certain pharmacy fees and pricing. See Beeman v.
Anthem Prescription Mgmt. Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103220 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2007). To
the extent that drug companies challenge legislative attempts to mandate disclosure of this
information on First Amendment grounds, the California decision may provide a useful anal-
ogy for the governmental position.
8 Hiltzik, supra note 9 (noting that insurers "generally don't have the right to audit PBMs'
rebate collections and distribution"); see Unions Report: CVS Caremark: An Alarming
Merger, Two Years Later, CHANGE TO WIN 9 (2009) [hereinafter Unions Report]; supra note
10 and accompanying text.
9 Hiltzik, supra note 9. Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner of the FDA recently referred to this
system as "Kabuki drug-pricing constructs-constructs that obscure profit taking across the
supply chain that dives up costs; that expose consumers to high out of pocket spending; and
that actively discourage competition." Scott Gottlieb, Commissioner of Food and Drug Ad-
ministration, Remarks at America's Health Insurance Plans' National Health Policy Confer-
ence: Capturing the Benefits of Competition for Patients (Mar. 7, 2018). The voluminous
number of claims combined with constantly fluctuating prices creates enormous data analytics
challenges for those who might want to audit closely. The volume of data is one reason insur-
ance companies hired PBMs to do might wonder whether the PBMs have simply become too
big to audit.
91 See Sood, Goldman & Van Nuys, supra note 1; see also FTC Workshop Slides, supra
note 53, at 100. One can see the power of these three players, in particular, from the fact that in
2016, the California Public Employee Benefits System (CalPERS) had only three finalists in
the bidding for contract to manage prescriptions for the nearly 500,000 members and their
families enrolled in non-HMO health plans. Hiltzik, supra note 9. Only the big three can
compete for the major prizes.
92 Jon Roberts, CVS/Caremark Executive Vice President & President, Gaining Lives with
Our Unique PBM Capabilities 27 (2014), https://nanopdf.com/download/jon-roberts-presenta-
tion pdf [https://perma.cc/FS95-ZV7S].
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be offered preferred deals at those pharmacies or, in some cases, be required
to purchase certain types of drugs from the PBM's own pharmacies. In the
1990s, some drug companies acquired PBMs, although the FTC eventually
required the drug companies to effectively unwind some aspects of those
acquisitions, citing competition concerns.93
The following graphic shows the flow of payments throughout the drug
supply chain, including pharmaceutical companies, wholesalers, PBMs, pa-
tients, and third-party insurance payors.
9 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Early Results on Ventures
with Drug Manufacturers, 4-5 (1995), https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/221921.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/2JJY-9QRF] (noting that following a slew of drug companies purchasing PBMs, the
FTC finally intervened when Eli Lilly purchased PCS and established safeguards against po-
tentially anticompetitive consequences). See also Merck & Co., Inc., et al., 127 F.T.C. 156
(1999) (requiring an "Open Formulary" along with other conditions in response to a complaint
that Merck was receiving favorable treatment on Medco's formulary); Eli Lilly & Co., 127
F.T.C. 577 (1999) (setting aside an order placing restrictions and obligations on Lilly's use of
its PBM after Lilly sold it to Rite Aid); Elizabeth L. Mitchell, The Potential for Self-Interested
Behavior by Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Through Vertical Integration with Pharmacy Ben-
efit Managers: The Need for a New Regulatory Approach, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 151, 152-53
n.16-17 (1999) (noting that SmithKline ultimately sold Diversified Pharmaceutical services
for $700 million after having originally paid $2.3 billion for the PBM); Milt Freudenheim,
With Ties Lingering, Medco Leaves Merck, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2003), http://www.nytimes
.com/2003/08/20/business/with-ties-lingering-medco-leaves-merck.html [https://perma.cc/
SB7J-T7KQ] (describing Medco's spin-off from Merck); Merck & Co., Inc., Letter to Share-
holders: Important U.S. Federal Income Tax Information Concerning the Medco Health Solu-
tions, Inc. Stock Distribution, MERCK & CO., INC. (2003) (noting that shareholders "received
1206 shares of Medco Health common stock for each share of Merck common stock" owned);
FTC Gives Final Approval to Lilly Order; Pledges Continued Monitoring for Anticompetitive
Practices, FED. TRADE COMMN (July 31, 1995), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-re-
leases/1995/07/eli-lilly-and-company [https://perma.cc/NBQ2-L45R] (noting SmithKline's ac-
quisition of Diversified Pharmaceutical Services in a press release also touching on concerns
regarding the anticompetitive potential of similar acquisitions).
An even greater concern would be if a drug company purchased a health insurer or formed
some form of joint venture alliance that provided pathways for disfavoring competitors. Con-
sider the following competition risk of a drug company alliance with a health insurer. Suppose
DrugCo with a 30% market share in a drug offers to underwrite capitation for a health insurer.
In other words, DrugCo agrees to take on the burden of paying a group of doctors or health
care providers a certain amount per enrolled patient, regardless of whether or how much the
enrolled patient seeks care. In exchange, the health insurer would agree to give DrugCo a 40%
market share. In this manner, DrugCo could purchase a greater market share. Although the
industry flirted with that type of arrangement in the 1990s, nothing came to fruition, perhaps
due to FTC scrutiny of competition in the industry. See FED. TRADE COMMN, supra (noting
that FTC approved SmithKline's acquisition of Diversified Pharmaceutical Services while
maintaining there are anticompetitive concerns which will be continually monitored). And if
DrugCo purchased a health insurer, DrugCo would have more direct power for setting reim-
bursement and blocking competitors from access to patient markets. A new consolidation vari-
ant has arisen recently as insurance companies look to purchase PBMs, raising a different set
of issues for competition authorities to contemplate. See Alex Kacik, Cigna-Express Scripts
Deal Unlikely to Benefit Consumers, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www
.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180312/NEWS/180319984/cigna-express-scripts-deal-un-
likely-to-benefit-consumers [https://perma.cc/H7C9-ABAP].
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In theory, the system is designed so that at numerous points throughout
the drug distribution system, the incentives align in favor of obtaining the
lowest cost drug for the patient. The job of the PBM historically has been to
provide valuable services to the plan sponsors by negotiating the lowest cost
and highest quality drug benefit for each plan-whether public or private.
Insurers should be able to use their volume buying power to obtain rebates
that individual patients could never obtain on their own. Insurers also should
be motivated to obtain good pricing structures and lower premiums in order
to compete in the market for patient enrollees. Pharmacists, who know the
prices of the drugs in their stock and see the patient's cost sharing amounts at
the cash register, should be able to give patients information on how to find
the best deal and should be motivated to provide those deals so that patients
can afford their medicines.
In addition, the norms of the medical profession obligate doctors to
make decisions in the best interests of the patient. 94 Public interest groups
should be motivated to step in and nudge the system in healthier directions.
Finally, all of this occurs against the backdrop of a national policy to
expedite and encourage vigorous competition through the rapid entry of
94 NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 111-12.
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generic drugs as soon as patents expire.9 5 Something, however, is not
working in the system.
III. How THE INCENTIVE STRUCTURES DRIVE PRICES HIGHER
As described in the prior section, in a competitive market, the incentive
structures should operate to create competition and keep prices in check. The
reality on the ground, however, is quite different. At numerous levels, the
incentives operate to drive prices higher and reduce competition among ther-
apeutically similar products-or what economists might call, substitute
products. This includes incentives for PBMs, incentives for insurers (includ-
ing Medicare and other government plans), incentives for some pharmacists,
doctors, and patient advocacy groups, and, of course, incentives for drug
companies themselves. Together, this alignment of incentives operates so
that higher prices are a win-win for everyone-except for those who pay the
price.
A. Why PBMs May Prefer Higher Prices
1. PBM Pay Structure
The core of the incentive problem lies with the PBM system. These
middle players, who establish the drug formularies and negotiate between
drug companies and the insurance plans, have evolved in a manner that cre-
ates upward pressure on prices.9 6 These players are uniquely situated with
the bargaining power, drug information, and data to negotiate the most ag-
gressive price concessions from drug companies, but have been distorted by
reimbursement schemes that reward them most significantly when drug
prices and drug spending increases.
The problem starts with a payment structure that, on the surface, would
appear to be procompetitive, but in actuality minimizes the competitive pres-
sures to reduce prices. Insurers pay their PBMs based on the extent of the
discount that a PBM can negotiate with individual drug companies. In highly
simplified form, a PBM is paid based on an amount off of the list price.9 7
95 See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 1 (describing the Hatch-Waxman system
for rapid entry of generic drugs); cf Jennifer L. Graber, Note, Excessive Pricing of Off-Patent
Pharmaceuticals: Hatch It or Ratcher?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146, 1162 (2017) (citing Anna
Edney & Justin Sink, Trump Calls Drug Pricing 'Astronomical' and Promises Changes,
BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www. bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-31/
trump-meets-with-drugmakers-as-industry-fears-price-controls [https://perma.ccl5T3P-EUZ4]
(noting President Trump's promise to find ways "to get new medicines to market faster")).
96 See EXPRESS SCRIPrS, supra note 35, at 13, 18, 62; see also Joana Shepherd, The Fox
Guarding the Henhouse: The Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers by a Market Adver-
sary, 9 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POLY 1, 2 (2013) (noting that PBMs administer prescription drug
benefits for health plan sponsors and also negotiate discounts from drug manufacturers in
exchange for putting the manufacturers' drugs on preferred medication lists).
9 Some forms are modeled as price protections, others as anticipated rebate amounts.
2020] Perverse Incentives 327
The higher the list price, the greater the spread opportunity. In other words,
the greater the distance between the list price and the final price, the more
money a PBM makes.98 In theory, this might encourage PBMs to drive
prices down, given that their pay is directly tied to the level of discounts and
rebates.99 In reality, the incentives operate to drive prices higher. Drug com-
panies compete with generics, or those who would offer lower-priced drugs
within the same class, by raising the drug's list price, which allows them to
offer what appears to be an even more attractive rebate deal to PBMs.
In this manner, the drug company can offer a sweeter deal to a PBM,
without absorbing the full cost of that sweetener. The drug company collects
the same final price for the drug, but the PBM can command a higher fee
from the health plan in light of the greater discount. Moreover, the contract
between the PBM and the insurance plan is based on the rebate level the
parties think the PBM will be able to negotiate, while the insurance plan is
never permitted to know the actual level of that rebate. If the rebate is more
than the companies anticipated, the PBM pockets that difference as well.100
Driving up prices is a win-win for PBMs and drug companies-drug compa-
nies can charge more for their products, while PBMs increase their slice of
the pie.
One can think of the PBM role as analogous to that of a travel agent. In
theory, both of them ought to be looking for the best price for the customer.
However, a travel agent, who may be paid by the airline and hotel based on
the cost of the vacation, has the incentive to sell you a nice Caribbean cruise,
rather than a trip to a cheap motel at the beach town nearby. As long as the
travel agent can get the trip for you at a price cheaper than other agents will
charge, or than you could get on your own, the travel agent is in a good
position. And if there are only three travel agents in the country, that is even
better.
PBM contracts have been reported to last as long as seven years, while
drug companies change their prices at least annually and sometimes more
frequently.101 On the one hand, this shifts risk to the PBM to ensure that it
98 See Meador, supra note 85, at 82 (noting that PBMs take advantage of the price range
in various price lists for generic drugs, negotiating with manufacturers for a lower price and
setting reimbursement rates with plan sponsors using a higher list price, in order to maximize
the spread); cf. Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that PBMs may use rebates to grow
profits by keeping a share of the high prices paid by insurers for costly medication).
9 See Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at 21-22 (noting that contracts between plan spon-
sors and the PBM are often based on list price without rebates in part because this incentivizes
the PBM to bargain for larger rebates). Accounting methods for PBMs are also problematic.
PBMs report their revenue based on the total value of drugs flowing throught their contracts
and their income as a percentage of that total revenue. Thus their earnings-per-share stock
valuations increase as the total revenue increases, a figure that is, in part, a function of prices.
.oo For a more complete discussion of why insurers agree to this arrangement even without
seeing the terms of PBMs contracts with drug manufacturers see infra notes 162-71 and ac-
companying text.
10' For an example of a particularly powerful PBM-insurer contract, see Hiltzik, supra
note 9 (reporting that in 2016, the California Public Employee Benefits System (CalPERS)
awarded a five-year contract to OptumRx, one of the three major PBMs, to manage prescrip-
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can constantly deliver at least the rebate for which it has contracted with its
insurance client. On the other hand, drug companies and PBMs together use
the system to increase both revenue to the drug firm and income to the PBM
by raising list prices. One need not ascribe any motive on the part of drug
companies to try to influence the design of the system. Drug companies have
simply found a way to operate within the system to their own greatest advan-
tage. Can one really expect anything different from profit-making
enterprises?
In addition to rebates, drug companies offer payments in the form of
administrative fees or data managing fees to PBMs. 102 These administrative
fees do not have to be reported to the health insurance plans or included in
any types of payments that flow through to the plan or to the patient. In-
creasingly, drug companies offer creative fees for "services," such as pro-
viding research and information to the drug company. 103 These fees have the
advantage of being invisible to the insurers, including Medicare and Medi-
caid systems. As a transfer of money from the drug company to the PBM,
these payments reduce the drug company's net income from sales of the drug
and increase the PBM revenue related to a specific drug. Even when a drug
company pays for services from a PBM, if the value of the service is sub-
stantially less than the payment made, the transaction is simply an indirect
price concession. Once again, raising list prices can leave room for the drug
company to offer these goodies, without reducing the company's net income
from sales of the drug. And of course, as described above, many people will
be forced to pay the higher list prices.
As an outcome of this complex process of payments and inducements,
the drug company's product either may be placed in an advantageous posi-
tion on the PBM formulary, 104 or the PBM may even entirely exclude a ge-
tions for the nearly 500,000 CalPERS members and their families enrolled in non-HMO
plans).
102 Complaint at 6, Boss et al. v. CVS Corp. et al. (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2017) (No. 17-01823)
[hereinafter Boss Compl.] (arguing that payments other than rebates are provided under a
variety of labels, including discounts, credits, concession fees, etc.); see also Cahn, supra note
9.
103 See, e.g., EXPRESS SCRIPrS, supra note 35, at 12 (describing its pharmaceutical services
to include aligning its expertise and industry insight with the UBC consulting company, which,
among other services, partners with drug companies to help prescribers with navigating pre-
scription drug coverage and pharmacy options through patient access programs, including pa-
tient assistance programs, reimbursement, alternate funding and compliance services). Express
Scripts acquired UBC in its purchase of another PBM (Medco), in 2012 and sold the subsidi-
ary in 2017. Samantha Liss, Express Scripts to Sell Subsidiary to Private-Equity Firm, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 27, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/express-
scripts-to-sell-subsidiary-to-private-equity-firm/article 26514461-225a-5e81-8abb-
09efe0ab005b.html [https://perma.cc/GM8K-BEPQ].
1" Rebate agreements may also ensure a form of most favored nation status, ensuring that
competitors do not have better access in any way, presumably even if the competitor offers a
lower price. See, e.g., Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir.
2016) (contract clause preventing hospitals from giving competing drugs priority status).
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neric or competing drug in the same class from being reimbursed at all.105
Documents submitted to the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance show that in
2014, for example, Express Scripts PBM negotiated a significant rebate from
Abbvie on its hepatitis C drug in exchange for giving that drug an exclusive
position on its formulary and excluding the competing drugs Sovaldi and
Harvoni.1 06 Senate documents also note that some states followed suit award-
ing Abbvie's drug a preferred position on its formulary in light of the fact
that "Abbvie submitted more aggressive rebates."10 7
2. The Power of Volume
The rebate, or the size of the rebate, may be conditioned on having a
certain volume of the drug purchased by the PBM's client. All of the rebates,
discounts, and other payments, which I refer to as "persuasion payments,"
can be structured as volume discounts, loyalty discounts, or market penetra-
tion rebates.
Regardless of the title of the rebate, the name of the game is volume.
Volume rebates provide a significant advantage to entrenched market partici-
pants at the expense of lower-priced entrants. The more volume rebates a
drug firm can offer the PBM, the better deal it can command to exlude its
rivals. Similarly, the greater a drug's volume, the more the drug company
105 See Complaint at 26, Sanofi-Aventis U.S. v. Mylan GmbH, No. 17-9105, 2019 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 170790 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2017) (drug company Sanofi acknowledged that drug
maker rebates in exchange for exclusive coverage "are not unheard of' but said that drug
makers with monopolies "do not - and under U.S. antitrust law cannot - condition large
rebates to block new rival drugs from key access to the market"). As described in this article, a
drug company does not need to have full monopoly power in any particular drug to create
blocking behavior, nor are the drugs that suffer necessarily new drugs. See infra notes 114-34
and accompanying text; see also Boss Compl., supra note 102, at 6 (arguing that however the
rebates are named or described, they are a quid pro quo for formulary inclusion or placement).
106 See Andrew Pollack, AbbVie Deal Heralds Changed Landscape for Hepatitis Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/22/business/pharmacy-deal-
heralds-changed-landscape-for-hepatitis-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/U2KG-QLAN]; Gail R.
Wilensky, "Negotiating" Drug Prices for Medicare, 70 HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. MAG. 3,
32-33 (2016). Subsequently, CVS Health Corp. struck a deal to make Gilead's hepatitis C
medicines the exclusive treatments for its customers following rebate negotiations. See Robert
Langreth & Caroline Chen, Gilead Makes Exclusive Deal With CVS for Hepatitis C Drugs,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-05/gilead-
makes-exclusive-deal-with-cvs-for-hepatitis-c-medicine [https://perma.cc/8JWD-QNLP];
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 114TH CONG., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS IMPACT ON
THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 114 (Comm. Print 2015) (citing an email from the Director,
Federal Government Affairs at CVS Health Corp. stating "as new drugs came on to the market
like Viekira Pak, we were able to negotiate discounts [with Gilead]"). In theory, when players
equally situated compete to lower prices, the customer benefits. As noted below, however,
problems may arise when the players are not equally situated, such as when one player has a
large stable of drugs with which to bargain and the other does not. And as noted in prior
sections, the entire rebate system pushes prices higher, prices that patients will frequently pay
without the rebate and that create other burdens and economic distortions.
107 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 114TH CONG., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS IM-
PACT ON THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 88 (Comm. Print 2015).
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can spread out any discount across each unit of the drug sold.108 In other
words, suppose DrugCo sells 100,000 bottles of LifeElixer at $10 a piece to
a particular PBM for total sales revenue of $1 million. With rebates and
other payments worth 20%, the drug company can offer the PBM a
$200,000 check, of which the PBM might keep a significant portion. In con-
trast, if a competitor sells only 10,000 bottles at the same $10 price, the
rebate and payment discount rate of 20% would provide only a $20,000
check for the PBM. Thus, the same price and the same discount rate will be
far less attractive to the PBM. And, of course, a new drug just coming on the
market would lack the volume to match the total rebate dollars offered by
the current market leader.
These rebate schemes do not necessarily aim for exclusivity in the mar-
ket or even for massive increases in the market. If a drug company has a
50% market share, it may be tremendously expensive to extract too much
additional market share. For example, if the competing drug is not a perfect
substitute, some patients will simply refuse to switch, supported by laws that
require a plan to allow patients to remain with their original drug under
certain circumstances. 109 Other consumers may choose to pay for their origi-
nal drug out of pocket, which could prevent the PBM from reaching the
volume or other requirement for the payments. In those circumstances, the
drug company would have to pay an enormous sum to the PBM to compen-
sate. Thus, hypothetically, a PBM might simply aim to increase its market
share by ten or fifteen percent. With drugs for which the molecule is really
the same, for example insulin, a drug company might try to push its market
share up far more aggressively. In many cases, however, the drug company
may be bargaining for smaller market share increases, an approach that may
be more difficult to measure in traditional federal antitrust terms, which may
categorize behavior as inappropriate only when it rises to the level of at-
tempts at market dominance, rather than smaller increases in market share.
The volume rebate barriers are particularly problematic in combination
with the patent system and other aspects of the drug approval process that
can create additional barriers to entry by competitors.110 When a drug's pat-
ent or its other regulatory exclusivities expire, lower-priced generic competi-
tors should be able to enter the market quickly and drive prices down.' The
brand company, however, is likely to have enjoyed unfettered access to mar-
kets, so that when the patent expires, the company holds a majority of mar-
"o Michael E. Porter, How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy, 59 HARV. Bus. REv. 2,
137, 140 (1979) (noting how buying groups are more powerful if they purchase in large
volumes).
109 See generally infra note 175.
.o FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 49, 86, 136; Robin Feldman, Empirical Evi-
dence of Drug Pricing Games -A Citizen's Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39,
45 (2017); Robin Feldman, Regulatory Property: The New IP, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 54, 64
(2016) (describing the various bargaining chips utilized in negotiations between PBMs and
manufacturers).
". See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 33.
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ket share, if not total market dominance. 112 Given the advantages of volume
in the PBM system, competitors may be unable to break through and gain
more than limited market shares, despite their vastly lower prices.
Other contractual terms in the contracts between drug companies and
PBMs can further entrench a market leader. An incumbent drug company
with a PBM contract may be given a right of first refusal. This would allow
the drug company to match any lower price that is bid by another company
after new requests for bids have gone out. On the flip side, the drug com-
pany could promise that it will not offer a lower price to any other PBM or
buying group. 113 Sometimes called most-favored-nation clauses, these agree-
ments not only deter price competition in the PBM industry, they may also
have the effect of setting uniform prices for drugs across the industry. Spe-
cifically, to the extent that state or federal reimbursements are based off of
the lowest prices available or average sales price on a particular drug,
promises not to give a better price help could help drug companies maintain
price levels.
The circumstances described above relate to a company foreclosing
competition using volume rebates related to a single drug. Courts have yet to
address that issue squarely. However, dicta in older cases relating to foreclo-
sure through volume rebates across multiple drugs suggest that single-drug
behavior poses no threat to competition. The following section describes
multi-drug foreclosure, and Part III.A.4 describes the older cases.
3. Bundled Rebates
When a drug company has a portfolio of drugs to offer, the opportuni-
ties for blocking competition increase. Consider a drug company that has
three drugs, and imagine that two of the drugs are strongly buttressed against
competition, perhaps protected by strong patents or regulatory exclusivities
or by having no competitor on the horizon. The company's third drug is
vulnerable to competition, either because its patents and exclusivities have
expired or because the remaining patents are weak, secondary ones.1 14 The
112 It is important to note that a patent is not a guarantee of a monopoly. It brings the right
to exclude and the opportunity thereby to obtain a monopoly position. There may be substi-
tutes in the market, however, such as ibuprofen and acetaminophen, or the market may have no
interest in the drug. For a deeper discussion of these issues, see ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING
PATENT LAw 23 n.53 (2012) (citing Brief for Respondent at 24, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep.
Ink Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329).
113 See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 809 F. Supp.
2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (No. 2:10-cv-14155) (challenging Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michi-
gan's use of MFNs); see also Roy LEVY, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY: A DISCUSSION OF COMPETITIVE AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN AN ENVIRONMENT OF
CHANGE 54 (1999).
114 Secondary patents cover various adjustments to a drug's timing, dosage, or delivery
mechanism, rather than covering the main chemical formula or innovation. Secondary patents,
sometimes called evergreen patents, may be added in an effort to extend the life of the drug's
protection, and such patents can be more difficult to defend in court. For an explanation and
empirical analysis of evergreening, see Feldman, supra note 8, at 596; Michael A. Carrier,
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company can bargain so that the weaker drug receives an exclusive or pre-
ferred position on the formulary.
The strategy is known as packaged, bundled, or loyalty rebates115 With
such an approach, a DrugCo tells a PBM that in order to get the best rebate,
the PBM's client must accumulate a certain volume, not just across one drug,
but across all of the drugs. Under those terms, a competitor with only one
drug could be completely unable to offer a comparable deal.
The strategy may be particularly powerful when one drug of the drugs
that are part of the bundle enjoys significant market share, perhaps due to a
strong patent position. In that case, the brand company could offer a break
on the price of the patented product-for which there is strong protection
against competition-in exchange for a preferred position for drugs in which
there is strong competition. The competitor would not be in a position to
offer a comparable deal.
a. Allergan Pharmaceuticals's Drug Restasis. For example, in Octo-
ber of 2017, Shire Pharmaceuticals sued Allergan Pharmaceuticals, alleging
that Allergan used bundled rebates to block competition and preserve its
dominant market share in the blockbuster dry-eye medication, Restasis. 116
Shire's complaint alleged that this scheme does not save patients money as
the "clinically inferior" Restasis is "not an innovative product" and has a
greater incidence of adverse reactions.117 According to the complaint, the
brand drug enjoyed a complete monopoly on the preferred tier of Medicare
formularies from 2002 until the FDA approved the competing brand drug
Xiidra, and Allergan developed the scheme to shore up its monopoly posi-
tion as the competing drug emerged.1" The complaint alleges further that the
scheme has made it impossible for the new drug to gain reasonable formu-
lary access, and that according to one Medicare plan administrator, given
Allergan's bundling scheme, Shire could give the new drug away for free
and the numbers still wouldn't work.119 This striking statement demonstrates
the power that market share combined with bundled rebates can wield in
blocking newer competition.
b. Johnson & Johnson's Drug Remicade. In a similar vein, a case filed
in late 2017 alleges that Johnson & Johnson attempted to suppress competi-
Nicole L. Levidow & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Antitrust Law to Challenge Turing's
Daraprim Price Increase, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1405 (2016); and Stacy L. Dogan &
Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L. REV. 685, 687 (2009).
115 See Robin Cooper Feldman, Defensive Leveraging in Antitrust, 87 GEO. L.J. 2079,
2103-05 (1999); see also Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Package or Bundled Dis-
counts, in ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
556 (3d ed. 2011).
116 See Complaint at 6, 21-23, Shire U.S., Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., No. 17-7716 (D.N.J.
2017) (implying specifically that Allergan's product portfolio, including many popular
Glaucoma drugs, provides them the "financial wherewithal to give . . . rebates that far exceed
anything that Shire could offer on Xiidra").
117 Id. at 2, 3, 18-19.
11 1 d. at 4-5.
119 Id. at 6-7.
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tion following expiration of the patent protection on the company's inflam-
mation drug Remicade.1 20 Johnson & Johnson's drug dominated the market
from 1998 through 2016, when Pfizer introduced the biosimilar version, In-
flectra.1 21 According to the complaint, just weeks after the biosimilar's intro-
duction, Johnson & Johnson began its "Biosimilar Readiness Plan" which
included anticompetitive bundling, coercive rebates, and exclusionary con-
tracts. 122 The complaint contends that Johnson & Johnson induced insurers to
enter contracts that required an explicit commitment to exclude the biosimi-
lar completely from formularies or to provide reimbursement only in the
rarest of circumstances." 123
Tactics cited in the complaint include threatening to withhold rebates on
Remicade prescriptions-both from existing and new patients-unless in-
surers agree to exclusivity 24 and bundling the rebates across multiple prod-
ucts so insurers that refuse to grant Remicade exclusivity will suffer rebate
losses across their drug portfolios. 125 The deals apply not only to insurers but
to providers such as hospitals, who purportedly declined to stock the bi-
osimilar, even though it was covered by government programs, effectively
forcing the government to continue reimbursing providers for the more ex-
pensive Remicade. 126 The Remicade lawsuit suggests the power of bundled
rebates in the market for drugs delivered in the hospital setting, as well as
drugs purchased from retail pharmacies.
c. AstraZeneca's Drug Nexium. In 2015, AstraZeneca entered into a
small settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice regarding its drug Nex-
ium. 12 7 The case alleged that AstraZeneca provided rebates to a PBM in ex-
change for giving Nexium sole and exclusive status on formularies. 128 The
case also alleged that, as part of the deal, the drug company gave price con-
cessions on other drugs, including Prilosec, Toprol SL, and Plendil. 129 At the
time, the drug company was already engaged in shifting the market from
Prilosec to Nexium, such that price concessions for Prilosec would not hurt
120 Complaint at 1, Pfizer, Inc., v. Johnson & Johnson and Janssen Biotech, Inc., 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31690 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (No. 17-4180).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 2.
123 Id. at 3. If insurers are allowed to reimburse for the biosimilar when Remicade has
failed, the complaint alleges that the effects of the contract are still exclusionary because phy-
sicians are unlikely to turn to the biosimilar if the original drug failed. See id. at 3-4.
124 Id. at 5.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Dep't of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, AstraZeneca to Pay $7.9 Million to Resolve
Kickback Allegations, Press Release (Feb. 11, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/medco-
pay-79-million-resolve-kickback-allegations [https://perma.cc/4E97-X6MV].
128 Complaint for Damages and Other Relief under the Qui Tam Provisions of the Federal
False Claims Act and Similar State Provisions at 2, United States of America et al. v. As-
traZeneca LP et al., No. 10-00910 (D. Del. 2010).129 Id. at 17.
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the company and would provide little benefit to the PBM's insurance
clients. 130
d. Other Health Care Markets: Vaccine and Medical Devices. Bun-
dling rebate schemes appear in other sectors of the pharmaceutical market as
well. In the vaccine market, as opposed to medications, Sanofi paid to settle
an antitrust bundling suit. 13 1 The suit alleged that when a competing com-
pany planned to enter the market to compete against Sanofi's pediatric men-
ingitis vaccine menactra, Sanofi charged up to 34.5% higher prices for the
vaccine, unless buyers agreed to purchase all of Sanofi's vaccines exclu-
sively. 132 Sanofi paid $61.5 million in October of 2017 to settle the case,
which was pending in a federal district court in New Jersey. 133
In the medical device market, a competitor sued Tyco for engaging in
anticompetitive conduct related to discounts for its oximity meter product, a
non-invasive device that clips onto the end of patient's finger and measures
pulse and blood oxygen saturation. Tyco provided loyalty discounts to hospi-
tals that agreed to purchase a certain percentage of their requirements from
the company, sole-source discount agreements, and bundled rebate agree-
ments. 134 In an unpublished, non-precedential opinion, the trial court upheld
the jury's findings of anticompetitive conduct related to all three types of
agreements-an opinion that will be discussed further in Part III.A.4 below.
e. Does Negotiating on a Drug-by-Drug Basis Eliminate Bundling?
In the modem context, PBMs and drug companies could argue that bundled
behavior is not possible, asserting that they negotiate rebates with a drug
company on a drug-by-drug basis. Even to the extent that is accurate, other
fees flowing from drug companies to PBMs need not be based on a single
drug. Moreover, the complexity of the contracts can camouflage the bun-
dling aspects. For example, DrugCo's bid on drug X can stipulate that if the
plan provides a favored position for another one of the company's drugs Y,
then the rebate on drug X will increase by an additional amount. In that way,
DrugCo can reference other drugs in its bid for a single drug.
130 FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 71.
131 See generally Order Granting Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Approving
Plan of Distribution, and Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal, Castro, M.D., P.A. v. Sanofi
Pasteur, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96001 (D.N.J. 2012) (No. 11-7178) [hereinafter Sanofi
Settlement Final Approval]; Order Granting Preliminary Approval of the Proposed Settlement,
Approval of the Proposed Manner and Form of Notice, and Appointment of Escrow Agent and
Settlement Administrator at 2, Castro, M.D., P.A. v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 96001 (D.N.J. 2012) (No. 11-7178) [hereinafter Sanofi Settlement Preliminary
Approval].
132 Class Action Complaint at 3, Castro, M.D., P.A. v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., LEXIS 96001
(D.N.J. 2012) (No. 11-7178).
133 See generally Sanofi Settlement Final Approval, supra note 131; Sanofi Settlement
Preliminary Approval, supra note 131, at 2.
134 Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, LP., No. 02-cv-4770(MRP), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29977, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2006) (unpublished case with no precedential
value).
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Finally, although price is important to a PBM in awarding a contract to
a drug company, it is not the only factor. PBMs could also consider stability
of source and supply, which means that the company with more drugs and
greater resources is in a better position. PBMs may also favor dealing with
fewer manufacturers, to reduce transaction costs, once again favoring the
company with more drugs in a way that can provide more room for bun-
dling-type effects.
4. Scattered Decisions on Volume Discounts in the Health Care
Industry
Bundled rebates did not originate with the emergence of the PBM mid-
dle-player system. This author wrote about bundled pharmaceutical rebates
roughly twenty years ago, in relation to efforts to block generic competitors
out of the market who might try to gain a foothold against entrenched mo-
nopolists by splintering off sections of the market and gaining a foothold. 135
That case sets the stage for the modem antitrust battles that may unfold as
rebates are challenged in the courts. Specifically, Eli Lilly had a monopoly
over the cephalosporin market for almost a decade when competitor
SmithKline introduced two new types of cephalosporin. 13 6 Lilly responded
with a rebate plan providing optimum prices only when hospitals purchased
a certain amount of at least three of Lilly's five cephalosporin options. 137
SmithKline brought an antitrust action against Eli Lilly alleging that
Lilly's marketing scheme was "an unlawful tying device," and that Lilly had
committed "monopolization in violation of section two of the Sherman
Act." 138 The district court declined to find illegal tying given that buyers had
the freedom to purchase the products individually, even if the terms were
economically unfavorable. 139
The district court agreed with the plaintiff, however, that Lilly's rebate
scheme constituted "the willful maintenance of monopolistic power." 140 The
court explained that it is impermissible for Lilly to use pricing to link mo-
nopolistic products with another competitive product to deter a competitor
from entering or effectively competing in the market. 14 1 In dicta, however,
the court suggested that Lilly was free to take efforts to maximize profits
when competing "product versus product."14 2 This 1976 language may com-
135 See Feldman, supra note 115, at 2091, 2104 (citing SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1976)).
136 SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
137 Id. at 1091-92.
138 Id. at 1091.
139 Id. at 1112-14.140 d. at 1120-21.
141 Id. at 1128. But see Masimo Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29977, at *34-37 (unpub-
lished case with no precedential value criticizing the reasoning in SmithKline).
142 SmithKline Corp., 427 F. Supp. at 1128.
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plicate modern efforts to rein in volume discount behavior, outside the ex-
plicit bundling context.
In a separate section of the decision, the Eli Lilly court declined to find
tying in the case because the buyer was free to buy the two drugs separately,
despite any financial burden. The court noted that although "[tlhe econom-
ics of the market place precluded that freedom of choice for most hospitals;
such a freedom of choice ... is enough to circumvent the tie-in prohibitions
of the relevant antitrust laws." 14 3
The definition of "choice" embodied in the court's analysis leaves
much to be desired. At some point, the notion of what constitutes a choice is
so extreme as to become absurd. For example, suppose I say, "I'm not forc-
ing you to buy both products. You could certainly buy them separately. I will
just take your first-born child as payment, if you do." Would we really say
this is a choice? And when it comes to profits-the beloved child of free
enterprise-is it really a choice when the economic effects are so drastic?
In addition to the 1976 Eli Lilly case, a more modern case addresses
health care rebates, although in the context of medical devices, rather than
drugs. As noted above, 144 Masimo v. Tyco concerned various discount pro-
grams related to Tyco's oximity meter. These included a single-product dis-
count to hopsitals that agreed to purchase a certain percentage of their
requirements from the company (market share discount), a sole source
agreement, and bundled discounting. 145 In an unpublished, non-precedential
opinion, the trial court upheld various jury verdicts finding anticompetitive
conduct for each of these forms of agreement. The court found that the mar-
ket share discounts in relation to single-drug activity constituted exclusive
dealing arrangements in practical effect, foreclosing more than twenty-four
percent of the market, thereby violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, as well as violating Sherman Act Section 2's
prohibition on attempted monopolization. 146 The court found that the sole
source agreement violated the same provisions.
The bundled discount portion of the decision also resulted in a decision
at odds with Eli Lilly, which was handed down in a different circuit. Explic-
itly disagreeing with the logic of the Eli Lilly opinion, the trial court in
Masimo declined to find that bundled discounts constituted a tying arrange-
ment. 147 Rather, the court held that as a general matter, bundled discounts do
143 See id. at 1114 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1958)
("Of course where the buyer is free to take either produce by itself there is no tying problem
even though the seller may also offer the two items at a single price")).
144 See supra text accompanying note 134.
145 Masimo Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29977, at *3.
14 6 See id. at *16, *19, *33.
147 See id. at *37 (unpublished opinion from the Central District of California disagreeing
with the Third Circuit opinion of Eli Lilly & Co. v. SmithKline and another Third Circuit
decision related to discounts outside the health care context, LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d
141, (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (June 30, 2004)).
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not constitute monopolization without evidence of predatory pricing-that
is, pricing below cost-or tying.
Thus, antitrust decisions on single-drug and bundled discounts in the
health care industry are few and far between, with much of that language
unpublished or in dicta from forty years ago. Even if the language were
precedential, the pharmaceutical industry distribution system forty years ago
was a pale shadow of the world we live in today. In the modern context,
volume discounts in both bundled and single-drug settings are being
deployed on a vastly more sophisticated and dangerous scale, given the in-
centive structures and information asymmetries in the PBM market.
5. The Effects of Bundled Rebates
The system certainly provides strange results, some of which are begin-
ning to leak into public view. For example, a 2017 article in the New York
Times reported on insurance plans that punished patients for filling prescrip-
tions with the generic version, rather than the brand. 148 One patient learned
that using the generic version of Adderall would cost her family $50 more
per month; another found that his plan would not cover the generic version
of Adderall at all, with the result that he had to pay $90 a month in co-
payments when he normally paid $10 or less a month for his generic medica-
tions. Tactics such as these have helped Adderall keep twenty-nine percent
of the market share, when the average market share for brands after one year
of generic competition is far less. 149 Similarly, pharmacists were informed at
the end of 2017 that some Medicare prescription drug plans (with formula-
ries designed by the CVS Caremark PBM) would cover only brand-name
versions of twelve drugs, some of which have generic competitors on the
market.15 0 These reimbursement decisions led one physician to describe the
pattern as "Alice-in-Wonderland time in the drug world."15 1
148 Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Take the Generic, Patients are Told. Until They Are
Not., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/health/prescription-
drugs-brand-name-generic.html?mtrref undefined [https://perma.cc/U4JU-4P3X].
149 See id. Henry Grabowski, Genia Long & Richard Mortimer, Recent Trends in Brand-
Name and Generic Drug Competition, 17 J. MED. ECON. 1, 6, 7 (2013); Andreas J. Dirnagl &
Myrvet A. Cocoli, Global Generic Pharmaceutical Industry Review: Corporate Research,
BANK OF TOKYO-MITSUBISHI 11 (2016), https://www.krungsri.com/bank/getmediala5599675-
701b-49d8-a857-33d247c773a0/BTMU-Research-201602-29.aspx [https://perma.cc/VT6Z-
PYBS]; AssN FOR ACCESSIBLE MED., Generic Drug Access & Savings in the U.S., AssN FOR
ACCESSIBLE MED. 16 (2017) https://accessiblemeds.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/2017-
AAM-Access-Savings-Report-2017-web2.pdf [https://perma.cc/87WZ-WPLG].
150 Ornstein and Thomas, supra note 148.
151 Id. In an example from medical care, rather than medicines, the FTC entered into a
consent agreement in 2017 with a group of ophthalmologists in Puerto Rico. The complaint
alleged that collusion by the physician group had forced a health plan and network administra-
tor to abandon plans for a new lower-cost network. See generally, Cooperativa de M6dicos
Oftalm6logos de Puerto Rico, No. C-4603 F.T.C. (2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/cases/170303c4603_cooperativa order.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XQR-6ECW]; Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Puerto Rico Opthamologist Group Settles FTC Charges that
Members Agreed to An Illegal Boycott of Health Plan (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/
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Moreover, an empirical study by this author documented widespread
formulary discrepancies that disadvantage generic drugs in favor of brand
drugs. 152 For example, from 2010-2017, the percentage of generic drugs on
the most-preferred tier dropped from seventy-three percent to twenty-eight
percent.153 This harms patients, given that a patient's generic copay triples
when moving from the most-preferred tier to the next tier, even though the
health plan's cost for generic drugs on the two tiers remains the same. 154
During the same period, the percentage of drugs placed on inappropriate
tiers in relation to drugs with the same active ingredient increased from
forty-seven percent to seventy-four percent.155
In the same vein, a pair of class action lawsuits filed in 2017 against
Walgreens and CVS alleged that the pharmacies charged patients more for
purchasing certain generic drugs than they would have had to pay without
insurance or if paying cash. 156 The cases alleged violations of Racketeering
Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, fraud, violations of state unfair
competition and consumer protection laws, breach of fiduciary duty, and
violation of provisions of the patients' health care plans.15 7
The rebate system for brand drugs can have spillover effects on prices
for generic drugs. For example, the pharmaceutical company Valeant drew
public fury when it raised the price of its drug Syprine from $652 in 2010 to
$21,267 in 2015.158 In February of 2018 the generic company Teva an-
news-events/press-releases/2017/0 1/puerto-rico-ophthalmologist-group-settles-ftc-charges-
members [https://perma.cc/KH6H-6NA4].
152 See Feldman, supra note 65.
153 Id. at 30-31.
154 Id. at 31-32; see also 2017 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFIT SURVEY, KAISER FAMILY
FOUNDATION, (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.kff.org/report-sectionlehbs-2017-section-9-pre-
scription-drug-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/T87V-EBK5] (documenting average copay on vari-
ous tiers).
155 Id. at 25.
156 See Complaint at 2, Schultz v. CVS Health, No. 17-00359 (D.R.I., Aug. 07, 2017),
ECF No. 1; Complaint at 2, Grabstald v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., No. 17-05789, (N.D.
Ill., Aug. 09, 2017), ECF No.1 (alleging that plaintiffs would have paid less for generic drugs
had they paid with cash instead of insurance). These complaints were voluntarily dismissed.
Notice of Voluntary Dismssal, Schultz v. CVS Health, No. 17-00359 (D.R.I. Aug. 23, 2017),
ECF No. 8; Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Grabstald v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., No.
17-05789 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017), ECF No. 25 (providing notice of plaintiffs' voluntary
dismissals of their cases).
151 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, CVS Caremark Corp. to Pay $36.7 Million to U.S.,
23 States, and D.C. to Settle Medicaid Prescription Drug Fraud Allegations (Mar. 18, 2008),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/iln/chicago/2008/prO318_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
F6MJ-BSKJ] (announcing that CVS Caremark agreed to pay $36.7 million to the U.S. govern-
ment, twenty-three states, and the District of Columbia to settle claims that the company im-
properly switched patients from the tablet version of the ulcer and stomach acid prescription
drug Ranitadine to a more expensive capsule version, in order to increase Medicare
reimbursements).
15' Katie Thomas, Patients Eagerly Awaited a Generic Drug. Then They Saw the Price.,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/23/health/valeant-drug-price-
syprine.html?emc= editth_180224&nl todaysheadlines&nlid=497896550224 [https://per
ma.cc/D9ZP-KD6K].
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nounced that it would sell a generic version of the drug. 15 9 The joy and opti-
mism that greeted the announcement was dampened, however, when the
price for the generic emerged. At $18,375 for a bottle of 100 pills, the ge-
neric is hardly a bargain, and certainly not for a drug that cost $652 in
2010.160 The Syprine example shows the way in which the systemic struc-
tures that push brand prices higher can create opportunities for soaring ge-
neric prices, as well. In other words, the system creates an umbrella effect,
sheltering the generics from having to reduce prices too quickly or too
steeply.
Some insurers have begun requiring that the PBMs pass through 61 part
or all of the rebates they receive from drug companies. While a noble effort,
rebate pass through provisions have little power when insurers do not have
the right to see the contracts between the drug companies and PBMs. Most
important, rebate pass through attempts miss the point. For example, one
industry consultant notes even when PBM contracts specify that all or most
of rebates must be passed through to the health insurer, the language defines
the term "rebate" as amounts attributable to utilization of pharmaceuticals
by the health plan, which may be defined to exclude price concessions paid
on mail-order and specialty pharmacies, bundled rebates or loyalty pay-
ments, and fees not designated as rebates. In short, drug companies can sim-
ply shift that money to other types of side payments that the PBM can hold
onto. 162 The incentives continue unabated. 163
159 Teva Announces Launch of Generic Version of Syprine in the United States, Bus. WIRE
(Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20180209005252/en/ [https://perma
.cc/7TPB-H6CB].
160 Thomas, supra note 158.
161 With pass through, the PBM must transmit all of the rebates from drug companies to
the health plan, rather than keeping part of the spread. See Ge Bai, Mariana P. Socal & Gerard
F. Anderson, Policy Options to Help Self-Insured Employers Improve PBM Contracting Effi-
ciency, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 29, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20190529.43197/full/ [https://perma.cc/K5ST-7K35]. For an explanation of the current
system in contrast, see supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
162 See infra note 182 and accompanying text; see also supra note 161 (noting that when
PBM contracts agree to pass through all or most of the rebates to their clients, the contracts
may define rebates to exclude rebates paid with respect to utilization of specialty drugs).
163 Concerned about the role PBMs may be playing in rising drug spending, a few states
recently have tried to absorb the PBM functions themselves. For example, in July of 2017,
West Virginia's Medicaid agency took over for the PBMs, and the state's Department of Health
and Human Resources reports that it saved roughly $30 million in the first six months. See
Ivan Zhykhariev, Health Care Policy: PBMs' Medicaid Role Under Attack in Some States, 6
CAPITOL F. 1, 1-2 (2018), https://www.ohiopharmacists.org/aws/OPAlpt/sd/news article/
152158/_PARENT/layout interiordetails/false [https://perma.cc/9L28-Z7NS]. It would be
difficult for states to remove PBMs from their Medicare and Medicaid services entirely, given
the myriad of services that PBMs provide at so many levels. Most important, our history casts
doubt on the notion that government programs are likely to run more smoothly and efficiently
than free-market programs. The challenge involves fixing the perverse incentives and competi-
tive barriers that are distorting the current market system.
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6 Why Insurers Allow the PBM Rebate System
One might ask why insurers would ever agree to such a system. Con-
sider a highly sophisticated and economically powerful private health insurer
or self-insured employer. A player with that level of sophistication and buy-
ing power, in theory, could demand a different deal from its PBM, including
pass through of all rebates and comprehensive files on all claims and rebate
checks.
a. Insurance Company Interest in Maintaining the Status Quo. How-
ever, it may not be in the health plan's immediate economic interests to bar-
gain for these terms.M Recent exchanges between the PBM Express Scripts
and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission demonstrate that PBMs
charge a health insurer more if the insurer receives a rebate pass through. In
addition, one cannot overestimate the data analysis challenges and the enor-
mous time and resources necessary for health insurers to fully interpret what
is happening. Moreover, as described above, volume agreements work so
that those who are already in the market and have a higher volume can offer
deals that cheaper entrants cannot match. Thus, to the PBM and to the plan,
the price may actually be cheaper.
PBMs are also already well ahead of the game when it comes to offer-
ing attractive deals to health insurers. A more recent innovation in PBM
contraction does not involve rebates at all. Known as "price protection," the
PBM promises the insurer that overall prices will rise between two and four
percent a year and no more, for example. This approach completely obscures
the rebates and other payments from drug companies to the PBMs, allowing
these deals to flourish unchecked while appealing to the health insurer's bot-
tom-line interests.
Even if the health insurer had sufficient size and economic power to
exert its muscle, it might still be entirely rational to go with the flow. Any
individual insurer that tried to buck the system would bear all the burdens of
trying to ensure competition in the drug industry, meaning that no one would
be willing to move alone. And of course, antitrust law frowns deeply on the
collusion among insurance competitors that might produce joint action.
Companies could rationally conclude that responding to the clear, short-term
benefit is a better opportunity.
b. Long- and Short-Term Costs. The long-term versus short-term
problem is magnified by the pressures created for a public company of satis-
fying annual and quarterly expectations for shareholders and market ana-
lysts. 16 5 For both public and private companies, year-end or quarterly
bonuses, designed to incentivize performance, may create pressure on con-
1" See Eric R. Slusser, Exec. Vice President and Chief Fin. Officer to Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n (June 26, 2017) (on file with author) (noting PBM Express Scripts finds that some
clients prefer to keep a greater percentage of rebates).
165 See Nitzan Shilon, Putting Directors' Money Where Their Mouths Are: A New Ap-
proach to Improving Corporate Takeover Dynamics, 2017 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 511, 584.
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tracting departments and company executives to favor short-term over long-
term interests, in order to secure their bonus payments. 166 Next year or next
quarter, someone else could have replaced them in the job or the bonus
structure could have changed. Thus, the value of collecting a bonus today
increases. The burden of the long-term cost is diffused, given that they will
be borne by competitors unable to enter and compete. Any remaining long-
term cost is difficult to perceive, measure, and respond to in the short term.
The pressures of the short term, combined with the diffusion of the long-
term costs, drown out any long-term considerations.
c. PBM Market Concentration and Insurance Companies. Concentra-
tion in the PBM market also makes it difficult for insurance companies to
push back. When the PBM big three offer some of the same key terms-
including refusing to give auditors access to drug company contracts-a
health insurance company's options are limited. Insurers may even inadver-
tently support the system, by sending letters to patients warning them that
the drug they are on is not covered or not preferred. From the insurer's per-
spective, that is perfectly reasonable information to share with the patient, 167
even if the preferred drug has a lower cash price or if the effects of the
insurer's formulary will be to reduce competition in a supplier's industry.
Some larger employers and insurers are beginning to push back by
forming their own, internal PBMs. These include employers such as Berk-
shire Hathaway and J.P. Morgan and insurers such as Anthem and the Kaiser
HMO system. To the extent this route proves effective across time, however,
the approach of forming one's own PBM would be available only for large
players. In addition, if large players form their own PBM, the incentives still
might continue unabated. Drug companies could shift from sharing monop-
oly rents with PBM middle players to sharing those rents with health insur-
ers. The true competition that brings down prices and benefits patients would
continue to languish.
166 Martin D. Mobley, Compensation Committee Reports Post-Sarbanes-Oxley: Unim-
proved Disclosure of Executive Compensation Policies and Practices, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 111, 150, 171-74; cf Julie Wokaty, Investors Say Executive Pay Packages at Pharma
May Incentivize Drug Pricing Risks, INTERFAITH CTR. ON CORPORATE RESP. BLOG (Dec. 13,
2017) http://www.iccr.org/investors-say-executive-pay-packages-pharma-may-incentivize-
drug-pricing-risks-0 [https://perma.cc/N5UR-B5HV] (explaining post-shareholder resolution
on drug pricing and access with quote from United Auto Workers Retiree Medical Benefits
Trust representative that "misaligned incentive pay may encourage executives to sacrifice
long-term, organic growth from drug discovery for short-term, 'quick fix' strategies that may
pose business risks").
167 In some cases, written notice of certain formulary changes is mandated by state law.
See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1369.0541(a)(3) (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-
49.4 (2019) (Texas and New Mexico state laws mandating that insurers provide to affected
parties sixty-days' advance written notice if a drug is removed or loses preferred classification
on a formulary).
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7. Summary of the PBM Rebate System
As described above, rising prices are largely cost free to the drug com-
pany. 168 The drug company can return the extra amount collected with the
price increase to the PBMs in the form of side payments and rebates, while
maintaining or increasing the same drug sales revenue.169 As my mother al-
ways told me, however, if it looks too good to be true, it is too good to be
true. Thus, if price increases are cost free for a drug company, then who is
paying the bill? At the head of the line are the employers. Insurance compa-
nies pass the increased price of medications to the employers in the form of
more expensive health insurance. Next in line are the individual patients. As
described above, 170 many people pay the full list price at some point, and
some patients pay the full list price all the time. Individual patients also pay
in the form of higher rates for purchasing the insurance in the first place, as
portions of the increased costs are passed down to them. Government pro-
grams, and the citizens whose taxes provide the funding for those programs,
also pay in terms of the need to provide social and charitable programs when
individuals become impoverished by medical costs. Society's greatest cost,
however, is the reduction of competition among drug substitutes. Rising
prices help drug companies secure advantageous positions on the formula-
ries and block generic and new entrants from gaining much of a foothold.
The system also reinforces the dominant position of larger drug companies
and larger PBMs. The overall reduction in competition redounds to the great
detriment of a society that depends on open and vigorous competition.
In short, it is the perfect lose-lose for patients. Manufacturers raise the
price, the consumer pays the higher price, the extra goes to the PBM, and in
exchange, the PBM creates competition-free zones for the drug company's
drug. 171 In the short term, the patient pays more in the form of higher prices;
in the long term, the patient pays more in the form of fewer competitors to
offer lower-priced drugs.
168 Price rises may impose costs on the drug company in terms of reputation, and drug
companies are certainly taking a beating in the press for high prices. In addition, a health
insurance plan does have to pay the reimbursement at the time of the sale, before any rebate
might be gained. In reaction, the plan could push its PBM to put the drug on a less desirable
tier, thereby affecting utilization.
169 In other words, the drug company maintains the same revenue from the PBM and
increases revenue overall by pulling in higher prices from those who are paying without a
rebate, such as patients who have not reached their deductibles, cannot obtain insurance cover-
age for the medication, or have no drug coverage at all.
170 See supra notes 56-59.
171 Cf FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 35-36 (describing how pay-for-delay deals
between brand and generic hopefuls allow drug companies to use regulatory incentives for
first-filing generic companies to extend competition-free zones, with consumers paying the
price).
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B. Why Pharmacies May Prefer Higher Prices
Pharmacies also play a key role in the drug supply chain, as the point-
of-sale contact for patients. The pharmacist collects the insurance reimburse-
ment payment and the patient's copay or co-insurance amount, 172 and this
may be the first time patients see how much they must contribute to a partic-
ular drug's cost.
1. Pharmacies and Drug Companies
However, large pharmacies, such as substantial retail pharmacy chains,
may also receive side payments from drug companies. 173 These can include
payments for monitoring data or providing other information to the drug
company. If those payments are based on a percentage of total revenue or
unit volume flow, these can provide incentives for the pharmacy to prefer a
drug company with greater market share or with the most expensive drug. To
the extent any of these payments are ever based on drug price, that would
also create a bias towards higher prices.
In addition, higher-volume drug companies, who sell to more patients,
drive more patients to a pharmacy-patients who may buy non-prescription
items offered at the pharmacy. 174 Once again, the pharmacy's interests may
lie in arrangements favorable to the large-volume drug companies that hold
greater market share, and unfavorable to newer players, such as generics
entering the market.
2. How Laws Incentivize Higher Pharmacy Prices
In theory, pharmacists should inform patients about lower-priced alter-
natives. This is particularly important when the calculations for co-insurance
or copayments are complex, and a patient might be better off paying for the
drug on a cash basis, rather than paying a high copay out of pocket. Unfortu-
nately, both contract law and state dispensing laws get in the way of provid-
ing information to the patient. Until recently, some PBM contracts with
pharmacies contained gag rules that prevented pharmacists from volunteer-
ing or even providing the cash price to the patient.175 Although Congress
172 As described below, the patient's contribution may be reduced by coupons or cards
supplied by the drug company to the patient.
173 See Milt Freudenheim, And You Thought a Prescription Was Private, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
8, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/business/09privacy.html [https://perma.cc/
P669-YQEX] (showing that pharmacies selling patient data to drug manufacturers is legal
even in the face of recently enacted privacy laws).
174 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. In theory, a patient's ability to buy other
items in the household budget basket would be constrained when costs increase for medicine.
Although that concept is not entirely irrelevant in health care, health care markets do not
behave in a manner analogous to ordinary markets.
"1 See RICHARD CAUCHI, NATL CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, PROHIBITING PBM "GAG
CLAUSES" THAT RESTRICT PHARMACISTS FROM DISCLOSING PRICE OProNS: RECENT STATE
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passed an anti-gag-clause provision that was signed into law in 2018,176
pharmacists still can provide information only if they have it and are moti-
vated to share it with the patient.
In addition, many dispensing laws allow pharmacists to substitute the
precise generic for the brand, but they do not allow substitution within the
same class of drugs-that is, the laws do not allow substitution among drugs
that treat the same disease and provide similar results but are not specified as
the FDA-approved generic for that precise version of the brand.17 7 Nor do
they allow pharmacists to substitute a generic unless that generic is related to
the brand drug for which the prescription is written. Thus, drug companies
can develop a new version of the drug, with a different timing, dosage, or
delivery system. The new version will be protected by new patents, such that
the generic may have to wait more than a decade before offering the new
version. In that case, the pharmacist cannot suggest that the patient go with
the older generic version, even though the price may be much lower for
something that is essentially the same.1 78
3. Specialty Pharmacies
Specialty pharmacies are those that generally deal only with costly or
complex treatments. 179 For specialty pharmacies, the incentives for higher
prices may be even stronger. Some specialty pharmacies handle only a sin-
gle drug. In that case, the pharmacists would never have the incentive, or
LEGISLATION 2016-2018, (2018) (describing these rules as "restrictions that mean a pharmacist
is prohibited by a contract with a PBM from informing consumers that the drug they want to
buy . . . could be purchased at a lower cost if the consumers paid out of pocket rather than
purchasing through their insurance plan.") (emphasis added); Robert Pear, Why Your Pharma-
cist Can't Tell You That $20 Prescription Could Only Cost $8, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/us/politics/pharmacy-benefit-managers-gag-clauses.html
[https://perma.cc/X9BL-82FY] (quoting Thomas E. Menighan, the chief executive of the
American Pharmacist Association: "the pharmacist cannot volunteer the fact that a medicine is
less expensive if you pay the cash price and we don't run it through your health plan"); see
also id. (describing how multiple states enacted laws to "make sure pharmacists can inform
patients about less costly ways to obtain their medicines"); Paige Pelton, Some Pharmacists
Barred from Helping Patients Save Money, ACTION NEws JAx (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www
.actionnewsjax.com/news/local/some-pharmacists-barred-from-helping-patients-save-money/
705277162/ [https://perma.cc/RTX8-4727] (describing that contracts may prohibit pharmacies
from telling patients about savings when paying in cash).
176 See Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, Pub. L. No. 115-263, 132 Stat. 3672
(2018).
177 See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8 (discussing technique of filing for patents on
minor modifications in dosage or delivery system of a drug and encouraging doctors to pre-
scribe the new formula so that pharmacists cannot substitute the generic, which will have been
approved only for the prior dosage or delivery system).
"1 See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 69-71 (describing product hopping); see
also Feldman, supra note 8, at 597 (showing an empirical study concluding that on average
seventy-eight percent of drugs associated with new patents in the FDA's records were for
existing drugs as opposed to new ones).
179 See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 86; see also Jennifer Hagerman et al.,
Specialty Pharmacy: A Unique and Growing Industry, 2013 PHARMACY TODAY 39, 39.
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even the opportunity, to substitute a generic version.8 0 Specialty pharmacies
also have been used by drug companies as part of strategies to prevent ge-
neric hopefuls from getting the samples necessary to gain FDA approval. In
this strategy, the brand company supplies its drug only through specialty
pharmacies and declines permission to sell to potential generic
competitors.'
Finally, specialty pharmacies can provide easy opportunities for drug
companies to provide additional side payments, in a manner that can help
buttress the drug's market position. For example, in 2015, Novartis paid
$390 million to settle a case with the U.S. Attorney in the Southern District
of New York related to its drugs Exjade and Myfortic, drugs related to side
effects from blood transfusions and organ transplants, respectively. 18 2 The
case alleged that Novartis gave rebate deals to specialty pharmacies in return
for recommending the two drugs, as well as creating incentives and pressure
on doctors to prescribe Exjade. The case alleged violation of anti-kickback
statutes and the False Claims Act.183 Such drug company payments to a phar-
macy can distort the pharmacy's incentives, leading to undesirable results for
consumers.
Other opportunities exist for drug companies to provide payments di-
rectly to specialty pharmacies. In particular, the FDA has been increasingly
approving drugs on the condition that the company provide additional infor-
mation about safety and efficacy over time. 18 4 These approvals are in re-
"' Carrier, Levidow & Kesselheim, supra note 114, at 1381 (noting that Daraprim was
sold to a network of specialty pharmacies through an exclusive deal with Walgreens); Andrew
Pollack, Drug Makers Sidestep Barriers on Pricing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www
.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/business/drug-makers-sidestep-barriers-on-pricing.html [https://per
ma.cc/BP9B-6PWA] (reporting that some patients were directed by doctors to specialty phar-
macies carrying Horizon-manufactured Duexis, a combination of Motrin and Pepcid costing
about $1,500 a month).
181 See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 85-86.
182 See Press Release, Dep't of Justice U.S. Attorney's Office, Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces $370 Million Civil Fraud Settlement Against Novartis Pharmaceuticals for Kick-
back Scheme Involving High-Priced Prescription Drugs, Along with $20 Million Forfeiture of
Proceeds from the Scheme (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-
us-attorney-announces-370-million-civil-fraud-settlement-against-novartis [https://perma.cc/
M7ZG-3GJQ].
183 See id.; see also John George, AmerisourceBergen-owned Specialty Pharmacy to Pay
$13.4M to Settle Kickback Allegations, PHILA. Bus. J. (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www
.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/news/2017/08/24/amerisourcebergen-pharmacy-bioservices-ex-
jade.html [https://perma.ccIU35K-YL4H] (noting that the specialty pharmacy involved paid
$13.4 million in the settlement).
184 See, e.g., Food and Drug Association Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-144, 126 Stat. 993 (allowing the FDA to base accelerated approvals for certain drugs on
markers that indicate the drug is "reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit"); John Carroll,
FDA floats new rules for testing Alzheimer's drugs, SCIENCE (Feb. 16, 2018), http://www
.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/fda-floats-new-rules-testing-alzheimers-drugs [https://perma
.cc/WRH3-T5GX] (remarking that the FDA's draft guidelines effectively suggest an acceler-
ated approval pathway for Alzheimer's drugs if they can indicate the drug is working); see also
Caroline Chen and James Paton, The FDA is Approving Drugs at a Staggering Pace, BLOOM-
BERG (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-06/flurry-of-drug-ap-
provals-has-wall-street-eyeing-pharma-profits [https://perma.cc/T6Q2-NFXX] (noting how
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sponse to pressure on the FDA to get drugs out to market more quickly.
These FDA requirements provide an incentive for the company to track its
drugs closely, which in turn provides an avenue for conferring tracking pay-
ments to any type of pharmacy. It may also allow drug companies to limit
the distribution networks, even when such limited distribution is not re-
quired by the FDA. If such payments are volume-based or not in proportion
to the pharmacy's services, the structure again reinforces market position and
erects barriers to entry.
4. Concerns of PBMs Merging with Pharmacies
The greatest concerns, however, exist when PBMs purchase or run their
own pharmacies, which magnifies the anticompetitive opportunities. First, a
PBM has much greater power to direct patient buying practices than pharma-
cies, given that the PBM designs the formulary, which dictates how much a
patient will have to pay for a given drug. The PBM's power to direct patients
can combine with incentive distortions in the pharmacy space. These distor-
tions are especially problematic when the PBM also owns a specialty phar-
macy that shares monopoly rents with a drug company, particularly a current
market leader or large-volume drug company.1 5 In addition, when formula-
ries require that patients purchase their specialty medicines from the PBM's
own pharmacy, the PBM's incentives and control systems are perfectly al-
igned in favor of the drug company that can offer the highest level of persua-
sion payments. One interest group report asserted that certain PBMs write
their contracts so that specialty drugs must be filled at their own pharmacies
and then reclassify drugs as specialty to drive traffic there.186 Given the lack
of a consistent definition of specialty drugs, such a tactic certainly would be
possible.
Consider the May 2016 class action filed in the wake of a contract
dispute between the health insurance company Anthem and the PBM Ex-
press Scripts. In 2009, the PBM purchased a smaller PBM that was owned
by Anthem. Details of the complex deal, which involved a 10-year agree-
ment for the PBM to administer Anthem's prescriptions, emerged when the
the FDA's recent high rates of drug approvals are tied to 2012 legislation widening the use of
accelerated approvals).
15 See supra notes 114-34 (describing incentives for PBMs to favor a company's drug,
particularly with market leaders and large volume drug companies); see also EXPRESS SCRIPTS,
supra note 35, at 13 (explaining that with their specialty pharmacies, they purchase directly
from the pharmaceutical companies and wholesalers).
186 Unions Report, supra note 89, at 6. The report also cites a pharmacists' advocate ex-
plaining that pharmacists observed the Caremark PBM referring to refrigerated injectable
medications as specialty drugs so that they would have to be filled exclusively by the PBM's
pharmacy, despite the fact that all state pharmacies are required to have refrigeration, and
classified high-cost oral oncology drugs as specialty medication, although they do not require
special care of administration. In contrast, the PBM does not classify inexpensive drugs such
as the Coumadin blood thinner as specialty, although the drug requires monitoring. See id. at 7.
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parties entered litigation over the terms of the contract in March 2016.187 The
class action alleges that the companies breached their fiduciary duties to
patients by negotiating that the Express Scripts PBM would pay less to
purchase the smaller PBM company in exchange for getting to charge pa-
tients above competitive market price for prescription drugs." In other
words, Anthem got more money out of the sale, while patients would have to
pay more over time.
The PBM also could give preference to its own retail pharmacy, re-
stricting patients' access to drugs and preventing independent drugstores
from competing for new customers. One Caremark plan, for example, re-
stricts patients from getting 90-day supplies of a drug from any pharmacy
other than Caremark's own CVS pharmacies. 18 9 If a PBM uses its formulary
power to drive patients towards its own retail pharmacies, the group can also
benefit in the form of ancillary purchases, such as tissues, soap, or over-the-
counter medications, that the patient may make once in the store. 190 As one
commentator noted, regardless of whether the dominant company in the
combined pair is the PBM or the pharmacy, the combination provides incen-
tives for the PBM to steer patients to its own pharmacies, rather than con-
tracting with as many pharmacies as possible to provide maximum location,
convenience and care for its patients, tying its products together to some
degree. 191
"' Anthem, Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., No. 16-CV-02048, 2017 WL 1134765 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 23, 2016).
188 See Second Amended Complaint [ 26, In re Express Scripts/Anthem ERISA Litig.,
285 F. Supp. 3d 665 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 16-3399).
189 See Prescription Benefits FAQ, CVS CAREMARK CORP., https://www.nhsd.org/cms/lib/
PA01001961/Centricity/Domain/65/Prescription%20FAQs%204.1.2016.pdf [https://perna.cc/
8B9E-YL9D] ("CVS Pharmacy is the only retail pharmacy that can provide ... a 90-day
supply" of a prescription for Caremark plan members in the Maintenance Choice program).
190 See Unions Report, supra note 89, at 2-3; CVS CAREMARK CORP., 2008 ANALYST/
INVESTOR MEETING TRANSCRIPT, STATEMENT OF HELENA FOULKEs 7 (2008) (on file with au-
thor) (CVS Caremark executive discussing how CVS Caremark planned to issue 10 million
ExtraCare promotional benefits cards to patients enrolled in prescription benefits plans); see
also The CVS Caremark ExtraCare Health Card, CVS CAREMARK CORP. (2008), https://www
.caremark.com/portal/asset/fsajthp.pdf [https://perna.cc/EZJ7-TRZS] (CVS Caremark pro-
viding discounts on certain CVS-brand items such as allergy and cold remedies, first aid
materials, and oral hygiene products for holders of their ExtraCare Health card); Press Release,
CVS/Pharmacy Expands ExtraCare Program with New Pharmacy and Health Rewards (Feb. 4,
2013), https://cvshealth.com/newsroom/press-releases/cvspharmacy-expands-extracare-pro-
gram-new-pharnacy-health-rewards [https://perma.cc/XSJ8-C736] (announcing a program
wherein customers can earn "free CVS money" for in-store items as a reward for filling a
certain number of prescriptions at CVS/Pharmacy).
191 See FTC Closes Antitrust and Unfair Competition Investigation of CVS Caremark
Post-merger Marketing Practices, AKIN GUMP STRAUss HAUER & FELD LLP (Jan. 19, 2012),
https://www.akingump.comlen/news-insights/ftc-closes-antitrust-and-unfair-competition-in-
vestigation-of-cvs-caremark-post-merger.html [https://perma.cc/M8T7-B255] (noting that
under some PBM contracts, members are automatically enrolled in CVS Caremark's ExtraCare
loyalty program, which may serve the purpose of driving consumers to CVS pharmacies in-
stead of others).
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Finally, the information that a PBM can gain from owning a general or
specialty pharmacy-particularly about patient usage and patient behav-
iors-increases the information asymmetries that put their insurance clients
at a disadvantage. 19 2 In short, when PBMs own pharmacies, the originally
intended structure, in which the PBM is responsible for negotiating the best
bargain on drug prices, becomes so tilted that patients' interests are bound to
suffer.
Consider the example of one PBM and the drug Zyprexa, which is pre-
scribed for psychiatric conditions including schizophrenia and bipolar disor-
der. Documents unsealed in a lawsuit filed by health insurance plans show
that CVS Caremark, a combined PBM and pharmacy, offered to send a letter
to 120,000 doctors touting the benefits of Zyprexa. 19 3 One might imagine
that the claims information would allow the PBM to target physicians who
had prescribed Zyprexa or any competing drugs. The text of the proposed
letter appears in court documents, along with internal documents from the
maker of Zyprexa, noting "the first wave of results from the most recent
[PBM] physician mailings."1 9 4
The letter has the feel of being designed to dance right up to the edge of
legality without stepping over, although the later court complaint suggests
the letter may have tripped past the line anyway. The language is carefully
worded to appear to be simply providing useful information as a health plan
intermediary, noting that "Caremark manages the prescription drug benefit
plan for one or more of your patients," and "we are pleased to provide you
the enclosed information . . . to review at your convenience."19 5 The letter
goes on to tout the benefits of Zyprexa and to downplay recent reports of
side effects. 196
192 See, e.g., EXPRESS SCRIPTS, supra note 35, at 10-11 (touting its information flow and
explaining that "[o]ur claims processing system also generates a database of drug utilization
information that can be accessed at the time a prescription is dispensed, on a retrospective
basis to analyze utilization trends and prescribing patterns for more intensive management of
the drug benefit, and on a prospective basis to help support pharmacists in drug therapy man-
agement decisions").
193 Complaint at 23-39, Sergeant Benevolent Assoc. Health & Welfare Fund v. Eli Lilly
Co., No. 06-CV-06322 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). One press report, using quotations that could not be
confirmed with the nonredacted court material, contained alleged quotes from internal docu-
ments that the letter would target doctors based on "the most recent . . . claims data," and the
campaign was "designed to influence key prescribers" to assist in a "tactical plan for
Zyprexa." FirstWord Pharma, CVS Unit Played Both Sides, $6.8 Billion Lilly Lawsuit Reveals,
FIRSTWORD PHARMA (June 12, 2009), http://www.firstword pharma.com/nodel
367134?tsid= 17#axzz59SxEvJjt [https://perma.cc/TU6J-5HF2]; see also Unions Report,
supra note 89, at 4; cf. EXPRESS SCRIPrS, supra note 35, at 9 (noting that "[o]ur physician
connectivity program facilitates well-informed prescribing by delivering benefit and formulary
evaluations and medication history, both electronically and in real-time, as physicians write
prescriptions).
194 See Complaint at 23-39, Sergeant Benevolent Assoc.
195 See id.
196 See id.
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The tone of the letter is one of gentle, subtle persuasion rather than
heavy-handed argument. 197 At the end of the day, however, the PBM's com-
bination with one of the largest pharmacies in the country gave it the ability
to mine data to push a particular drug over competitors. 198 The potential
power of such arrangements gives drug companies the opportunities to ad-
vance their sales agendas in a manner that will appeal to the PBM's incentive
structures and harm competition. Such arrangements also highlight the dan-
gers of PBM mergers with pharmaceutical companies, particularly in highly
concentrated PBM and pharmacy markets. 199
In 2005, shortly after the rise of the PBM industry, Congress directed
the FTC to investigate whether conflicts of interest or "self-dealing" might
arise if PBMs owned mail-order pharmacies. Concerns included that such
integration might lead to a failure to substitute and dispense generics or the
possibility of replacing generics with more expensive drugs. 200 The FTC's
report, however, concluded that these allegations were without merit, exam-
ining the potential anticompetitive effects of PBMs owning mail-order phar-
macies. 201 Despite the report's conclusions, the increased vertical and
horizontal concentration in the PBM industry over the last fifteen years and
anecdotal evidence suggest that an updated analysis of this and other aspects
of the industry would be warranted.
Thus, perverse incentives can lead pharmacies to prefer brand drugs
over generics, regardless of the higher brand prices. The problems can in-
crease when retail or specialty pharmacies combine with PBMs, given that
the entities negotiating drug price and volume are also selling to individual
customers and advising on which drug to choose.
197 See John Russell, Lilly Pays CVS Caremark to Try to Get Doctors to Prescribe
Cymbalta, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Oct. 18, 2009) https://indystar.newspapers.com/image/
126786606/?terms=221illy%2Bpays%2Bcvs%22 [https://perma.cc/P5XX-RLYF] (describing
letters mailed by CVS to physicians promoting Eli Lilly's antidepressant Cymbalta and de-
signed to look like international mailings).
198 The case also alleged that the maker of Zyprexa pushed the drug for off-label uses for
the treatment of dementia, when the company's internal research showed that the drug did not
counteract dementia. See Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 54-57, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Noel Brinkerhoff, Eli Lilly Pushed Useless Drug
for Dementia, ALLGov (June 15, 2009), http://www.allgov.com/news/controversies/eli-lilly-
pushed-useless-drug-for-dementia?news= 839025 [https://perma.cc/Z2C4-HPG7]. Doctors
are permitted to prescribe off-label uses for drugs, and recent court cases have affirmed that
drug companies have the right to advertise those uses. See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d
149, 168 (2d Cir. 2012); Robin Feldman & Connie Wang, May Your Drug Price Be Ever
Green 60 (UC Hastings Research Paper No. 256, Oct. 29, 2017).
199 See, e.g., Complaint at 48-50, Boss v. CVS Health Corp., No. 3:17-cv-01823 (D.N.J.
2017) (alleging that Sanofi, Norvo Nordisk, and Eli Lilly engaged in an insulin price fixing
scheme); see also Jacklyn Wille, Sanoi, CVS, Others Accused of Insulin Price Fixing, BLOOM-
BERG LAW (Mar. 20, 2017, 5:48 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/corporate-law/sanofi-
cvs-health-others-accused-of-insulin-price-fixing [https://perma.cc/A2LA-5KST] (describing
collusion between drug manufacturers and PBMs that led to Boss v. CVS).
200 See FED. TRADE COMMN 2005 REPORT, supra note 73, at vi.
201 See id.
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C. Why Insurers May be Pushed Towards Higher-Priced Drugs
In theory, insurers should not prefer higher prices. Although there are a
limited number of major players in the health insurance market, the market
is less concentrated than the PBM market, with the top ten companies con-
trolling just over half of the market. 202 Higher prices can translate into higher
premiums, which makes it more difficult to attract patient enrollees.
Counterintuitively, insurers, in some cases, do prefer higher prices for drugs
because of certain aspects of the health care market incentive structure.
Odd aspects of this structure do dilute the effects of price increases, as
well as create some circumstances in which it is actually better for the health
insurance company when prices are higher. For example, consider the
strange case of the Medicare system. Medicare health insurance plans may
have incentives in certain circumstances for higher drug prices for two rea-
sons, both stemming from provisions in the Affordable Care Act.2 03 First,
once a Medicare patient reaches the out-of-pocket threshold, the government
picks up 80% of the remaining cost through its reinsurance, rather than the
health plan paying the full, remaining cost. 20 4 Thus, higher drug prices push
Medicare patients more quickly into the territory in which the government
picks up a greater portion of the tab and the health insurance company ad-
ministering the plan pays less.
Second, Medicare makes the health insurance company allocate the re-
bate dollars they receive from pharmaceutical companies back to the govern-
ment's reinsurance plan. However, the formulas operate in a way that when
most of the rebates are for higher-priced drugs, the health insurer actually
pays less, the government's reinsurance obligations rise, and the patient pays
more. 205 As one government report noted, a Medicare health insurance plan's
decision to place higher priced drugs on its formulary rather than lower
priced ones, "may be a rational response to the incentives they face." 206
In short, in some cases, patients will be able to move past the uncovered
gap more quickly, and the health insurance plan will have more dollars that
could be spent on lowering premiums for all patients, when the Medicare
patient utilizes a higher priced, non-generic drug. The problem, of course, is
the long-term risk to competition from generics. As with other incentive
structures discussed throughout this Article, this is counterproductive.
Finally, health insurers do have a path of least resistance. Although it
may not be optimal, the insurance company can always choose to shift costs
to the patients, by increasing copays and co-insurance. That has, indeed,
202 Sood, Goldman & Van Nuys, supra note 1, at 32.
203 Adam J. Barnhart & Jason Gomberg, The AIDS Institute: Financial Incentives in Medi-
care Pan D, MILLIMAN 1, 6 (2016).
204 MEDPAC 2017 REPORT, supra note 21, at 404.
205 Id.
206 Id.
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happened in recent years. 2 0 7 Thus, perverse incentives can push against a
health insurer's motivation to drive patients into cheaper drugs.
D. Doctors, Hospitals, and Other Medical Practitioners
For some doctors, hospitals, and other medical practitioners, the incen-
tive structures may be similar to those for PBMs. Medical practitioners or
organizations that provide medications directly to patients may be open to a
variation of the persuasion payments given to PBMs. For example, doctors
may be offered payments in the form of what are called "key opinion
leader" payments or lesser forms of benefits such as wining and dining. For
some hospitals, drug companies can offer medication rebates. 208 In turn, the
treatment facility charges patients the list price, or even some rebate off the
list price, and pockets the spread. In this way, drug companies can raise the
list price of the drug and offer a larger rebate, thereby maintaining revenue
while offering enticing payments. A drug company may condition the re-
bates on volume or exclusivity in that setting in the same manner as with
PBMs. A hospital may even believe that it is getting a good deal for its
patients, obtaining a rebate for them by guaranteeing volume across the full
patient load. As described with the PBM payments above, 209 however, the
patient pays in the form of reduced competition in the long run, as well as
higher prices when the facility does not pass the rebate through. These op-
portunities can occur when hospitals and medical practitioners provide in-
house infusions or other treatments, particularly for certain forms of cancer,
as well as for medications during surgery or hospitalization.
The courts, however, have not necessarily been sympathetic to competi-
tors complaining about these types of activities under antitrust law. In 2016,
the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of a case against Sanofi, regarding re-
bates to hospitals for its anticoagulant drug Lovenox. 2 10 The plaintiff alleged
that the threat of not obtaining these rebates effectively "handcuffed" hospi-
tals, forcing them to choose Lovenox over the competitor's product, which
had different but overlapping indications. 211 The circuit court, however, saw
only a reasonable marketing effort and ruled that "[tfo the extent that Sa-
nofi's conduct caused damage to its competitors, that is not a harm for which
Congress has prescribed a remedy." Ultimately, however, the court found
there was "no evidence that Sanofi's actions caused broad harm to the com-
petitive nature" of the market. 212 Thus, the decision sends a signal to firms
and regulators, providing a tacit blessing to continue the behaviors.
207 See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
208 See the previous section's description of how Novartis created incentives and pressures
for doctors to prescribe Exjade. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
209 See supra notes 136-59 and accompanying text.
210 See Eisai, Inc. v. Sanofi Aventis U.S., LLC, 821 F.3d 394, 400 (3d Cir. 2016).
211 Id. at 407.
212 Id. at 399, 407.
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A particularly troubling issue arises with what are known as 340B hos-
pitals. Section 340B of the federal Public Health Service Act (PHSA) pro-
vides that certain nonprofit hospitals that serve the nation's most vulnerable
patients receive large rebates on drugs used in outpatient treatment, which
are thought to be used for indigent care. 213 Drug companies provide these
rebates up front, as discounts off the list price, and the rebates may amount
to as much as a 50% deduction off list price. 214 Medicare then reimburses
these physician-administered drugs at a much higher rate, 215 6% above the
average list prices. The relevant hospitals receive those rebates even for
those patients who have private insurance. Private plans generally reimburse
for those drugs at rates even higher than Medicare, further increasing the
spread.
In theory, the amounts are intended to help those hospitals in their work
for low-income or vulnerable patients, but the law does not require any
showing that the funds are actually used in that manner. Some government
sources and commentators have questioned whether the spread simply in-
creases hospitals' bottom lines and market shares. 216 More than 42,000 enti-
ties participate in the 340B program. 217 Whenever spread exists, the
economics create incentives for rising prices and agreements that entrench
large drug companies and disfavor lower-cost or newer entrants.
E. Patients and Patient Advocacy Groups
Looking first at patients, drug manufacturers increasingly provide cou-
pons or coupon cards to patients, in order to encourage them to purchase
what might otherwise be an expensive drug. In this manner, drug companies
can appeal directly to the patient's wallet. With a coupon or coupon cards,
the brand company agrees to pay all or a significant portion of the patient's
out-of-pocket costs. While lower out-of-pocket costs sound appealing, they
actually drive demand down for lower-priced alternatives, reinforcing the
213 See Public Health Service Act § 340B, 42 U.S.C. § 256 (2018); NAS REPORT, supra
note 5, at 105-06.
214 See Lynn Kennedy & Helen Gao, Inside Rx: Discounts Available for Insulin and Other
Diabetes Medications, DIATRIBE (May 16, 2017), https://diatribe.org/inside-rx-discounts-avail-
able-insulin-and-other-diabetes-medications [https://perma.cc/SP7F-XZE6]. Drug companies
are not required by the Act to provide these price concessions up front, but it has become the
practice to do so.
215 These are physician-administered drugs, which are covered under Medicare Part B.
216 See Casey Ross, Trump takes on hospitals: the facts behind fight over 340B drug dis-
counts, STAT (2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/11/06/340b-drug-discounts-fight/
[https://perma.cc/W3M8-BLW5].
217 See H. ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM., REVIEW OF THE 340B DRUG PRICING PROGRAM
13 (2018), https://republicans-energycommerce.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/
2018011OReview of the340BDrugPricingProgram.pdf [https://perma.cc/99A4-M2JC];
see generally Rena M. Conti & Peter B. Bach, The 340B Drug Discount Program: Hospitals
Generate Profits by Expanding to Reach More Affluent Communities, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1786
(2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4591849/ [https://perma.cc/B793-
K3MN1.
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incentives for more expensive drugs, which, in turn, drives costs higher
throughout the system.
Red flags for the behavior include that the copayment offsets are almost
always offered by brand drugs-primarily when competition exists from
generics or other brands-and that the benefits are normally directed at pa-
tients who have prescription drug insurance plans. 218 Beyond blocking
lower-cost competition, this practice distorts the economic effects as well.
For example, the cost of reimbursing the patient's copay is much less than
the full cost difference between the branded drug and the generic. Thus,
although the patient pays little, the insurance company bears a far higher
cost. 2 19 In addition, when the patient's cost goes to zero, drug companies can
encourage over-consumption of the drug,220 for example when patients
stockpile drugs that they do not need, allow automatic refills for drugs they
may not be using, or have less incentive to ask doctors if the drugs are still
necessary.
Coupons are increasing as a common feature of the drug landscape.
Between 2007 and 2010, spending on brand drugs that offer coupons grew
from 30% to over 50% as a percentage of spending on all brand drugs, 2 2 1 and
the strategy seems to have conferred considerable benefit on drug compa-
nies. Studies suggest that copay coupons increase brand drug sales by 60%,
mostly by reducing sales to generic competitors, as well as by increasing
drug costs for all enrollees in prescription drug plans. 2 2 2 The blockbuster
arena of cholesterol-lowering drugs provides an example of the coupon prac-
tice. In 2012, only three medications made up more than 75% of the statin
market, with the two brand drug companies widely distributing copay cou-
pons. 2 2 3 When the first generic competitor entered the market, the maker of
the brand drug Lipitor engaged in an aggressive coupon strategy to maintain
market share, until additional generics were finally able to enter the mar-
ket.224 Presumably, the strategy helped preserve market share and revenue as
long as possible, until the presence of multiple generics made the strategy
too expensive and difficult to maintain.
218 NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 93-94. One should note that coupons are not available
for government insurance because they would be considered a form of kick-back.
219 See Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at 27.
220 See id. at 26.
221 Leemore Dafny, Christopher Ody & Matthew Schmitt, When Discounts Raise Costs:
The Effect of Copay Coupons on Generic Utilization, 9 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POLICY 91, 94 fig.
1 (2017) (noting that this measure does not capture actual coupon use, given that not all buyers
use or are eligible to use coupons).
222 Id.; see also Joseph S. Ross & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Prescription Drug-Coupons - No
Such Thing as a Free Lunch, 369 N. ENG. J. MED. 1188, 1188-89 (2013).
223 David Grande, The Cost of Drug Coupons, 307 JAMA 2375, 2375 (2012); see also
Dafny, Ody & Schmitt, supra note 221, at 120 n.41 (noting that "copay coupons for Lipitor
may have resulted in loss of share for generic statins").
224 FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 22 (describing Hatch-Waxman's so-called
"Paragraph IV" provision in which the first generic in some circumstances receives a six-
month period in which no other generics may enter the market, as an incentive to do battle
with the branded drug).
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Although the goal in many circumstances is to find the least costly al-
ternative for the patient, strategies like this can encourage the highest-priced
drug, driving demand away from lower-cost drug substitutes. In the process,
companies can purchase brand loyalty, along with the volume that provides
a platform for the PBM strategies described above.
Beyond coupons, drug companies have provided meals, gifts, or other
payments to patients so that the patients will advocate for the use of a partic-
ular brand with other patients. For example, the New York Times reported
that hemophilia drug manufacturers and specialty pharmacies, whose prod-
ucts cost between $30,000 to a few hundred thousand dollars annually per
patient, have taken to courting patients and their relatives with free meals
and hiring opportunities to gain inside access in selling their drugs. The
companies' attempts to attract the business of individuals with costly treat-
ments by hiring them have blurred the lines between patient and drug sales-
person, creating ethical dilemmas in the community.225 The practice has a
happy side effect as well. If patients begin to complain too loudly, the drug
company can pay them off in a manner that reduces public relations friction,
while shifting the costs to insurers. 226 And, as always, the long-term burdens
fall on society in the form of reduced competition and higher health care
costs overall.
Patient advocacy groups are another way in which drug companies can
influence market behavior. Ostensibly, these groups are formed by patients
who have a particular disease in order to advocate for policies and practices
in the interests of those patients. These organizations are not required to
disclose their funding sources, however, and research shows that the major-
ity of patient advocacy groups receive significant support from drug and
device companies. 227 In order to maintain their funding levels, such groups
may directly or indirectly advocate for policies that push drug prices higher.
Funding patient assistance programs and patient advocacy groups have
additional financial advantages, including tax credits for the drug company.
In particular, drug companies can donate their drugs to their own foundation
or to independent charitable organizations that support the purchase of the
company's drugs, earning charitable deductions in the process.228 In fact,
225 See Andrew Pollack, Hemophilia Patient or Drug Seller? Dual Role Creates Ethical
Quandary, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/14/business/hemo-
philia-patient-or-drug-seller-dual-role-creates-ethical-quandary.html [https://perma.cc/NN53-
ZAGU]; see also Philip Kucab, Katelyn Dow Stepanyan & Adriane Fugh-Berman, Direct-to-
Consumer Marketing to People with Hemophilia, 13 PUB. LIBR. OF ScL. MED. 1 (2016); Mor-
ton & Boller, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that brands may offer kickbacks in the form of cou-
pons, financial assistance, free meals, patient care and other benefits to avoid moving demand
to lower-priced alternatives).
226 See Thomas, supra note 158.
227 NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 94 (citing Matthew S. McCoy et al., Conflicts of Interest
for Patient-Advocacy Organizations, 376 NEw ENG. J. MED. 880-85 (2017)).
228 See Austin Frerick, The Cloak of Social Responsibility: Pharmaceutical Corporate
Charity, 153 TAx NOTES 1151, 1151-64 (2016); see also Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at
27-28 (discussing the implications of the Frerick paper).
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such patient assistance programs constituted ten of the fifteen largest charita-
ble foundations in the United States as of 2014.229
Donations such as these are particularly valuable deductions because
under a tax code provision, the company gets a deduction above the cost of
the drug.230 Brand drugs are generally inexpensive to make, with the bulk of
expenditures coming from the research and development and the approval
processes. 231 A special enhanced-deduction provision allows drug companies
to deduct not simply the cost basis of the inventory they donate, but the basis
plus half the difference between that and the fair market value, up to twice
the basis. 232 In other words, the provision gives the company an enhanced
deduction for the appreciation in the value of the product. This tax provision
makes the donations unusually valuable, and the higher the list price, the
greater the benefit to the company-at least until the company reaches the
cap.
F. The Full Landscape
In short, despite a health care system that relies on competition to en-
sure the quality of care and reduce prices, the system contains precisely the
opposite incentives. Nearly all of the parties along the drug supply chain-
including PBMs as well as certain types of pharmacies, insurers, doctors,
hospitals, and public interest patient groups-do better when prices rise. 2 3 3
In particular, woven throughout all the Article's sections above are the incen-
tives for the drug companies themselves. The system allows drug companies
to use some of their monopoly rents to entrench their market shares and to
share those rents with each segment along the drug distribution continuum.
With consumer spending on the rise and frustration mounting, everyone
points fingers at others in the system.234 And as one commentator noted
229 Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at 29 (citing Frerick, supra note 228).
230 See 26 U.S.C. § 170(e)(3) (2018); 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1 (2019) (tax provisions detail-
ing the enhanced deduction, where a deduction on donated drug inventory will equal the cost
of the drug plus half of the difference between the list price and the cost); see also Morton &
Boller, supra note 1, at 29 (describing the history of the enhanced deduction, including that
Congress first restricted corporate deductions of "income property" to the donor's cost and
then eased that restriction as a means of incentivizing the donation of medical supplies rather
than disposing of them); ROGER COLINVAUX, ENFORCING THE ENHANCED CHARITABLE DEDUC-
TION, URBAN INST. CTR. ON NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY AT URBAN-BROOKINGs TAX POL-
ICY CTR. 1 (2012), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/23211/412727-
Enforcing-the-Enhanced-Charitable-Deduction-Improved-Reporting-on-the-Form--.PDF
[https://perma.cc/UTY5-FDN5].
231 Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at 29 (noting that pharmaceuticals have a low marginal
cost).
232 See id.
233 These groups are not necessarily monolithic, nor do they all benefit. For example,
smaller and rural pharmacies may not benefit, and the same may be true of employers who
self-insure.
234 See, e.g., Robert Langreth & Rebecca Spalding, Gilead Executive Says Pharmacy Ben-
efit Managers Keep Prices High, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 2017, 4:13 PM), https://www.bloom-
berg.com/news/articles/2017-03-03/gilead-executive-says-pharmacy-benefit-managers-keep-
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dryly, insurers, drug companies, and PBMs would do better for investors if
they "just kept quiet to preserve their very profitable relationship." 235
To some extent, they are all correct, although greater blame may lie
with some players than others. In particular, although much anger is focused
on PBMs, they are merely responding to the rent-sharing opportunities
placed in front of them. The core problem lies with the distorted incentive
structures. If society fails to fix this, we can add ourselves to the list of those
to blame.
IV. ALIGNING INCENTIVES
A. What Won't Work
Interestingly, some of the pharmaceutical industry's pledges and fixes
may be of limited value, and in some cases counterproductive. Consider the
controversial pledge some drug companies have entered into regarding keep-
ing the rise in list prices below 10%. On the one hand, that is certainly better
than an increase above 10%. On the other hand, it provides cover for in-
creasing prices to that level, and discourages anything below it. Unfortu-
nately, companies get absolutely no benefit from increasing only 7-8%, for
example, and they could get hammered by shareholders and capital markets
for going much lower than 10%. Thus, 10% helps to set a floor for price
increases in addition to a ceiling.
Another proposal for taming drug prices that is gaining popularity from
drug companies and some commentators is called value-based pricing or a
version of that called outcomes-based pricing. For example, in discussing the
industry's support for value-based pricing, the executive vice president of the
pharmaceutical industry association made the following comments about
when new breakthrough drugs will come to market:
[W]ill it have a big price tag? It might. If we really are moving
toward a value-based health care system, then medicines that truly
represent value should merit a larger price, and we're comfortable
with saying that should be the case. 2 3 6
prices-high [https://perma.cc/JX3F-8PY9] (Gilead executive pointing to PBMs and saying
"[i]f we just lowered the cost of Sovaldi from $85,000 to $50,000, every payer would rip up
our contract"); see also Eric Sagonowsky, Lilly CEO: With Pharma Friends in High Places,
It's 'Time for Action' to Ease Drug Costs, FIERCEPHARMA (Jan. 10, 2018, 7:33 AM), https://
www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/lilly-ceo-says-pharma-hasn-t-done-enough-pricing-but-now-
time [https://perma.cc/26WX-J3VR].
235 Charley Grant, The Blame Game on Drug Prices is Getting Dangerous, WALL STREET
J. (Apr. 9, 2017, 1:27 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-blame-game-on-drug-prices-is-
getting-dangerous-1491758834 [https://perma.cc/AN2F-N5N2].
236 Dylan Scott, Drug Makers and Insurers, Longtime Rivals, Eye an Alliance on Prices,
STAT (2015), https://www.statnews.com/2015/11/24/drug-prices-health-insurers/ [https://per
ma.cc/WNE3-88RY]; see also Sagonowsky, supra note 234.
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The basic notion of value-based pricing is that drug companies should
be compensated based on the value that they provide with their drug treat-
ments. A key problem, as the National Academies of Science concluded, lies
with the question of how to determine when and the extent to which inter-
vention with a particular drug has been of value. 237 This is particularly true
given that the scientific field lacks a straightforward method of even deter-
mining what would count as evidence of value. 2 38
A version of value-based pricing would look at outcomes. In this partic-
ular strain, drug companies would provide a drug, and the payer would re-
ceive a rebate if the drug failed to save a patient's life, provide a cure, or
work as expected. 2 39 For example, Novartis is testing this approach with an
237 See NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 53-54, 57; see also INST. OF MED., FINDING WHAT
WORKS IN HEALTH CARE: STANDARDS FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS 17-18 (Jill Eden et al. eds.,
2011) (observing how it is often difficult to assess the quality of systematic research reviews
documenting the potential harms and benefits of medical interventions); Matthew J. Page et
al., Bias due to selective inclusion and reporting of outcomes and analyses in systematic re-
views of randomized trials of healthcare interventions, COCHRANE DATABASE SYSTEMIC
REV. (2014) (exploring how the choice of which outcomes to report in systematic reviews of
health care interventions may result in biased or inaccurate value assessments); INST. OF MED.,
SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, MINIMIZING RISKS 17 (2015) (dis-
cussing challenges to determining intervention efficacy from clinical trials research, including
"lengthy time frame, high cost, and often limited relevance of the research it produces").
238 See NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 56-57 (describing how different health organiza-
tions determine value or what would constitute evidence of value); see also Jeffrey L. Ander-
son et al., ACCIAHA Statement on Cost/Value Methodology in Clinical Practice Guidelines
and Performance Measures: A Report of the American College of Cardiology/American Heart
Association Task Force on Performance Measures and Task Force on Practice Guidelines,
CIRCULATION 2329-45 (2014) (noting that the ACC-AHA uses a cost-effectiveness framework
that measures the treatment's dollar value per quality-adjusted life-year, while factoring in the
quality of evidence that treatment is beneficial); Lowell E. Schnipper, American Society of
Clinical Oncology Statement: A Conceptual Framework to Assess the Value of Cancer Treat-
ment Options, 33 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 2563 (2015) (noting that ASCO uses a point-based
framework that considers clinical benefit, toxicity, palliation, and increased time off all treat-
ment, but the framework does not integrate the drug's score with cost); INST. FOR CLINICAL &
ECON. REVIEW, OVERVIEW OF THE ICER VALUE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND UPDATE FOR
2017-2019 (2017) (explaining that ICER value framework considers cost-effectiveness,
clinical effectiveness, various contextual considerations like ethical/legal issues, and overall
budget impact on GDP); Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, Drug-Abacus Methods,
https://drugpricinglab.org/tools/drug-abacus/methods/ [https://perma.cc/L25H-ZP3W] (ex-
plaining that value framework considers survival, toxicity, novelty, R&D cost, rarity of the
treated disease, and the burden of the disease on the U.S. population); Nat'l Comprehensive
Cancer Network, NCCN Clinical Practice Guidelines in Oncology (NCCN Guidelines) with
NCCN Evidence Blocks, https://www.nccn.org/evidenceblocks/ [https://perma.cc/2S2J-
BPCQ] (explaining that stakeholders judge value based on overall impression of the following
factors: efficacy, safety, evidence quality and consistency, and affordability are taken into
account).
239 See NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 59; see also Jeanne S. Mandelblatt et al., Evaluating
Frameworks that Provide Value Measures for Health Care Interventions, 20 VALUE IN HEALTH
186, 189-90 (2017) (proposing and applying criteria for evaluation of value frameworks to
assess health care treatments); Stephen Barlas, Health Plans and Drug Companies Dip their
Toes into Value-based Pricing: The Pressure is On P&T Committees to Monitor Utilization, 41
PHARM. & THERAPEUTICS 39, 39-41, 53 (2016) (describing that Amgen agreed to provide two
"pay for performance" rebates if its drugs failed to obtain certain results and citing perform-
ance-based agreements between drug manufacturers and insurers); Alan M. Garber & Mark B.
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expensive drug for treatment of pediatric patients with Acute Lymphoblastic
Leukemia?40 The company will charge for the drug only if patients respond
to treatment after one month of therapy.
The pricing and patient care data would be key for monitoring these
value-based contracts. Imagine a vertically integrated PBM-Insurer-Phar-
macy, which already has an incentive to share data with its rebate-conferring
drug company partners. These will be the only entities controlling this essen-
tial information, which is necessary for evaluating the drug company's value
claims. Such information and data analytic asymmetries will only expand
and grow more problematic, making it nearly impossible for payors and gov-
ernment entities to engage in independent auditing.
In addition, putting aside the sticky issue of determining the extent to
which a drug "provides value," outcome-based pricing could present serious
moral hazards. In simplified form, drug companies are saying in essence, "I
will give you my expensive drug. If the patient dies, you either get a rebate
or don't pay in the first place." This could create an uncomfortable incentive
structure, in which insurers, PBMs, hospitals, and doctors get paid more if
the patient dies. Why would one want a system in which the provider does
better financially if the patient dies? That is particularly of concern if the
drug company's payments are arriving in the form of rebates, rather than in
the form of not charging in the first place. Rebates given to a hospital at key
times of the year could be distributed to executives and staff or used to
improve a hospital's books at the end of a reporting period. Moreover, some
of the risks associated with complex diseases, for which many of these out-
come-based models are proposed, are not solely attributable to the drug
treatment and the structure could have an impact on incentives to provide
complimentary care that may be costly or burdensome on a hospital.
The entire notion of valuing medicines based on improvements in peo-
ple's lives, rather than the cost of making the medication, is out of focus if
not downright irrational. As noted above, my own life and comfort may be
of incalculable value to me, even when the likelihood of success is low or
the additional lifespan provided is minimal. As one commentator explained,
The key question is not: What's it worth to save a child's life. . . If
that was the question, the polio (vaccine) they gave me when I was
6 years old would have cost a million dollars. The right question
McClellan, Satisfaction Guaranteed - "Payment by Results" for Biologic Agents, 357 NEW
ENG. J. OF MED. 1575, 1575-76 (2007) (noting an extreme instance in which Johnson and
Johnson offered to waive charges for consumers who did not obtain desired results for one of
its drugs).
240 See Press Release, Novartis, Novartis Receives First Ever FDA Approval for a CAR-T
Cell Therapy, Kymriah(TM) (CTLO19), for Children and Young Adults with B-Cell ALL that
is Refractory or Has Relapsed At Least Twice (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.novartis.com/
news/media-releases/novartis-receives-first-ever-fda-approval-car-t-cell-therapy-kymriahtm-
ctlO19-children-and-young-adults-b-cell-all-refractory-or-has-relapsed-least-twice [https://per
ma.ccl87LX-HJGG].
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is: What is the price that will maximize accessibility and af-
fordability, while maintaining a robust R&D pipeline.241
Of the current methods for aligning incentives for market actors with
those of consumers and creating a more rational system, neither price
pledges nor value-based pricing do a sufficient job. Pledges effectively cre-
ate a floor for drug manufacturers to increase prices, while value-based pric-
ing ignores overall constraints on personal and governmental health care.
Moreover, neither of these approaches grapples with the root of the incentive
problem.
B. What Will Work?
1. Market Information
Markets, like gardens, grow best in the sun. And they wither without
information. Thus, when an industry's pricing information and rebate rela-
tionships are secret, deeply hidden, or obscured even from payors, one
should not be surprised to see significant competitive distortions and subop-
timal outcomes. Quite simply, entrants and prospective entrants power the
economic engines of competition, and information provides the fuel for
those engines.
To begin restoring sanity to pharmaceutical markets, information must
flow. That includes transparency about pricing information. All aspects of
the deals, including rebates and financial benefits in any form, at a mini-
mum, should be visible to the payers and the government. Governments,
however, have limited resources and face numerous demands. In light of
these limitations, in the best of all circumstances, the full range of informa-
tion would be visible to competitors and to the public. In particular, in an
open and democratic society, we would be foolish to bypass the power of the
press and individual citizens in their ability to ferret out objectionable behav-
ior, especially in the modern age of crowdsourcing and social media. One
can understand why industry would not wish to see this, but why would
society put shackles around its great twin powers: the free market and an
informed citizenry? These are among the core values upon which the United
States rests, although certainly not the only ones.
a. Changes at the Federal Level. The best opportunities for shining
light into the deep, dark crevices of pharmaceutical pricing lie at federal
legislative and regulatory levels. Any number of federal laws could be
amended to mandate information transparency. This could be done through
amendments to the Food & Drug Act, which regulates the manufacture and
marketing of all prescription and nonprescription medication. Current FDA
marketing authority relates only to providing improper marketing or adver-
241 Kelton, supra note 31.
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tising regarding risks and side effects.24 2 That statutory authority could be
amended to mandate that the FDA collect and release accurate information
on pricing and rebates. Historically, the FDA has been reluctant to engage in
competition issues, hewing more closely to their mandate for monitoring
safety and efficacy.24 3 Thus, Congress might be well-served to specify au-
thority for the FTC24 4 to act under its consumer protection powers if compa-
nies fail to provide adequate price transparency.245
A different approach to transparency could utilize the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA), which sets standards for pensions and
health plans in private industry. Congress could amend ERISA to require
transparency within plans.24 6 The agencies that administer Medicare and
Medicaid could similarly mandate transparency within these programs.247
More indirectly, transparency could be accomplished through regula-
tions from the federal agencies that fund pharmaceutical research. Many of
the drugs that end up in our medicine cabinets began with federal funding of
academic research by agencies such as the National Institutes of Health
(NIH). NIH regulations could mandate that those who receive funding must
include transparency stipulations for those who license or purchase their in-
242 See generally Prescription Drug Advertising: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION, https://www.fda.gov/drugs/prescription-drug-advertising/prescription-
drug-advertising-questions-and-answers#non requirements [https://perma.cc/4PQW-F4RV].
243 See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Evan Frondorf, Andrew K. Cordova, & Connie Wang, Em-
pirical Evidence of Drug Pricing Games A Citizen's Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 39 (2017) (showing that despite the FDA having "the power to summarily deny any
petition it believes was filed with the 'primary purpose' of delaying generic approval if the
petition also does not 'on its face raise valid scientific or regulatory issues'" and evidence that
a significant number of citizen petitions are filed by drug companies in a last-ditch effort to
delay competition, and the fact that the vast majority of citizen petitions are denied, the FDA
has yet to summarily dismiss a single citizen petition); see also Michael Carrier, Five Actions
to Stop Citizen Petition Abuse, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 81 (2018); Michael Carrier, Food
and Drug Admin. Comment Letter Addressing Abusive Citizen Petition, FDA REQUEST FOR
COMMENTS ON CITIZEN PETITIONS (Oct. 18, 2018).
244 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting deceptive ad-
vertising practices affecting commerce generally); id. § 52 (giving the FTC the power to pro-
hibit false advertising regarding over the counter drugs).
245 See Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1907) (which
regulates the manufacture and marketing of all prescription medication); see generally Pre-
scription Drug Advertising: Questions and Answers, supra note 242 (Congress granted the
power to regulate advertising and prohibit false advertising regarding over-the-counter drugs
to the FTC, but the power to regulate advertising for prescription drugs to the FDA.).
246 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (setting standards for pensions and health plans in private industry); see also Gobeille
v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943-45 (2016) (outlining the extensive ways in
which ERISA can mandate oversights and standards).
247 See 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1987) (noting that the Secretary can "make and publish such
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary to the efficient
administration of the functions with which [he or she] is charged"); see also Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (2003) (authorizing the Secretary to promulgate "regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the administration of the insurance programs"); Medicare and Medi-
caid Programs; Regulation to Require Drug Pricing Transparency, 84 Fed. Reg. 20,732 (May
10, 2019) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403).
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ventions. 248 Thus, either directly or indirectly, Congress could pave the way
for transparency.
b. Changes at the State Level. States also have the power to mandate
transparency, certainly when the state is an employer, administrator of a pro-
gram, or other payor, and likely for all health insurance activity within its
borders. 249 States also may have the power to mandate particular aspects of
information openness through state pharmacy substitution laws, related to
substituting generic prescriptions for brands, and other state regulatory
processes. In fact, states continue to be at the forefront of battling these
difficult issues. States have passed or proposed 178 bills (enacting 44 of
them) relating to price transparency, clawbacks, price gouging, gag rules
(which keep pharmacists from pointing customers toward the cheapest alter-
natives), and PBM regulation. 25 0
The proposals range from bold to timid, and the pharmaceutical indus-
try is expected to mount fierce opposition to these laws, including filing suit
under the basis of trade secret laws, the First Amendment, and various other
U.S. Constitutional provisions. 25 1 Such challenges already have been filed in
California, Nevada, Maryland, and North Dakota. 25 2
248 See Robin Feldman et al., Viral Licensing: Ensuring the Public Interest When Taxpay-
ers Fund Pharmaceutical Research, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 641, 648 (2020).
249 Although a discussion of federalism and a state's power is well beyond the scope of
this article, for an analysis of these issues in the context of state drug legislation, see generally
ROBIN FELDMAN ET AL. NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, STATES' RIGHTS: A
PATENT LAW ANALYSIS OF NASHP RATE-SETTING MODEL ACT 1-10 (2018), https://nashp.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/03/White-Paper-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D2S-M4EE].
250 State Legislative Action to Lower Pharmaceutical Costs, NATL ACAD. FOR STATE
HEALTH POL'Y (Oct. 9, 2018), https://nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Copy-of-Tracker-
Update-All-Legislation-10.9.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJW7-4SPR]; see also Richard
Cauchi, State Remedies for Costly Prescription Drugs, NATL CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
(Aug. 2018), www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-remedies-for-costly-prescription-drugs.aspx
[https://perma.cc/98QG-Z6RF].
251 EXPRESS SCRIPTS, supra note 35, at 30-31 (listing courts that have turned down their
First Amendment requests); Jay Hancock & Shefali Luthra, As States Target High Drug Prices,
Pharma Targets State Lawmakers, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Feb. 1, 2018), https://khn.org/news/
as-states-target-high-drug-prices-pharma-targets-state-lawmakers/ [https://perma.cc/G8BU-
G6VV]; see also EXPRESS SCRIPTS, supra note 35, at 31-32 (citing Jerry Beeman & Pharm. v.
Caremark Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 1027, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2018)) (noting that upon remand, dis-
trict courts denied defendants' motion to dismiss the case on first amendment constitutionality
grounds of a California law requiring the disclosure of retail drug prices to clients). But see 1-
800 Contacts, Inc., 2017 WL 1345289 F.T.C. 9372 (2017) (denying defense to horizontal
antitrust agreements that the parties were merely protecting their intellectual property).
252 See Ass'n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2018) (federal suit in
which the Association for Accessible Medicines sued the state of Maryland over a law that
would allow the attorney general to monitor drug price changes and seek orders to reverse
increases or issue fines); Pharm. Res. & Mfrs. of Am. v. Brown, No. 2:17-CV-02573-MCE-
KJN, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148499 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2018) (federal suit in which the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America sued the state of California over a law
requiring pharmaceutical companies to alert insurers of price increases above a certain thresh-
old and of reasoning for the increase at least 60 days before the planned increase); Pharm. Res.
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Sandoval, No. 2:17-CV-2315-JCM-CWH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149468
(D. Nev. Sep. 14, 2017) (federal suit in which the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
of America and Biotechnology Innovation Organization sued the state of Nevada over an insu-
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Some respected academics and government reports also have argued
that drug pricing information should be kept secret, on the notion that if drug
companies know the true prices their competitors are offering for drugs, the
companies will collude to keep prices high.2 5 3 Although well-meaning, those
analyses are misguided. To begin with, some of these perspectives are based
on a study from the 1990s of bidding in the cement industry in Denmark.254
It is a limited data point from an industry that has struggled with collusion.255
Normally, for empirical evidence to support a broad policy, one would want
to see broad-based evidence from the industry in question or alternatively,
from an extensive range of reasonably comparable industries, and certainly
evidence of a more recent vintage.
In general, it is quite odd to suggest that keeping price information
secret is good for competition. Rather, when things are secret, any collusion
that exists will be extremely difficult to uncover. Moreover, the notion that
price information is a recipe for collusion, defies the experience of the na-
tion's free market economy, in which pricing information normally is not
hidden from consumers, government entities, and auditors.
lin pricing transparency law on basis of trade-secret protection); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v.
Tufte, 297 F. Supp. 3d 964 (D.N.D. 2017) (federal suit in which the Pharmaceutical Care
Management Association sued the state of North Dakota over a law that would ban gag orders
on the basis of trade-secret protection).
253 See Lao, Feinstein & Lafontaine, Comment Letter, supra note 29 (suggesting that re-
quirements for public health plans to publicly disclose pricing and cost information may facili-
tate collusion); U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMMN, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 49-51 (1996) (describing an antitrust "safety zone"
and stating that without adequate safeguards, an exchange of price or cost data among health
care providers can lead to collusion and increased prices); Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at
22-23; Leemore Dafny, Northwestern Univ. Professor, Competitive Effects of Price Trans-
parency at 6 (on file with author); Joanna Shepherd, Is More Information Always Better?
Mandatory Disclosure Regulations in the Prescription Drug Market, 99 CORNELL L. REv.
ONLINE 1, 1-2, 18-20 (2013) (stating that if pharmaceutical manufacturers know details of
their competitors' rebate arrangements or price discounts, "tacit collusion among them be-
comes possible"); NAS REPORT, supra note 5, at 63-65 (advocating for true transparency in
pricing information and citing arguments in opposition to transparency).
254 See Shepherd, supra note 253, at 19 n.96; Dafny, supra note 253, at 7 (citing Svend
Albaek, Peter M0llgaard & Per B. Overgaard, Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination?
A Concrete Case, 45 J. OF INDUSTRIAL ECON. 429 (1997)). But see David Besanko, David
Dranove & Craig Garthwaite, Insurance and the High Prices of Pharmaceuticals (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ Res., Working Paper No. 22353, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22353.pdf
[https://perma.cc/495E-NEVL] (economic demand model provides rationale for drug compa-
nies setting prices above value and suggesting that problems are worse with smaller drug firms
than larger ones, which cannot externalize as many of the costs).
255 See Ania Thiemann, Serial Offenders: Why Some Industries Seem Prone to Endemic
Collusion, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. 11, 30-31, 53 (2015) (stating that the ce-
ment and concrete industry has been frequently investigated for collusive behavior, with some
serial offenders having been investigated or sanctioned more than ten times each); see also
Joseph E. Harrington Jr. et al., The Discontent Cartel Member and Cartel Collapse: The Ger-
man Cement Cartel 7-8 (Ctr. for Eur. Econ. Res., Discussion Paper No. 14-084, 2014) (noting
that cartel formation in cement markets is common due to economic and market factors that
make collusive agreements profitable and stable, in addition to describing a German cartel
among six large cement companies in 1991 that lasted several years).
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If price information truly is such a dangerous recipe for collusion, the
current system is certainly no panacea. As described above, there are numer-
ous ways in which the secrecy helps entrenched players insulate themselves
from competition. In addition, drug companies are increasingly including
most-favored-nation clauses, in which the PBMs agree to protect the drug
companies by guaranteeing them the highest price anyone is willing to pay.
Market leaders in a drug and those who offer a range of drug products can
offer the volume needed to obtain most-favored-nation clauses provisions,
insulating themselves from price competition. This circumstance is enhanced
by the secrecy of the deals and that further insulates entrenched players from
market competition. Price secrecy may also help maintain the position of
dominant players. A subset of large players will be able to discover the
prices, with the result that the collusion behavior will be impossible to de-
tect, along with other improper behavior that is occurring. In the end, the
players we worry most about may be able to obtain the information, while
midsize competitors who are best suited to inject true competition are left in
the cold. Finally, if we are truly convinced that drug companies will collude
in their bidding with PBMs, one could always mandate that whatever agency
oversees release of the information must observe a delayed release. This
would alleviate collusion concerns without insisting that information must
never see the light of day.
Legislative and regulatory efforts to mandate transparency are likely to
run into the claim that price information and pricing terms constitute a trade
secret. Pharmaceutical companies and PBMs continue to advance this argu-
ment in cases and commentary. 25 6 The issue has yet to be squarely addressed
in the courts, however, and scholars have cast serious doubt on whether such
information constitutes a trade secret under either federal or state trade secret
law.257
c. The Al Capone Approach. With bar owners as our image, perhaps
we should return to the era of Prohibition and borrow a strategy effective in
relation to that era's famous gangster, Al Capone. The Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) finally was able to jail Capone not for his many crimes
related to bootlegging alcohol, murder, and mayhem, but for tax evasion.258
In other words, sometimes the indirect approach can be effective when the
direct approach may be difficult to accomplish.
For example, mandating transparency certainly is one approach, but
other mechanisms might work as well. Consider a recent exchange between
Express Scripts (one of the big three PBMs) and the Securities and Ex-
256 See Robin Feldman & Charles Tait Graves, Naked Price and Pharmaceutical Trade
Secret Overreach, 22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 61, 74-79 (2020).
257 See id.; see also Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How
Medical Device Manufacturers are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17
TEXAS INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 192 (2009).
258 Fed. Bureau of Inv., History: Al Capone, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (2018),
www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/al-capone [https://perma.cc/A5YU-CNZ8].
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change Commission (SEC). 2 59 The series of letters involves the PBM's ac-
counting treatment of various items and the disclosure involved in that
treatment. In the exchange, the SEC objects to the fact that Express Scripts
does not separately disclose the rebates and other payments it receives from
pharmaceutical companies, as well as other detailed information.
Express Scripts may be making a good faith effort to comply with ac-
counting standards, given the unusual timing and funding flows of the indus-
try. Nevertheless, the exchange is a poignant reminder of the SEC's power.
If accounting regulations designed and applied to the PBM industry were to
require a different level of disclosure, the shadowy world of pricing might
find itself in the sunlight.
In its comments to Express Scripts, the SEC conveys surprise that the
PBM seems to be treating the money flow from drug companies as though
the drug companies were the PBM's customers-when in fact, the health
plans are the customers. Here is the SEC's language: "It is unclear why you
believe accounts receivable from pharmaceutical manufacturers are a com-
ponent of customer receivables considering that pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers do not appear to be your customer." 260
The choice to lump the revenue flow from pharmaceutical companies in
with the revenue flow from health plans may simply be sloppy accounting,
and Express Scripts readily agrees to separate out the two figures going for-
ward.261 Nevertheless, Dr. Freud might suggest that there are no accidents: It
would be quite easy for a PBM to begin thinking of drug companies as its
clients, rather than keeping the interests of health plans and patients in
mind.262
In particular, financial disclosures such as these highlight the extent to
which nonrebate revenue from drug companies may constitute a significant
part of a PBM's business. In the case of Express Scripts, its 2017 annual
259 Letter from Eric R. Slusser, Exec. VP & CFO, Express Scripts Holding Co., to U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Div. of Corp. Fin. (June 26, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from
Joel Parker, Senior Assistant Chief Accountant, Office of Beverages, Apparel & Mining, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Div. of Corp. Fin., to Eric R. Slusser, Exec. VP & CFO, Express
Scripts Holding Co. (Aug. 2, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from Bradley Phillips, VP,
Controller & Chief Accounting Officer, Express Scripts Holding Co., to U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Div. of Corp. Fin. (Aug. 30, 2017) (on file with author); Letter from Joel Parker,
Senior Assistant Chief Accountant, Office of Beverages, Apparel & Mining, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, to Eric R. Slusser, Exec. VP & CFO, Express Scripts Holding Co. (Sept. 29,
2017) (on file with author); Letter from Bradley Phillips, VP, Controller & Chief Accounting
Officer, Express Scripts Holding Co., to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Div. of Corp. Fin. (Oct.
12, 2017) (on file with author).
260 Letter from Joel Parker, supra note 259.
261 Letter from Bradley Phillips, supra note 259.
262 See Linette Lopez, The Feds Just Asked a Huge Healthcare Company Who Their Real
Clients Are and the Answer Is Totally Unsatisfying, Bus. INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2017, 4:09 PM),
http://www.akleg.gov/basis/getdocuments.asp?session=30&docid=42823 [https://perma.cc/
F82D-TZBM] (citing accounting professor Ed Ketz's comment that "at 40% [of receivables]
we can start thinking of the pharmaceutical companies as customers. They're not just bystand-
ers in this equation").
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report suggests that nonrebate revenue from drug companies could be up to
$1.4 billion-a significant figure in comparison to Express Script's $5.4 bil-
lion in operating income. 263
From society's perspective, one might hope that the law would channel
a PBM into thinking of the good of the patients served by the formularies it
is crafting. Attempts to claim that PBMs have a duty to patients have fallen
flat, however, running up against issues related to ERISA, the mammoth
federal law that governs most health plans and pensions.264 A different un-
derstanding of the role of ERISA could shift the landscape considerably,
opening the door to claims that the PBMs are breaching their fiduciary duty
to patients.
As an additional alternative to mandating that PBMs and drug compa-
nies make their pricing information public, governments might be able to
achieve similar results by acting in their capacity as buyers. In this case, the
government entities would be borrowing a page from the federal procure-
ment book. For example, companies selling to federal defense agencies must
disclose a host of information on pricing in sole bidding circumstances. Un-
til 2013, the statute was known by the memorable acronym TINA (the Truth
in Negotiations Act), but it is now saddled with a far less memorable title,
the Truthful Cost or Pricing Data Act. 2 6 5 Commercial items such as drugs,
however, are exempt from this statute. 266
A state or federal government agency could promulgate a regulation
that, in the agency's capacity as a buyer of health insurance products, re-
quires full pricing information to be provided. Although such an approach
would mandate disclosure only when the government is a buyer, the govern-
ment is indeed a buyer in a wide swath of purchases. In this manner, govern-
ments would not have to mandate that drug company-PBM interactions be
revealed in all circumstances, yet a wealth of critical information would be
revealed. Thus, rather than flatly mandating transparency, the government
263 Express Scripts, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2017) (especially no. 13, "Seg-
ment information"). That line item would also include management fees that Express Scripts
received for administering networks that are reported on a net revenue basis. See Letter from
Bradley Phillips, supra note 259.
26 See, e.g., Chi. Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund v. Caremark, Inc., 474 F.3d
463, 477 (7th Cir. 2007); In re Express Scripts, Inc., Pharmacy Benefits Mgmt. Litig., No.
1672, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65168, at *18 (E.D. Mo., Sept. 13, 2006); Mulder v. PCS Health
Sys., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 450, 456-59 (D.N.J. 2006); N.Y. State Teamsters Council Health &
Hosp. Fund v. Centrus Pharmacy Solutions, 235 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). For a
discussion of these cases, along with the perspective that PBMs should not be held to a fiduci-
ary duty under ERISA, see Thomas P. O'Donell & Mark K. Fendler, Prescription or Proscrip-
tion? The General Failure of Attempts to Litigate and Legislate Against PBMs as
"Fiduciaries," and the Role of Market Forces Allowing PBMs to Contain Private-Sector Pre-
scription Drug Prices, 40 J. HEALTH L. 2 (2007). For a general description of ERISA, see U.S.
Dep't of Labor, Health Plans and Benefits: ERISA, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-
plans/erisa [https://perma.cc/N7GE-FKR4].
265 See 41 U.S.C. §§ 3501-09 (2018); Federal Acquisition Circular 2005-73, 79 Fed. Reg.
24191 (May 29, 2014).
266 41 U.S.C. § 3503.
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could accomplish much of the same result simply by virtue of its rights as
"little old buyer, me."
In short, when the direct route is not feasible, there are times when an
indirect route might get you there as well. In other words, governments
might follow the Al Capone example.
2. Reduce Concentration and Rethink Markets
a. The Shape of Markets. Rising prices and competition concerns
raise questions about the level of concentration in various levels of the drug
delivery chain. The PBM markets are dominated by three players who hold
up to eighty-five percent of the market with commercial insurers; PBMs
have merged with large pharmacy chains, along with purchasing specialty
pharmacies; and concentration has increased among generic drug manufac-
turers, in insurance markets, wholesalers, and in local hospital markets, al-
though not to the severe extent seen in the PBM market.267 In light of these
concerns, federal and state competition agencies should tread carefully when
it comes to approving merger and purchase requests from major players,
either at the same level of the distribution chain horizontally or between
players at different levels of the distribution chain vertically.
b. Market Power and Multiplicity Effects. In examining the markets
themselves, competition agencies would do well to focus on the potential
anticompetitive effects possible through the PBM contracting and incentive
structures described throughout this article. One does not need market domi-
nation in a particular drug to create these effects, and federal market penetra-
tion measures may fail to properly capture the effects of those behaviors. 268
267 See supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also E.R. Berndt et al., The Generic
Drug User Fee Amendments: An Economic Perspective, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 103, 103-41
(2017); see generally M. Aitken et al., Has the Era of Slow Growth for Prescription Drug
Spending Ended?, 35 HEALTH AFF. 1595 (2016); E.R. Berndt et al., The Landscape of US
Generic Prescription Drug Markets, NATL BUREAU OF EcON. RESEARCH (2017); Mark Dug-
gan et al., Providing Prescription Drug Coverage to the Elderly: America's Experiment with
Medicare Part D, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (2011); John Norton, Media Scrutiny of PBM Corpo-
rations Ratchets Up - Part Two, NCPA's BLOG - THE DOSE (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www
.ncpanet.org/newsroom/ncpa's-blog--the-dose/2016/04/07/media-scrutiny-of-pbm-corpora-
tions-ratchets-up-part-two [https://perma.cc/4PG9-UNUB] (noting that CVS pharmacy owns
Caremark PBM; that Rite Aid pharmacy, which Walgreens announced a purchase of in 2016,
owns the PBM EnvisionRx; and that Express Scripts PBM owns specialty pharmacies; and
several PBMs own smaller pharmacies); Thomas L. Greaney, Coping with Concentration, 36
HEALTH AFF. 1564, 1565 (2017); Lisa Ellis, Snapshot of the American Pharmaceutical Indus-
try, HARV. SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (July 14, 2016), https://www.hsph.harvard.edulecpe/snap-
shot-of-the-american-pharmaceutical-industry/ [https://perma.ccIH8DG-T2JD] (noting that a
few companies hold the majority of market share in the drug wholesale market in the US).
268 On the practice of anticompetitive tying, compare Suburban Mobile Homes v. AMFAC
Communities, 161 Cal. Rptr. 811, 817 (Ct. App. 1980) ("[W]e emphasize that the power over
the tying product (here, home sites) can be sufficient even though the power falls short of
dominance and even though the power exists only with respect to some buyers in the mar-
ket."), with Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 27 (1984) (holding that an
entity controlling 30 percent of a market does "not generate the kind of market power that
justifies condemnation of tying").
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This is particularly true in the context of deals that exploit volume across
multiple drugs. If competition measures focus only on the market power of
each individual drug in a company's stable, the power of overall volumes
and the multiplicity effects will be overlooked.
The varying ways of exerting power in pharmaceutical markets de-
scribed in the sections above should be a wake-up call to state and federal
regulatory agencies, whose definitions of market power should be updated to
take into account multiplicity effects. One can think of multiplicity effects as
the combined effects of different tactics or of the same tactic across a range
of products. For the purposes of antitrust actions, antitrust authorities will
consider actions that create or maintain the power to raise price or restrict
supply in a relevant market. 269 From that perspective, the definition of rele-
vant market is key.
During the 1990s era of federal government action against Microsoft,
the notion of relevant markets expanded to include the notion of nascent
markets. 270 Specifically, antitrust authorities recognized that an existing com-
pany might exert power, not just to threaten competitors in a current market,
but to prevent the creation of new markets that might threaten its domi-
nance. 271 In other words, measuring only existing markets allows actions that
can strangle the baby in its cradle, before a new technological or splinter
market ever struggles to its feet. Those are tremendously important ad-
vances, but in light of modern multiplicity effects, they are not enough.
This is not the first time that multiplicity effects in markets have
stymied antitrust concerns. In the context of patent trolling, courts and anti-
trust authorities do not have the tools for combatting the potential to affect
prices in one market by targeting companies across that market with a large
portfolio of patents that will be too expensive to fight off, even if most of the
patents are unrelated to that market and many of them are weak.
In a similar vein, one cannot fully measure the potential competitive
impact of agreements related to a particular drug and its substitutes without
looking at the full range of drugs and markets that might be leveraged
through that activity. In short, modern markets require development of mul-
269 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) ("[I]n defining relevant mar-
ket to be used in determining whether monopolization is present, Commission is not bound to
follow antitrust standards as strictly as courts must under Sherman and Clayton Acts; ultimate
objective of any criteria used is to delineate markets which conform to areas of effective
competition and to realities of competitive practice.")
270 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating an-
ticompetitive conduct may be inferred when exclusionary conduct is aimed at producers of
both nascent and established competitive technologies).
271 See id. ("[1]t would be inimical to the purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopo-
lists free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will particularly in indus-
tries marked by rapid technological advance and frequent paradigm shifts."); see also Findings
of Fact, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) at [
60 (noting that Microsoft recognizes nascent paradigms that could oust its position as a pri-
mary platform for applications development and user interface, especially in a market charac-
terized by rapid and dynamic shifts).
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tiplicity analyses that allow antitrust authorities to understand and measure
ripple effects, along with the complex effects of volume and bundling.
Competition agencies may also need to be sensitive to the potential for
hub-and-spokes structures, which can be understood, in general, as the fol-
lowing. Market competitors may not get together on price or other terms. In
a hub-and-spokes arrangement, middle parties can create the mechanism for
collusion among the competitors, enforcing agreements that have the effect
of maintaining price controls or blocking other, lower-priced competitors
from access that would harm the market power of the group. The middle
player is the hub, which connects all of the competitors arrayed around it on
spokes.
A cutting-edge area of concern within the consultant sphere is the po-
tential for collusion established through artificial intelligence (AI) programs.
Without Al, human analysts are likely to reach differing conclusions about
the precise behavior that would lead to optimal results-at least if there is no
collusion. Suppose, however, that Al programs have the ability to cycle
through the behavioral options in a complex, layered manner that consist-
ently reaches approximately the same results. Different entities could have
perfectly coordinated efforts, while pointing to the Al to say, "The computer
made me do it." How would one prove collusive intent in a circumstance
like that? The challenges of Al for planning behavior will require creative
rethinking of antitrust doctrines.
Finally, from a competition standpoint, the most interesting change on
the horizon may be arising within the market itself. Amazon, Berkshire
Hathaway, and J.P. Morgan have formed a new venture to disrupt the PBM
and pharmaceutical distribution system. Using their own businesses as a lab,
the trio hopes to develop ways of delivering health care to the more than one
million employees of their companies in a way that reduces the high prices,
administrative costs, and waste of the current system. When giants walk, the
earth trembles. The Amazon/Berkshire Hathaway/J.P. Morgan venture is a
market solution that has fascinating potential, assuming that the government
regulations favoring entrenched players do not get in the way.
Such horizontal collusion is at the core of forbidden behavior under
antitrust laws. Although that may not be the case with the drug industry,
when prices are rising dramatically and middle players hold significant
sway, one would want to observe carefully.
c. The Federal Trade Commission's Expanded Investigative Authority
Under Section 6(b). The powerful investigative authority under Federal
Trade Commission Act Section 6(b) could aid the design of any regulatory
or legislative change and help clarify changing market conditions. 2 72 The
FTC has longstanding authority to conduct broad economic studies and to
272 See Morton & Boller, supra note 1, at 38.
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issue reports and legislative recommendations based on findings. 273 A partic-
ularly valuable component of this authority is provided in § 6(b) of the FTC
Act, which allows the commission to demand reports and other information
from entities "whose business affects commerce." 2 7 4 This section provides
additional weight to the FTC's investigative powers, allowing the agency to
compel the disclosure of reports and other information under oath. 275 The
FTC has exercised this clout with varying frequency, and the expansive
breadth of this authority has been repeatedly confirmed by courts. 276
Considering the current circumstances of the drug pricing scheme,
where pharmaceutical manufacturers and PBMs negotiate private deals
shrouded in secrecy, the commission's authority to compel the production of
valuable reports, accurate market data, and information is particularly advan-
tageous. 2 7 7 Specifically, the language of § 6(b) grants the FTC a mandate to
extract "answers in writing to specific questions, furnishing to the commis-
sion such information as it may require"-this creates room for access to
secret negotiations potentially so confidential that they were never formally
recorded. 278 As evidenced by historic examples described below, there is a
substantial amount of progress that can be achieved through these
investigations.
273 See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, FED. TRADE COMMN, HISTORY OF SECTION 6 REPORT
- WRITING AT THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 6 (Apr. 1981) [hereinafter FTC HISTORY OF
SECTION 6 REPORT], https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/history-section-
6-report-writing-federal-trade-commission/23 1984.pdf [https://perma.ccIC3N5-DD2Z]
(describing the FTC's "investigatory and publicity powers" dating back to its establishment in
1914); see also Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 250,
313 (2013).
274 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2018). While Congress also has investigative authority and has
examined pharmaceutical pricing in the past, the FTC may be better suited for the task both
because of internal competition expertise and because of its relative insulation to the effects of
lobbying. See Michael D. Bopp & Delisa Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges for
Witnesses in Congressional Investigations, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 897, 905 (2012) (not-
ing "Congress's broad investigative authority"); see also STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE,
114TH CONG., THE PRICE OF SOVALDI AND ITS IMPACT ON THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM,
106-10 (Comm. Print 2015) (investigating the dramatic increase in prices for the commonly
used Hepatitis C drug, Sovaldi).
275 15 U.S.C. § 46(b).
276 See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950) (recognizing "the
authority of the Commission under § 6 to require special reports of corporations"); Appeal of
FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 595
F.2d 685, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (offering a broad interpretation of the "relevance" element of
an FTC request for information); F.T.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(describing the FTC's authority to "compel production of evidence 'from any place in the
United States, at any designated place of hearing'" and removing an "unwarranted" travel and
expense burden on the Commission).
277 See supra note 269 and accompanying text; 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (noting the FTC's au-
thority to "require" that entities "whose business affects commerce" provide "to the commis-
sion such information as it may require"). Regarding the question of whether such information
might be protected by trade secret, see text accompanying note 257 (explaining that academics
have cast doubt whether price and price term information constitute trade secrets under state
and federal law).
278 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (2018).
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Although rare, past FTC studies and reports resulting from § 6(b) in-
vestigations have not only increased transparency but have also prompted
new legislation. 279 An early FTC Task Force even remarked that the agency's
investigations were likely to have had "the most substantial impact and en-
during value" of all its endeavors. 28 0 For example, in 1977, the FTC used
data obtained directly from drug manufacturers to begin an impactful inves-
tigation of prescription drugs because "public source material was inade-
quate." 28 1 The commission also concluded that trademarked brand names
created the basis for monopoly power and had the potential to extend market
power beyond the life of an existing patent's protections. 28 2 In addition, the
FTC determined that state laws prohibiting the substitution of pharmaceuti-
cal products for prescribed trademarked products were barriers to competi-
tion. 283 The FTC's resulting report was used to comment on draft legislation
in the pharmaceutical industry28 4 and provided support for a model law that
would help generate savings to consumers of a maximum range of $400
million to $500 million annually in favorable market conditions, and that
was adopted almost verbatim in Maryland. 28 5 Finally, the FTC's study indi-
rectly contributed to the Supreme Court decision that overturned a state stat-
ute's limits against revealing and advertising retail drug prices.286
The FTC voted to initiate another extensive § 6(b) investigation into the
economic activities of approximately 25 non-practicing entities (NPEs) in
2013.287 NPEs are entities whose primary activity and business model entails
licensing and litigating patents as opposed to creating products. 288 Growing
prevalence of this lucrative business model brought increased public atten-
tion to the practice of patent trolling and consequently prompted responses
on the federal and state levels as well as in legislative, regulatory, and com-
mon law arenas. 28 9 The FTC's § 6(b) action served as one of several regula-
tory actions, along with White House-issued report and executive orders on
279 See FTC HISTORY OF SECTION 6 REPORT, supra note 273, at 2-7.
280 See id. at 2 (citing Stanley E. Boyle, Economic Reports and the Federal Trade
Comm'n: 50 Years' Experience, 24 FED. BAR J. 489, 493 (1964) (quoting FEDERAL TRADE
Comm'N, TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMM'N, app. N, at 127 (1949))).
281 See id. at 63.
282 See id.
283 See id. at 64.
284 See id. (citing the FDA Drug Regulation and Reform Act as an example).
285 See id. at 64 n.189.
286 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
758-62, 770-72 (1976).
287 See FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their Impact on Innovation,
Competition, FED. TRADE COMMN (Sept. 27, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2013/09/ftc-seeks-examine-patent-assertion-entities-their-impact [https://perma.cc/
EH5Z-FJ6Z].
288 Robin Feldman, The Pace of Change: Non-practicing Entities and the Shifting Legal
Landscape, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 635, 636 (2015).
289 See id. at 637, 642-43 (citing Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500
Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 58 (Fall 2013))
(noting that "of the top ten most frequent filers of patent litigation, all ten were non-practicing
entities).
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patent assertion, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's response to the ex-
ecutive orders, 29 0 and a workshop hosted by the FTC and the Department of
Justice examining the antitrust implications of NPEs in December 2012.291
Furthermore, § 6(b) authority was used as a tool to collect more complete
information for a potential policy response to patent assertion activities at a
critical moment: when cost-benefit analysis of the NPE business model was
limited at best and suspicion about its potentially adverse impacts on con-
sumers was steadily increasing. 29 2 The FTC was able to use this information
to propose recommendations for legislative and judicial reform to maximize
productive business behavior and minimize the effects of nuisance infringe-
ment litigation. 29 3
These examples suggest the great influence that FTC investigations can
have on future legislation.29 4 Beyond this potential, there are other upsides to
an FTC investigation-most notably increased transparency. An FTC inves-
tigation into these secret transactions would increase the amount of informa-
tion available for players besides Congress; academics, payors, and even
consumers would benefit greatly from accessibility to this information. 295
Other scholars supported FTC efforts imposing this authority to scrutinize
the pharmaceutical industry in an effort to mitigate skyrocketing drug
prices. 29 6
d. Ruthless Simplification. For those who like complexity, the system
of intellectual property rights for pharmaceuticals is a garden of delights.
From the Hatch-Waxman legislation through the Biologics Price Competi-
tion and Innovation Act of 2009 (the Biosimilars Act), to the maze of regula-
tory exclusivities and beyond, the judicial and regulatory processes
290 See id. at 642.
291 See Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio &
Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 773 (2014) (citing Press Release, Dep't
of Justice, Federal Trade Commission to Hold Workshop on Patent Assertion Entity Activities
(Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2012/289873.htm [https://
perma.cclKL5Y-V9T8]).
292 Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Opening Remarks at Computer &
Communications Industry Association and American Antitrust Intitute Program (June 20,
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publicstatements/competition-law-
patent-assertion-entities-what-antitrust-enforcers-can-doll30620paespeech.pdf [https://perma
.ccIT3JJ-G9YC].
293 FED. TRADE COMMN, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY, 8-13
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-
ftc-study/pl31203_patent assertion-entity-activity-an-ftc-study_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
85ML-VYWL].
294 See supra notes 279-293 and accompanying text.
295 See id.
296 See, e.g., Hemphill, supra note 8, at 643 (noting that the FTC is "well positioned" to
address game playing in the pharmaceutical industry as the agency "has general authority to
require firms to divulge confidential information"); see also William E. Kovacic, The Impor-
tance of History to the Design of Competition Policy Strategy: The Federal Trade Commission
and Intellectual Property, 30 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 319, 327-28 (2007) (describing FTC efforts
to use § 6(b) authority in the pharmaceutical industry).
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surrounding intellectual property rights for drugs are among the most com-
plex comers of our legal system.
Of course, some complexity in pharmaceuticals is inevitable. The intel-
lectual property rights systems for drugs must, of necessity, interact with
approval processes, and those approval processes must operate with exqui-
site awareness of public health and safety. These are heady responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the system has become so complex and convoluted that it
threatens to collapse in on itself.
And, of course, complexity breeds endless opportunities. 29 7 It ensures
that the legislators and regulators will always be at least a step behind in an
endless game of cat and mouse. Year after year, government actors must
attempt to block strategic behaviors that have developed even as the industry
develops new ones. 298 In such a process, it is clear that our incentives struc-
ture is badly misaligned with societal goals.
Putting the system back on track will require ruthless simplification. It
means stripping away the intricate details that are so appealing to those who
must forge compromises among interest groups, compromises that sow the
seeds of current and future strategic behavior. In short, what has become
business as usual for the pharmaceutical industry must become a thing of the
past.
The 180-day period of exclusivity for first-filing generics is a classic
example of a complexity that provides game-playing opportunities, one that
is ripe for simplification. It is an extremely complicated and intricate piece
of legislation. Unfortunately, the system has provided a method for generics
and branded pharmaceutical companies to form anticompetitive agreements
within which the generic agrees to stay off the market in exchange for some
form of payment.
A simplified approach, in which the six-month period of exclusivity
attaches only if the patent is actually invalidated, could reduce the game-
playing. Along the same lines, one scholar has suggested that governments
should reduce complexity by viewing any transfer of contemporaneous value
conferral as a payment. 299 Frankly-and although it is akin to heresy to sug-
gest this-one could argue that the entire first-filer exclusivity period should
be eliminated. There may be sufficient market opportunities for generics
without that incentive-particularly given the high price of branded
297 See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 165 (2012).
298 See, e.g., supra note 16 (describing the Paragraph IV first-filer exclusivity that encour-
ages generic companies to enter the market swiftly to challenge brand name drugs); see also
FELDMAN, supra note 297, at 143 (noting that the brand name companies cannot receive more
than one 30-month stay period on potential generic competitors); id. at 65 (noting that new
legislation "requires that citizen petitions with the potential to affect generic approval . . . be
considered within 150 days"); id. at 49-65 (describing examples of the complex second gener-
ation of pay-for-delay settlements, taking place even after courts try to shut down pay-for-
delay settlements of the first generation).
299 See Hemphill, supra note 8, at 686-88 (advancing the proposal and arguing that the
law should require firms to actually earn their exclusivity).
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pharmaceuticals-and the game-playing it has spawned may outweigh the
benefits of having such a system.
A broader tactic for simplification would involve taking a standards-
based approach instead of, or in addition to, a rules-based approach. The
goal with a standards-based approach would be look at the overall effect of a
behavior in an effort to thwart those who follow the letter of the law, but
manage to arrive at a destination that the law intends to forbid. Such an
approach can be useful when those being governed may be able to find loop-
holes to defeat governmental intent. The tax code's "step transaction" doc-
trine provides a classic example of a standards approach, allowing tax
authorities to collapse all steps of a transaction if the steps are part of an
overall plan to avoid taxation.300
Of course, a legal restriction packs a powerful punch only if authorities
are willing to wield that restriction. Consider citizen petitions filed at the
FDA for the purpose of delaying competitive entry. In an effort to limit the
impact of that type of behavior, Congress passed legislation providing that
the FDA must rule on a citizen petition within 150 days. 301 This is an exam-
ple of a rules-based solution to a problem. 302 In the same legislation, Con-
gress granted the FDA the ability to summarily deny a citizen petition if the
petition has "the primary purpose of delaying the approval of an applica-
tion." 303 An example of a standards-based approach, the summary denial
provision suffers from two problems. 304 First, the petition is toothless. At
worst, the sham tactic fails more quickly, and the company trying the tactic
moves onto another approach. Second, the FDA has yet to summarily deny a
single petition-and this despite empirical evidence that the majority of peti-
tions are filed as a last-ditch effort to hold off competition 305 and that almost
all petitions are denied. 306 A standard is useless if no one is willing to apply
it and if the results of its application are meaningless.
300 See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 144 (describing the step-transaction doc-
trine to advocate for more liberal use of standards-based approaches in the pharmaceutical
field).
301 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126
Stat. 993 (2012) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F) (2018)).
302 See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 144.
303 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E).
30 See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 144 (noting that proving "purpose," as
required in the citizen petition context, is a tricky affair; any time intent is involved, the gov-
ernment stands at a disadvantage; the accused party can always counter that it had a perfectly
legitimate idea in mind; thus, concepts such as "primary effect" could be more useful).
305 See Robin Feldman et al., Empirical Evidence of Drug Pricing Games: A Citizen's
Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39, 44 (2017).
306 See Michael Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and At-Last
Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 332-33, tab. 4 (2016) (finding that ninety-two percent of
citizen petitions filed by competitors against drug companies between 2011 and 2015 were
denied by the FDA); Michael Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study,
34 CARDOZo L. REV. 249, 249 (2012) (noting that eighty-one percent of citizen petitions filed
by competitors against drug companies between 2001 and 2010 were denied by the FDA).
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Although one tends to think of penalties in terms of dollars assessed to
a company, that need not be the case. Pharmaceutical companies can pay
hundreds of millions of dollars in fines and still find a tactic to have been
worth the cost. In 2015, pharmaceutical company Teva paid $1.2 billion in
FTC fines and class-action settlements regarding its pay-for-delay tactics to
block generic competitors of its narcolepsy drug Provigil. 307 Despite this
hefty bill, the company still profited from the delay to the tune of roughly $2
billion. 3 08
In addition to, or in the place of, fines, Congress or a regulatory agency
could provide that a misbehaving company will lose certain regulatory privi-
leges. The government also could impose penalties on the lawyers involved
in behaviors that violate the standards. For example, under the SEC's system
to deter fraudulent filings, the Enforcement Division can impose punishment
on the company making the filing, and the Litigation Division can suspend
the attorney from practice before the commission. 309 This could provide a
model for responding to bad behavior in the drug industry and could be
applied at either the state or federal level, depending on the level at which
the bad behavior occurs.
In short, a standards-based approach could make it more difficult for
companies to profit from sophisticated strategies designed to exploit com-
plex systems. Standards are useless, however, unless someone has the power
and the will to enforce them.
e. One and Done. A different approach to reform would be the "one
and done" approach, which this author has recommended in other places. 3 10
One and done is a regulatory approach where a drug would receive only one
exclusivity period over the life of the drug. The drug manufacturer could
determine which type of exclusivity on their drug, but knowing they could
not add any additional exclusivities. While one and done would be effective,
expanding judicial doctrines could be a more politically palatable solution.
One pathway could be to expand the judicially created doctrine that prevents
patent holders from what is known as "obviousness-type double patenting."
The doctrine is intended to prevent the approval of claims from a second
patent where the new claims are not clearly distinct from those of the first. In
theory, one could craft a sister doctrine to prevent secondary patents from
the perspective that the core of the invention is no more than the original
chemical formulation. Anything else is merely an obvious adaptation of
what was the core of the invention, modified with existing technology.
307 See FELDMAN & FRONDORF, supra note 8, at 47 (describing the Provigil cases).
308 See id.
309 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2020); see also Robin Feldman, Comment on the FDA
Notice: Administering the Hatch-Waxman Amendments: Ensuring a Balance between Innova-
tion Access; Public Meeting, REGULATIONS.GOV (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.regulations
.gov/document?D=FDA-2017-N-3615-0071 [https://perma.ccl442F-XGV2] (advocating us-
ing the SEC approach as a model for the FDA).
310 See Feldman, supra note 8, at 640.
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In designing this approach, one could borrow a page from the Supreme
Court's approach in the doctrine of patentable subject matter. That Court has
cast doubt on numerous patents by taking an expansive view of what falls
within the category of an unpatentable law of nature and then holding that:
[I]f a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process
reciting the law of nature, unless that process has additional fea-
tures that provide practical assurance that the process is more than
a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.311
In other words, the Supreme Court Justices took aim at patents in which
they felt that, putting aside what already exists in nature or elsewhere, there
is (as Gertrude Stein would say) "no more 'there' there."
The Justices established a two-part test in which one should first deter-
mine whether the patent is directed to one of the ineligible categories-ab-
stract ideas, natural phenomena, etc.-and then should look to see if the
patent has something more:
We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an
"inventive concept" - i.e., an element or combination of elements
that is "sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept]
itself." 312
The Supreme Court's "patentable subject matter" doctrine was greeted
by howls of protest, and it has been the subject of repeated attacks by the
patent bar and by the Federal Circuit, which has never been known for fealty
to the Court.313 The complaints have argued that the doctrine is confusing
and unworkable because it is impossible to pin down how a patent holder
can satisfy the Court's two-part test. That, indeed, may be the Court's point:
Its quartet of cases may have been intended to eliminate much, if not all, of
the types of patent considered in those cases. A similar type of doctrinal
development could be applied to the doctrine of obviousness-type double
patenting.
Of course, one could argue that many secondary patents are obvious
adaptations of the original invention and existing technology, and that, as
311 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012).
312 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014) (citing life science
case Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012)).
313 See Robin Feldman, Coming of Age for the Federal Circuit, 18 GREEN BAG 27, 30-33
(2014) (describing the history of struggles between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court). For modern Federal Circuit resistance against the Alice/Mayo two-part test for patenta-
ble subject matter, see, for example, Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 56 F. Supp.
3d 813 (E.D. Va. 2014) (opining that there is no workable definition of an abstract idea);
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (admonishing that
courts must be careful not to apply too high a level of abstraction and moving certain inquiries
from the second part of the test into the first, so that the second part of the test is never
reached).
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such, they should already fail on obviousness grounds anyway. Indeed, a
more vigorous and robust application of the current obviousness doctrine
could go a long way toward reducing behaviors such as a company piling on
additional patents. Either invigorating the doctrine of obviousness or ex-
panding the doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting could be accom-
plished through judicial or legislative changes. Promoting transparency,
reducing market concentration through reimagining markets and competitive
policy, utilizing the FTC's investigative authority, adopting simplified rules
and standards, and a one-and-done legal approach would all assist in reinvig-
orating a competitive health care marketplace while reincentivizing market
players to lower costs for consumers.
V. CONCLUSION
As John F. Kennedy explained, "the enemy of the truth is very often
not the lie-deliberate, contrived, and dishonest-but the myth-persistent,
persuasive and unrealistic." 3 14 Nowhere is the fog of myth greater than in the
drug industry. Despite all of the parties who should be primed to protect the
interests of patients and consumers, including PBMs, pharmacists, health in-
surers, hospitals, doctors, and patient advocacy groups, the incentive struc-
tures align strongly in favor of higher prices. The system not only creates
great pain for patients and taxpayers, it also provides convenient levers that
allow drug companies to carve out or reinforce competition-free zones.
Numerous small alterations have been, and will continue to be, pro-
posed. Although many may help in small ways, and such tinkering may be
all that is politically feasible, high drug prices and persistent pain for pa-
tients, governments, and taxpayers are unlikely to ease unless society can
fundamentally alter the perverse incentive structures at work. Ensuring that
markets are fair, transparent and competitive-in the manner described
above-could make great strides in altering the nature of the incentives at
work. At the end of the day, if we lack the political will to face the issues
head on, we will have ourselves to blame, as well.
314 See Norton, supra note 267 (using the Kennedy quotation in the context of questioning
whether PBMs are good financial stewards of prescription drug plans).
